

PERNAMBUCO AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE BRAZILIAN NATION-STATE, 1831-1850

By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ii
✓ ABSTRACT	v
INTRODUCTION	1
 CHAPTERS	
1 INDEPENDENCE, REFORM, AND REBELLION, 1831-1835	22
2 REACTION, 1836-1841	61
3 CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS, 1837-1847	84
4 "FOREIGNERS IN THEIR OWN LAND": POLITICAL PARTIES, POPULAR MOBILIZATION, AND THE PORTUGUESE	150
5 THE PRAIEIRA REVOLUTION, 1848-1850	183
CONCLUSION	248
SOURCES CITED	254
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	266

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This dissertation examines nation-building from the provincial perspective of Pernambuco, Brazil, in the period 1831-1850. The project rectifies the bias towards state-making as a uni-directional process of expansion from the center, by examining the dialectic between provincial and national politics and society. The work analyzes the impact of local power struggles, particularly popular mobilization and violence, on the development of national political institutions and practice in the early phases of nation building. In exploring the bases of unity and division among the elite, the work demonstrates that careful scrutiny of political behavior reveals tension between the impulse to compete for land, labor, prestige, and related control of state power and the need for elite unity in the face of the ever-present fear of social upheaval. The dissertation demonstrates that intra-elite conflict in the context of a weak central state ran such a risk of igniting larger social conflagrations that many of the very regional elites

that had succeeded in achieving considerable autonomy in the 1830s subsequently became the greatest proponents of centralization.

The work complements the traditional focus on familial and clientelistic networks with analysis of ideology. The dissertation challenges the prevailing interpretation of political parties, that they were mere vehicles for patronage, devoid of ideological content. The Praieira liberal party in Pernambuco, for example, made frequent appeals to the discontented urban lower classes on the basis of lusophobia. Anti-Portuguese appeals played on the belief that the large Portuguese presence in the economy, particularly in small-scale commerce, impeded Brazilians from gaining employment and undermined artisan production. The party's call for a nationalist development strategy demonstrated a sharp programmatic difference from the Conservatives. Willingness to appeal to the "dangerous classes" marked differences in attitudes towards democratic participation. The party's call for decentralization of national political institutions likewise challenged the political system constructed by Conservatives.

ideology

Appeal
on foreigners,
people of
color

separatism

(ideology or
patronage?)

INTRODUCTION

Historiography

The nature and role of the state is currently undergoing reassessment in Latin America and elsewhere. Such reassessment requires historical analysis of the origins of the relationship between the state and civil society. This study explores the impact of local political struggles on the development of national political institutions in the early phases of nation-building in Brazil. My focus is upon the Province of Pernambuco between 1831 and 1850, a period which encompasses both decentralizing, democratic reforms and subsequent consolidation under an authoritarian centralized regime. I have chosen Pernambuco because it combines considerable economic importance with both political instability (revolting against the central government in 1817, 1824, 1832-1836, and 1848) and political importance (with an unusually large number of prominent statesmen participating in the nation's construction). why
to (revol-)

Several developments have generated renewed interest in state and society relations in Latin America. The first was the rise of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes in the 1960s and the 1970s, because they appeared to increase state power sharply at the expense of civil society. For the Brazilian case, Peter Evans, in Dependent Development, explores the alliances that a powerful state can make with national and foreign actors.¹ The second, related to the newly increased power of the state, has been criticism of

¹ Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979).

governmental inefficiency and calls for a reduced state role in the economy. The third has arisen from the work of neo-Marxists such as Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas. These analysts observe that traditional Marxist literature de-emphasizes the state, treating it mainly as an instrument for class rule. They point out, however, that Marx qualified his analysis of the state as the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," allowing for cases in which no one class enjoys a dominant position in society or in which a parasitic bureaucracy develops. Their renewed attention to the state in advanced capitalist societies has coincided with a more general interest among academics, including some social historians, in bringing the state back into the analysis.²

State-making, whether in early modern Europe, former European colonies after the Second World War, or nineteenth-century Latin America, has often been characterized by violent resistance to centralization. Cohen, Brown, and Organski argue that violence is an integral part of the accumulation of power by the new national state.³ Charles Tilly's

² Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, Verso, 1978). The state has received considerable attention from Marxists for several decades now, but Miliband and Poulantzas have been particularly influential in Latin America. On the broader interest in the state among social scientists, see Peter Evans, Peter Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985). Two early calls for reincorporating politics into social history were issued by Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene Genovese, "The Political Crisis of Social History: A Marxian Perspective," Journal of Social History 10:2 (1976) and Tony Judt, "A Clown in Regal Purple: Social History and the Social Historians," History Workshop 7 (1979). Also, see William Taylor, "Between Global Process and Local Knowledge: An Enquiry into Early Latin American Social History, 1500-1900," in Olivier Zunz, ed., Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History (Chapel Hill: Duke Univ. Press, 1985). For a recent work that has taken up this call, see George Reid Andrews, Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1988 (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1991).

³ Youssef Cohen, Brian Brown, and A.F.K. Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of Statemaking: The Violent Creation of Order," American Political Science Review 75:4 (December, 1981).

work exemplifies a considerable body of literature that explores the institutional consequences of struggles between state-makers seeking extraction of resources and the populations that resist loss of local control.⁴ Examination of nineteenth-century Brazil suggests that such approaches, in focussing on resistance to extraction by the central government, have failed to identify a significant dynamic that can facilitate centralization--the need to maintain social control threatened by local conflict. I hypothesize that it was the very success of demands for provincial autonomy in the 1830s that, paradoxically, led to the definitive establishment of a highly centralized regime in the 1840s which could establish and maintain the social and political order. I argue that reforms that shifted control of influential offices from the Court to the provincial capitals and reforms that increased citizen participation, such as local election of powerful justices of the peace and instituting the jury system, ran significant risks of igniting larger social conflagrations. As a consequence, many of the very regional elites that had succeeded in achieving autonomy subsequently became, when threatened from below, the greatest proponents of centralization.

★
why 1830-43
w/lt
control

The seemingly paradoxical provincial assistance in building centralized state power suggests the need to reformulate Michael Mann's influential distinction between despotic and infrastructural state power.⁵ Mann sees despotic power in the range of actions which the state elite is empowered to undertake without need for routine negotiations with civil

⁴ Among Charles Tilly's abundant works, see especially The Contentious French (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), as well as Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990) and the influential volume he edited, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975).

⁵ Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results," in John Hall, ed., States in History (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

society. Infrastructural power is conceptualized as the capacity to penetrate civil society and implement political decisions throughout the realm. This distinction illuminates Brazil's First Reign (1822-1831) as a period of struggle over the Court's efforts to construct infrastructural capacity throughout the country and the Regency (1831-1840) as the abandonment of that effort. The first decade or so of the Second Reign (1840-1889) marks a period of renewed efforts to create infrastructural power, this time, crucially, with the active support of many leaders on the periphery who had been challenged by Regency social and political upheavals. I argue that the active role of some provincial leaders in helping to construct infrastructural power for the state suggests the need to refine Mann's conceptualization. State power ought to be seen not only as something wielded over civil society by a central, state elite, but potentially as an enabling power, which, by providing desired services, can increase the power of both the state and certain local groups in civil society.⁶

challenge
Mann's
colonization

Conceptualization of civil society in Brazil has long focused on informal structures based on kinship and patron-client networks. Tightly interwoven with formal institutions, an understanding of these informal structures is crucial to grasping the significance of the better documented and more easily observable formal institutions.

informal
& formal
networks

Family networks were crucial after independence, when the central government proved unable to consistently and successfully impose itself on the provinces. Political union with Portugal had been ruptured; the contours of a new political framework were hotly contested. Pernambuco, for example, was the scene of a struggle for an independent republic in 1817, and, again, in 1824. In the 1830s, various urban revolts

⁶ See John Hall's discussion of Mann's argument in "Introduction," Hall, States in History, esp. p. 16.

erupted, as well as the three-year Guerra dos Cabanos in the countryside.⁷

Governmental reforms changed relationships of authority; indeed, they contributed to the instability of the period. In this context, family groups were well positioned to pursue their goals without being forcefully restrained by the state.⁸

Richard Graham describes the family and household as the basic units of the polity. Reaching beyond the nuclear family, they encompassed a variety of people related by blood, marriage, and ritual kinship. A degree of ambiguity in the term is clear, in that others not thus related, such as a senhor de engenho's slaves and tenants, might be called "family" as well.⁹ Linda Lewin notes that in Paraíba "family" generally referred to the "extended family" or parentela. This large group included "maternal and paternal ascendants and lineal descendants of several generations," aunts, uncles, nephews, nieces, as well as others brought in by marriage, and fictive kin.¹⁰

⁷ Cabanos were shanties or shacks of the rural poor and, by extension, members of the rural poor who participated in this rebellion.

⁸ On the opportunities independence allowed family networks generally in Latin America and on the inverse relationship between the power of the state and that of families, see Diana Balmori, Stuart F. Voss, and Miles Wortman, Notable Family Networks in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 10, 23. Oliveira Viana, Populações Meridionais do Brasil: história, organização, psicologia (São Paulo: Monteiro Lobato, 1922). Here and below, Portuguese orthography in the citations reflects the usage in the works cited and will not necessarily conform to modern spelling and diacritical mark usage.

⁹ Graham, Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1990), 17, 20-21. Eul-Soo Pang observes that slaves and the free poor population dependent on a senhor de engenho often used his surname and wryly notes that the sexual access the senhor abused often fully justified this practice. See In Pursuit of Honor and Power: Noblemen of the Southern Cross in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1988), 77.

¹⁰ Linda Lewin, Politics and Parentela in Paraíba: A Case Study of Family-Based Oligarchy in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987), 129-131.

The father's firm control of his family was reinforced by laws that enhanced his authority. He rewarded loyalty with benevolence, protection, and access to resources. Insufficient loyalty could elicit harsh treatment. Extreme cases might even bring imprisonment or expulsion from the family.¹¹

Families formed advantageous alliances, especially through marriages. A political alliance could be cemented, for example, by two men marrying each other's sisters; especially tight bonds were formed if the marriage was between cousins. This strategic view of family can also be seen in the flexibility of recognizing kinship. There was "ample opportunity for asserting claims to membership in a range of families, since everyone could claim to belong to at least two parentelas."¹² Naming practices allowed great flexibility in recognizing and emphasizing kinship and could be manipulated to advance political interests.¹³

The family provided the resources necessary for political engagement; the personal connections inherent in family networks were crucial. Linda Lewin has observed that

[T]he parentela underlay the basis of a politician's network and political friends. From it he constructed the core of his personalistic following, a family-based group that organized and delivered his votes locally, defended his partisan interests in his

¹¹ Graham, Patronage and Politics, 17-23. Lewin cites refusal "to marry or exact vengeance, or to execute capricious demands" as grounds for expulsion. Lewin, Politics and Parentela, 133. For a detailed analysis of legal changes influencing the institution of the family, see Dain Borges, The Family in Bahia, Brazil, 1870-1945 (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992), chapter 4. The work is relevant to a longer period than the title suggests.

¹² Lewin, Politics and Parentela, 143.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 133-134, 149; Pang, In Pursuit of Honor, 76-77. Dain Borges provides a careful analysis of family strategies in Bahia. See Borges, The Family in Bahia, chapter 7.

home município, and served him loyally as officeholders or bureaucratic appointees.¹⁴

Analysis of nineteenth-century Brazil has traditionally emphasized the importance of family and other informal groups over formal political institutions. Indeed, political parties have long been seen as personalistic groups formed to capture the spoils of government.¹⁵ Many authors have assumed similarity in their class composition, outlook and interests and have dismissed whatever differences may have existed in their political ideas as of little importance. Emília Viotti da Costa, for example, has written that until the last decades of the Empire, "political struggle was really little else than a struggle for power between factions under the leadership of prestigious families."¹⁶ While party divisions and the absence of ideological commitments made for ministerial instability, it was of little significance. "As long as the elites agreed about the main policies to be followed the alternation of political parties did not make any fundamental difference."¹⁷ Likewise, Cáo Prado Júnior wrote that governments were differentiated by liberal and conservative labels, "without that variety of nomenclature having the slightest significance."¹⁸

da Costa:
ideol/par
just so
not in
posturing

Some analysts, however, have seen differences in the compositions and interests of the parties. In 1948, Afonso Arinos Melo Franco wrote of agrarian interests in the

¹⁴ Lewin, Politics and Parentela, 127. Lewin's main interest is in a later period, but her discussion applies here as well. Graham, Patronage and Politics, 18.

¹⁵ Variations on this view are common in discussions of today's parties as well.

¹⁶ Emília Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 70-71.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 70.

¹⁸ Cáo Prado Júnior, Evolução Política do Brasil e Outros Estudos (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1963), 81.

Conservative party and urban interests and magistrates in the Liberal party. In contrast, Raymundo Faoro wrote of the Conservative Party as a bastion of a bureaucratic estate, and the Liberal Party as representing agrarian interests opposed to a strong central state. All these analyses share a lack of any firm documentary evidence for their conclusions. The understandings of political parties seem to speak more to varying conceptualizations of nineteenth-century society than to a careful sifting of evidence. Faoro, for example, sees a centuries long battle between an expanding bureaucratic estate and civil society, and projects that battle onto the political parties.¹⁹

José Murilo de Carvalho has written the most carefully documented analysis of the composition of the political parties. He concludes that public functionaries, mainly magistrates, were more heavily represented in the Conservative Party, while the Liberal Party attracted more of the liberal professions. Rural landowners were represented evenly in both parties, but the Conservatives had the allegiance of more landowners in-export-oriented areas and ones of the oldest colonization, while the Liberals were supported by landowners with internal markets. There were merchants in each party, but the wealthiest tended to be Conservative. Thus, Conservatives were strong in Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Pernambuco, where foreign trade made for powerful merchants with a less provincial view of politics, and where, in the three largest cities of the empire, preoccupation with order was greatest. Individuals with higher education and administrative training were also concentrated there, due to the strong economies or

¹⁹ Raymundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder: Formação do patronato político brasileiro 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Globo, 1987); Afonso Arinos Melo Franco, História e Teoria do Partido Político no Direito Constitucional Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro, 1948). For summaries of other works that touch on these issues, see José Murilo de Carvalho, A Construção da Ordem: A elite política imperial (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus, 1980), 155-157 and Ilmar Rohloff de Mattos, O Tempo Saquarema: A Formação do Estado Imperial (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 1990), pp. 130-132, notes 84-85.

importance as administrative centers in the colonial period. Conservative cadres from these areas supported and carried out policies of state centralization. Liberals were strongest in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul, where links with foreign trade were weaker, there were fewer individuals with higher education and where opposition to centralization had been greatest. The weakness of Murilo de Carvalho's study is that it analyzes only party members who served as government ministers: its conclusions refer only to the party elite. Thus, unless one accepts an assumption that the party elite faithfully reflects the membership of the entire party, the composition of the imperial political parties in terms of class and occupation remains an open question.²⁰

class based interests
logical jump

Richard Graham has provided the most powerful argument for viewing parties as devoid of ideological content and any significant differentiation. Graham believes that emphasizing struggles over policies is to misunderstand nineteenth-century politics. Politics was not fundamentally about government policies; rather, politicians were concerned, above all, with patronage. In particular, patronage was the building block which allowed leading landowners to solidify their power locally and thus deliver votes for candidates for national office. The Deputies could then aid their local patrons to expand their clientele and power by securing government posts for them from cabinet ministries, in exchange for political support in Parliament.²¹

Graham - no ideology

In its focus on patronage, politics was not, first and foremost, about policies, but about reinforcing values that undergird stability. The wealthy used government positions

²⁰ Murilo de Carvalho, A Construção da Ordem, chapter 8. In fairness to the author, no one has found a documentary base for a broader study that would encompass a cross section of the parties and it is questionable whether sufficient data exists. See Murilo de Carvalho's appendix, "Algumas observações sobre fontes de dados biográficas," 185-189.

²¹ Graham, Patronage and Politics, pp. 71-100.

not for "adopting this or that policy, tax law, tariff regulation, or labor act, but as an influence on concepts of the good and true, of properly deferential behavior within a hierarchical social structure, of loyalty to one's patron and care towards one's clients."²² Politicians' preoccupation with patronage "legitimized the existing social structure . . . Politics indeed worked to that end, but not solely or even principally through the pursuit of particular government policies. Rather the goal was reached through an entire style of life and practice."²³ The purpose of political action was based on two fundamental notions. First, "that all social relations consisted in an exchange of protection for loyalty [and that] recalcitrance merited punishment. Second, virtually every institution served to stress the social hierarchy, insisting that for every individual there was a very particular place . . ."²⁴ The mobility of the free but landless rural poor, people with a will of their own, made effective social control imperative.²⁵

Elections were frequent events in which many participated. They "were, first of all, elaborate dramatic performances that insistently reiterated the conviction that the only proper basis of social organization lay in a clear recognition of everyone's social superiority or inferiority."²⁶ Beyond their symbolic function, elections also worked to provide the government with support from the most powerful members of society. Elections did not serve primarily for voters to select winning candidates, for there was little doubt about this, since whichever faction controlled the electoral board that

²² Ibid., 4-5.

²³ Ibid., 7.

²⁴ Ibid., 23-24.

²⁵ Ibid., 4-7, 32-31.

²⁶ Ibid., 120-121 for the quotation. On elections as theater, pp. 101-121.

supervised the elections was likely to win. Rather, they served as a testing ground, in which challengers to the dominant faction attempted to demonstrate their power through force or its threat. Successful challenges resulted in objections to fraud being recorded in the electoral minutes. Challengers who demonstrated their strength would likely be recognized by the government and allowed some government posts. Thus, through frequent tests of power and appropriate government responses, the government stayed in touch with the balance of power in villages throughout the empire.²⁷

Graham depicts a system in which power simultaneously flowed down from the cabinet through the Provincial President and up from the powerful landowners through the Provincial President. Deputies to the Parliament found themselves at the intersection of these two planes of power, needing the support of each. Candidates appealed not to individual voters for support, but to electors or their patrons, as well as to the Cabinet. Local factions sought to be recognized as the most powerful, and thus deserving of government patronage. The Cabinet, in turn, supported the group perceived as the most powerful.²⁸

Nowhere in this scheme do political ideas, ideology, or policies figure prominently. For Graham, personal ties determined political groups, not questions of party or ideology. Parties were merely loose affiliations of deputies, without any commitment to particular policies. Indeed, some individuals switched parties and parties failed to consistently pursue distinctive programs.²⁹

²⁷ Ibid., 122-145.

²⁸ Graham, Patronage and Politics, pp. 146-181.

²⁹ Ibid., 122-145, 169-170. Graham qualifies his argument slightly. He recognizes that some deputies who were out of power might take somewhat more doctrinaire

(continued...)

The prevailing interpretation of political parties, that they were mere vehicles for patronage, devoid of ideological content, appears open to question. Pernambuco provides evidence not only for important differences between elite political conceptions, but also for meaningful party differences over programs and willingness to mobilize the lower classes for political struggle. The Praieira liberal party in Pernambuco, for example, made frequent appeals to the discontented urban lower classes on the basis of lusophobia.³⁰ Anti-Portuguese appeals played on the belief that the large Portuguese presence in the economy, particularly in small-scale commerce, impeded Brazilians from gaining employment and undermined artisan production. The party's call for nationalization of retail commerce demonstrated a sharp programmatic difference from the Conservatives, as well as a dramatic contrast in willingness to appeal to the "dangerous classes." Anti-Portuguese riots, particularly two days of mayhem in June of 1848, provide considerable support for this analysis, as does the large-scale mobilization of the urban and rural poor for the last great regional rebellion of the Monarchy, the Praieira Revolution of 1848.

Challenger
liberal
ideology
in Pern.

(...continued)

positions and that urban voters began to identify with particular political positions. He sees that landowners in regions more recently settled, who lacked ties to powerful politicians, might favor greater provincial autonomy. Yet he minimizes the importance of these qualifications. Cities were few. Elections were won in the countryside--only there could local potentates marshal large blocs of voters. Despite what minor differences might exist, deputies shared a common social background and the crucial issues they dealt with were the patronage of local bosses. Even issues which might seem crucial to modern readers, such as taxes and distribution of revenues, did not supersede the local leaders' concern with securing appointments. Ibid., 169-171, 176-181.

³⁰ The praieiros, who took their name from the Rua da Praia (Beach Street), where their party newspaper was published, were the local, Pernambuco allies of the Liberal party in Rio. On the Liberals, especially in Rio, see Thomas Flory, Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil, 1808-1871: Social Control and Political Stability in the New State (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981) and Roderick Barman, Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798-1852 (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1988).

Rio
liberals

In exploring the bases of unity and division among the elite, I argue that careful scrutiny of political behavior reveals tension between the impulse to compete for land, labor, prestige, and related control of state power, and the need for elite unity in the face of ever-present fear of social upheaval in a society profoundly divided by race and slavery. Having examined the political conflict of the period, I have come to emphasize the ideological significance of the rift between liberals and conservatives. I hypothesize that ideological differences in part corresponded to a conflict between older entrenched families and the newer planter families that challenged them. I propose that rising groups combined a strategic view of liberalism with a commitment to democratic intellectual currents flowing from the United States and England. These intellectual currents, however, in a fluid period of experimentation in developing new political institutions and practice, offered such promise that they attracted individuals from other groups as well. I further hypothesize that the clash of liberals and conservatives can be read, in part, as a crucially important ideological debate over the propriety of inclusion of the middle and predominantly Afro-Brazilian lower classes in intra-elite conflict. I propose that the great political violence of the period profoundly influenced discourse on race, politics, and political institutions, leaving a legacy of pessimism concerning the possibility of democratic participation.

Argument

inclusion
of
(SPM republicans?)violence
exclusion
(re: S?)

The Setting

The varied geographical conditions of Pernambuco have long been recognized as a key to understanding how Pernambucans have ordered their society. Since early colonial days, sugar has been grown for export in the coastal zona da mata, or forest area. Stretching the 225 kilometers from the northern border with Paraíba to Alagoas in the

south, comprising sixteen percent of the province, it is here that the bulk of the population has lived since Portuguese settlement in the 1530s. In contrast, the sertão, or *backland*, occupies well over half of Pernambuco's total area, yet has always supported only a small population. These harsh, dry scrublands served most importantly for raising cattle for the coastal sugar industry. Between the two lies a varied transitional zone, the agreste, resembling the sertão here, the coastal zona da mata there. Commercial hubs such as Caruaru developed in the agreste, linking the cattle raising interior with the sugar producing coast.³¹

The humid zona da mata, extending from the Borborema Plateau to the coast, with rich black massapê soils, rainy and dry seasons and perennial rivers, was early recognized as ideal for growing sugar cane. It was here that Duarte Coelho established the first successful sugar mills in Brazil, in the 1530s. The southern half of the forest zone, roughly that south of Recife, presents superior conditions for cultivating sugar cane, particularly its greater rainfall, 2,500 mm in some places, and larger and more regular rivers. The flood plains adjacent to these large rivers with soils moistened and enriched with humus left by river overflow were the most productive areas. By the nineteenth century, the greatest estates were located around Cabo, between the Jaboatão and Serinhaem Rivers, estates with 100 to 150 slaves and huge, two story houses for the estate owners. In the drier mata north of Recife there were fewer of the great estates like those in Cabo. Rainfall here rarely exceeds 2,000 mm a year, and is considerably less in

³¹ Manuel Correia de Andrade, The Land and People of Northeast Brazil (Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1980), provides a detailed statement on the geography of the region in chapter 2; Peter L. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco: Modernization Without Change, 1840-1910 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1974), 121-123; Nancy Priscilla Naro, "Brazil's 1848: The Praiera Revolt" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1980), 11-12.

many places, especially farther from the coast. On lands not suitable for cane, squatters or slaves might plant beans, manioc, or fruit. In some places sugar cane shared the landscape with cotton fields, large and small, though cotton was more important in the transitional agreste, to which the zona da mata gives way here within ninety kilometers of the coast north of Recife, and 160 kilometers in places to the south.³²

The agreste, a drier area sometimes struck by drought, supported a sparser population. Still, though scattered among the drier lands, were some brejos, elevated areas with cooler temperatures moistened by wet winds year round, niches providing pockets of denser settlement. The bulk of the province's cotton was produced in the agreste, on a variety of scales, from large land holdings worked by numerous slaves, to small plots worked by renters and sharecroppers. The far smaller labor and capital requirements, shorter growing cycle, as well as the practice of planting beans and maize alongside the cotton, made even small-scale farms feasible. Cattle raising was also important. Commercial centers such as Caruaru, a key point in the cattle route from the backlands to the coast, and Bom Jardim, important in the cotton trade, developed.³³

The hot, dry sertão, an enormous area not infrequently struck by drought, was, and continues to be, thinly populated. The region's settlers spread over the area, grazing cattle for the coastal sugar industry, with its need for beasts of burden for mill work and transportation, as well as for meat. Extensive grazing and massive ranches, only vaguely

³² Correia de Andrade, Land and People, 10-12, 73, 76; Marcus Joaquim Maciel de Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion in Pernambuco (Brazil), 1821-1835" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1989), 22; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 12; on massapê, see *Ibid.*, note 4, pp. 14-15 and Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry, 36, 123.

³³ Correia de Andrade, Land and People, 18, note 16 p. 224, 118; Carvalho; Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 21; Henry Koster, Travels in Brazil (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1966), 98, 169-170.

demarcated, were the norm; ten hectares were needed for each head of cattle.³⁴ Corrals were often established near large rivers. Cowboys were central figures in the "leather civilization" that developed, as hides were put to multiple and ingenious uses. Their demanding physical labor was rewarded with a share of the cattle and horses raised, a share cowboys sometimes enlarged, in light of oversight by absentee owners in distant cities. The cowboys also raised sheep, pigs, and goats on their own near their small mud dwellings. Great cattle drives were common sights, transporting cattle to commercial hubs in the agreste, and on to the coast, or to more humid areas in the sertão during the driest times.³⁵

Serif
w
cattle
drives

Rivers provided relief from the region's dry spells, as did the elevated areas touched by moisture laden winds. A few areas, such as Triunfo at the peak of the Serra da Baixa Verde, were sufficiently humid to grow sugar cane for local use and subsistence crops such as beans and maize. More common was cotton farming, which was established in the late eighteenth century and expanded greatly in the early nineteenth century. Some of the cotton was processed for slaves' clothing, while some was exported to Great Britain. The Pajeu Valley figured prominently in this latter trade. In the 1840s coffee was introduced to the more elevated, humid areas of the agreste and sertão.³⁶

cotton

coffee
(cane)

From the pioneering efforts in the mid-sixteenth century into the twentieth century, sugar production was Pernambuco's leading economic activity. Long after the mid

³⁴ Indicative of the approximate nature of measurements and boundaries in the region was Koster's observation that sertanejos speak of large leagues, small leagues, and nothing leagues, all of varying and approximate size, though none smaller than four miles. Koster, Travels in Brazil, in Brazil, 42.

³⁵ Correia de Andrade, Land and People, 144-147, 157-159; Koster, Travels in Brazil, 65, 69, 72.

³⁶ Correia de Andrade, Land and People, 149-153.

seventeenth-century decline from the apogee of the colonial sugar cycle, long past the rise of coffee in south-central Brazil in the 1830s as the country's leading export, growing and processing cane and transporting and exporting sugar overshadowed other activities in Pernambuco. Sugar supplied the foundation for the planter elite, with its control of land and rural labor, and was the basis for fortunes made in Recife by merchants, often Portuguese born, who loaned capital to planters, exported their sugar, and imported goods and slaves for their use.³⁷

By the nineteenth century the zona da mata was mostly occupied. The bulk of the best lands were controlled by a relatively small number of families, many of whom had acquired land through the generous land grants made by the Crown in the colonial period. Initially as large as four square leagues, by the early nineteenth century royal grants usually measured one square league. Smaller estates spread across the countryside as well, organized in a similar manner. Only a fraction of a planter's lands, perhaps a fifth, grew cane at any given time. The remaining land was held for its potential value. Boundaries between land holdings were often vague and many held lands without titles. De facto control of land was assured by the threat or the use of force and through political influence.³⁸

Senhores de engenho employed forty or fifty slaves, or 100 to 150 on large plantations, or even 300 on the very largest, to carry out the arduous work of cane

³⁷ Eisenberg, Sugar Industry, 14-16.

³⁸ Eisenberg, Sugar Industry, 6-7, 126-127, 129-131; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 18; T. Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institutions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1972), 257-282 offers an extensive discussion on indeterminate property boundaries.

growing, harvesting, processing and transporting.³⁹ In the early nineteenth century Koster wrote of forty slaves (in addition to free laborers) as sufficient. Whatever the number, it was a labor-intensive business. Gangs of slave field workers equipped with hoes broke the ground, planted cane, and weeded the fields over the twelve to fifteen months after planting the first harvest. Slaves used machetes and brush hooks to cut the cane, bundled it and sent it to the mills in carts or on horses or mules. New cane grew from the stubble within a year, and not until the quality had diminished by the fourth year were the stalks cut down and left to nourish the soil.⁴⁰

The cane was processed much as it was in other sugar growing regions of the world, except that nineteenth-century Brazilians were slower to adopt innovations than their counterparts elsewhere.⁴¹ Large iron covered wooden rollers crushed the cane to extract the juice. By 1854 a large majority of mills still employed horses, oxen or mules to turn levers attached to the roller axles, though some took advantage of rivers, using water wheels to power their mills. Not until the 1870s would a significant number invest in steam-driven machinery.⁴²

labor method

Water was evaporated from the juice in a series of boiling kettles, to which the sugar master added clarifying agents and subsequently skimmed off the impurities which rose to the surface. Straining further removed impurities. The juice then cooled and

³⁹ Eisenberg, Sugar Industry, 146, cites averages of 55, 20, and 70 from surveys in 1842, 1854 and 1857. The second figure, being so far out of line with the others, seems questionable.

⁴⁰ Eisenberg, Sugar Industry, 34-36; Koster, Travels in Brazil, 161-163.

⁴¹ Eisenberg attributes this to the relatively low costs of land and labor, low profit margins, a faltering and uncertain world market for sugar, and high tariffs on imports. Sugar Industry, 41-48.

⁴² Eisenberg, Sugar Industry, 37-38; Koster, Travels in Brazil, 164-5.

crystallized for four to five days in conical clay pots; more water was removed by purging over the next week, as water and clay sprinkled on top of the sugar worked its way through to the bottom. After three weeks of drying in the sun, the final product was ready--a dry loaf of sugar, white at the top and brown at the bottom.⁴³

Rivers or the ocean allowed the cheapest transportation. Barcaças, sailing vessels capable of carrying twenty-five- to fifty-ton loads were preferred, but even the far smaller and accident-prone jangadas might be used.⁴⁴ For those without access to water transport, oxcarts loaded with a ton to a ton and a half of sugar, and drawn by six to twelve oxen, made a plodding substitute. Mules and horses were packed with sixty to eighty pound sacks on each flank. The poor quality of the roads, which were often barely passable after rains (especially over hills), kept overland freight rates high.⁴⁵

Sugar loaves and cotton were brought to warehouses in the Bairro do Recife. This commercial district, the oldest of Recife's three sections, housed the customs house and sugar-inspection buildings. Here ships loaded and unloaded, protected from rough seas outside the harbor by the wall of reef (recife) which gave the city its name. Old brick,

⁴³ Eisenberg, Sugar Industry, 38-39 and p. xiii, note 2, for citations to publications on sugar in various other provinces; Koster, Travels in Brazil, 165-166. The classic work on sugar is Noel Deerr, The History of Sugar, 2 vol. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1949-1950). For colonial Brazil, see Stuart Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550-1835 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For comparison, see Manuel Moreno Fraginals, The Sugarmill: The Socio-Economic Complex of Sugar in Cuba, 1760-1860 (New York: Monthly Review press, 1976); J. H. Galloway, The Sugar Cane Industry: An Historical Geography from its Origin to 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Sidney Mintz Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Penguin Books, 1986).

⁴⁴ On jangadas, see Koster, Travels in Brazil, and L. F. Tollenare, Notas Dominicais (Recife: Estado de Pernambuco, Secretaria de Educação e Cultura, Departamento de Cultura), 17-18.

⁴⁵ Eisenberg, Sugar Industry, 50-52; Koster, Travels in Brazil, 28.

three- and four-story buildings lined narrow, twisting streets, housing larger commercial establishments and their warehouses, insurance companies, foreign consuls, small shops, bars, and the coffee house in which merchants carried out transactions. People resided in smaller structures along these paved streets as well. A crowded hustle and bustle continued from morning until late afternoon. A French observer noted the "continuous movement of blacks coming and going, carrying bundles, picking up their spirits with simple, monotonous song" into which were mixed cries of Afro-Brazilian women selling cloth and other wares which they carried in baskets on their heads.⁴⁶ Upon arrival, an English traveller was also struck by "the very circumstance of seeing a population consisting chiefly of individuals of a dark color," and, like the Frenchman, commented on "[t]heir hideous noise when carrying any load."⁴⁷

Three miles to the north of the Bairro do Recife sat Olinda, the site of the first European settlement in the area, built upon hills that allowed a spectacular view. A thin sandy isthmus, upon which the Brum and Buraco forts were built, linked the two. Canoes were often the preferred means of traversing the distance. In the other direction, one could leave the commercial district by crossing a bridge into the Bairro de Santo

⁴⁶ Tollenare, *Notas Dominicais*, 20.

⁴⁷ Koster, *Travels in Brazil*, 4 for the quotation, 4-6 for his description of the Bairro do Recife. For Tollenare's initial description of Recife, see *Notas Dominicais*, 20-23. Other descriptions of Recife are collected in Mário Souto Maior and Leonardo Dantas Silva, eds., *O Recife: Quatro Séculos de sua Paisagem* (Recife: Editora Massangana, 1992). Antônio Pedro de Figueiredo provided a detailed description in 1857, pp. 169-192; Daniel Kidder and James Cooley's *Brazil and the Brazilians portrayed in historical and descriptive sketches, based on travels in the latter 1830s and early 1840s*, is excerpted, see pp. 149-158; Charles Darwin seems to have been in ill humor during his 1836 visit and offers a consistently pessimistic assessment of Recife, though he was clearly impressed by the safe anchorage provided by the reefs, pp. 165-166. Figueira de Mello, *Ensaio Sobre a Estatística Civil e Política da Província de Pernambuco* (Recife: M. F. de Faria, 1852) provides abundant information.

Antônio. This island neighborhood between the Bairro do Recife and the Bairro da Boa Vista was separated from the former by the Beberibe River and the latter by the Capibaribe River. The principal government buildings, such as the Presidential Palace, the Treasury Building, and the prison were located here. There was also much commercial activity here as well, but it was retail sales, unlike the large-scale merchant activities across the Beberibe River in the Bairro do Recife. Crossing a bridge to Boa Vista, one stepped back onto the land mass. While the oldest section, near the river, held tall buildings housing retail commerce, by and large it was a residential area. It quickly shaded into the countryside, with country homes surrounded by gardens.⁴⁸

Recife's population was rapidly growing in the period under study. A systematic study published at mid-century, using figures from the 1840s, estimated the number of the city's inhabitants between 60,000 and 70,000, out of a provincial population of 644,000. Sixty-five percent of Pernambuco's population was of at least partly African descent, reaching nearly seventy percent in Recife. In the province as a whole, some twenty-three percent of the population were slaves, while in Recife the number reached twenty-six percent.⁴⁹ The residents of the capital thus comprised only a fraction of the entire provincial population, but they exercised greater influence on politics than their numbers alone would suggest. Let us see how as we turn our attention now to politics in the early 1830s.

Demographics

very folk
turn
show

⁴⁸ Koster, Travels in Brazil, 6-7; Tollenare, Notas Dominicais, 18-19, 21-23; Figueiredo, "O Recife," excerpted in Souto Maior and Dantas Silva, eds., O Recife: Quatro Séculos, 179-192 and Kidder Brazil and the Brazilians, excerpted, *Ibid.*, 154-155.

⁴⁹ Population figures vary substantially. See Figueira de Melo, Ensaio sobre a Estatística, 265-283, and "5º MAPA ESTATÍSTICO DA POPULAÇÃO DA PROVÍNCIA DE PERNAMBUCO..." and "6º MAPA ESTATÍSTICO DA POPULAÇÃO DA COMARCA DO RECIFE..." in the appendixes.

CHAPTER 1 INDEPENDENCE, REFORM, AND REBELLION, 1831-1835

Brazil achieved political independence from Portugal in 1822, in a movement led by the Portuguese monarch's son, Dom Pedro I. In this chapter we will see that Pedro's subsequent abdication opened the way for far-reaching liberal reforms that restructured political authority. A series of revolts in Pernambuco, however, staged by various groups with diverse goals, raised doubts about the optimistic assumptions that intellectually undergirded the reform efforts. They suggested that without traditional, central political authority, the social order was open to profound challenge.

*Pernambuco - the scary
aftermath of liberal reform*

April 7, 1831 marked the completion of Brazilian independence from Portuguese tutelage. Formal independence had been achieved in 1822, but a Portuguese prince rose to the Brazilian throne. Dom Pedro I, surrounded by Portuguese advisors, sought to impose his will, yet many were resentful of centuries of colonial rule from Lisbon. The familiar institution of the monarchy enjoyed broad support, particularly as a means of ensuring social stability. Yet Dom Pedro's autocratic ways, exemplified by his forceful dismissal of a Constituent Assembly and subsequent unilateral promulgation of the Constitution of 1824, did not sit well with many. This fundamental conflict played out in frequent clashes between the Emperor and Brazil's political representatives, especially in the Chamber of Deputies, throughout the 1820s. A disastrous military campaign in the

Banda Oriental, where military defeat led to the creation of Uruguay, as well as rioting by foreign mercenary soldiers in the streets of Rio de Janeiro, only worsened matters. Inflation, fueled by poorly handled state finances, as well as easily counterfeited copper coins, added to urban discontent. Unable to rule as he wished, unwilling to accept the limits on his powers the Chamber of Deputies sought to impose, Dom Pedro abdicated in favor of his son and left for Portugal, to battle for his daughter Maria da Gloria's claim to the Portuguese throne.¹

Abdication came as a shock.² Brazilians, or at least those who were politically active, were, like the citizens of any newly independent country, abruptly forced to confront basic political questions. The first decision was made immediately by the Chamber. To the great disappointment of radicals (exaltados), who had played so prominent a role in opposing Dom Pedro, the dream of a republic went unrealized. The Chamber of Deputies maintained the Monarchy, appointing a provisional three-man regency to rule in place of the six-year old heir to the throne, Dom Pedro II.³

¹ On the abdication as the completion of independence, see "Comunicado," Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 6, 1831, pp. 860-861, especially, "If the independence of Brazil was a vain title. . . . It became a reality on April 7 of the current year 1831." See Neill Macaulay, Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798 - 1834 (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1986), ch.5 and ch.7 for a detailed study of the period focusing on Dom Pedro; Roderick Barman, Brazil: The Forging of a Nation (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1989), 130-160; Leslie Bethell and José Murilo de Carvalho, "1822-1850," in Brazil: Empire and Republic, 1822 - 1930, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), 49-58; Paulo Pereira de Castro, "'A Experiência Republicana', 1831-1840," pp. 9-11 in História Geral da Civilização Brasileira. Tomo II. O Brasil Monárquico 2º Volume. Dispersão e Unidade, eds. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda and Pedro Moacyr Campos (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1985).

² Joaquim Nabuco, Um Estadista do Imperio: Nabuco de Araújo. Sua Vida, Suas Opiniões. Sua Época. Tomo Primeiro. 1813-1857 (Rio de Janeiro: H. Garnier, 1898), 29-30.

³ Exaltado could be rendered as extreme or radical liberal, zealot, or hothead.

(continued...)

Fundamental questions on the nature of political authority and on viable political institutions that could ensure stability and progress would be debated and struggled over throughout the Regency (1831-1840).⁴

The early years of the Regency saw dramatic institutional changes. Key liberal reforms involved decentralizing power from the Court to provincial capitals and involving citizens to a greater degree in the political process, particularly through locally elected officials with broad powers. In part, these reforms were a strategic response to the fear of a restoration attempt by Dom Pedro and his allies in Brazil, the caramurus, or, as they were commonly referred to in Pernambuco, colunas.⁵ More fundamental, however, was an earnest commitment to institutional change based on localism as the

(...continued)

Exaltados sought federalism and, in many cases, a republic. Unlike most other politically-active groups, they often resorted to action in the streets. Exaltados published many newspapers, normally employing fiery language, that often lasted only short runs. Their nativism appealed especially to artisans. Antônio Borges da Fonseca was a leading exaltado in Pernambuco. On exaltado publications, see Luis do Nascimento, História da Imprensa de Pernambuco, 1821-1954 (Recife: Imprensa Universitária Federal de Pernambuco, 1968), vol. 2, Diários do Recife, 1828-1900 and vol. 4, Periódicos do Recife, 1821-1850; Helio Vianna, Contribuição à História da Imprensa Brasileira (1812-1869) (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1945); Nelson Werneck Sodré, História da Imprensa no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966).

Exaltados
PPPS

⁴ Nabuco, commenting on the disillusionment of the radicals, notes Theóphilo Ottoni's characterization of their experience as a journée des dupes. Nabuco, Estadista, 27-28. See Theóphilo Ottoni, Circular dedicada aos Srs. Eleitores pela Província de Minas Gerais (São Paulo: Estabelecimento Graphico Irmãos Ferraz, 1930), 19; Pereira de Castro, "A Experiência Republicana," 11-13; Barman, Brazil, 160-162.

⁵ Ottoni asserted that without fear of restoration the key liberal reform, the Additional Act, would not have passed. Ottoni, Circular, 40-41. Nabuco, Estadista, 31, and Barman, Brazil, 176-178, agree. Thomas Flory, Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil, 1808-1871: Social Control and Political Stability in the New State (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press), 66, makes the same argument for the passage of the 1832 Criminal and Procedural Code.

means of securing a stable, progressive nation in which individuals could freely pursue their own goals.⁶

Portugal had exercised colonial rule in large part through its legal system, with judges defending the interests of the Crown throughout the realm. Criticism of this system, which the new country inherited with independence, and which now served the emperor in Rio de Janeiro, was widespread. Routine complaints included its cost, inefficiency, and delays. Many voices denounced corruption and corporate spirit among the magistracy. It was this system to which reformers first turned their attention.⁷

The 1832 Criminal and Procedural Code was based on the notion that localism would facilitate a more democratic and responsive system. Elections at the county level would bring to office men who enjoyed local support, who had an interest in local stability and who would not be agents of the central government in Rio de Janeiro. Judicial independence would strike the sharpest blow against the legal system founded on colonial rule. A new judicial organization based on local participation displaced the professional magistracy and jury trials were instituted.⁸

judicial
revolution

⁶ For a comparative perspective on federalism and utilitarianism in Latin America, see David Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1954); Simon Collier, Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808-1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967); Charles Hale, Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968); Paul Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Post-Independence Peru (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989); Frank Safford, "Bases of Political Alignment in Early Republican Spanish America," in Richard Graham and Peter H. Smith, eds., New Approaches to Latin American History (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1974).

⁷ Flory, Judge and Jury, 31-43.

⁸ Raymundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder: Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Globo, 1987), 305-307; Flory, Judge and Jury, 33-34 on localism and the contrast to the Portuguese colonial system's attempts to isolate judges from local influences. On this latter subject, see Stuart Schwartz, Sovereignty and Society in

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The 1832 Code established elected justices of the peace as the linchpin of the criminal justice system. This position, which did not require a law degree, combined judicial and police functions. A justice of the peace could arrest subjects in any jurisdiction, assemble evidence and bring charges in all court proceedings, and try lesser crimes. The justice of the peace also exerted great influence over local elections. He served with the parish priest and president of the county council on the electoral boards that judged credentials to vote, and counted the votes. He could also influence voters directly through his right to authorize conscription and his ability to dispense favors.⁹

Localism also informed other judicial reforms. County councils presented triplicate lists of nominees for the new position of county judge and for district attorneys to the provincial president. The former did not need law degrees, and were, to a large extent, assistants to the district judges.

The 1832 Criminal Code also instituted citizen juries. From the lists of electors, sixty jurors were randomly chosen.¹⁰ Twice a year, or up to six times in large cities such as Recife, grand juries and juries to judge guilt were assembled. Professional district judges were thus reduced to presiding over trials and deciding only the punishments for those found guilty by the juries. Individual rights were further protected by the right of habeas corpus.¹¹

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Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and Its Judges, 1609-1751 (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1971).

⁹ Bethell and Carvalho, "1822-1850," 64; Flory, Judge and Jury, 49-68; Faoro, Os Donos do Poder, 306-307.

¹⁰ The basic qualification was an annual income of 200 milreis.

¹¹ Bethell and Carvalho, "1822-1850," 64; Flory, Judge and Jury, 112, 115-119; Faoro, (continued...)

Reform of the 1824 Constitution provided the arena for the most important of liberal reforms. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies battled for three years, as fundamental reforms to overhaul the political system were debated. Moderado (moderate liberal) proponents of far-reaching reforms to reduce the Emperor's prerogatives, eliminate the Senate, or at least its life-time appointments, and shift power to the provinces were consistently blocked by the Senate. In July of 1832 the frustrated minister of justice, Diego Antônio Feijó, led a coup attempt with the support of the regents, the ministry and the majority of the Chamber. The minister planned that, with the armed backing of the National Guard, the Chamber would declare itself a National Convention and pass sweeping reforms, codified in a new constitution. A dramatic and powerful appeal to constitutional process by mineiro representative Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão on the floor of the Chamber, however, weakened the plotters' will. The coup attempt failed, with significant long-term consequences. Feijó's willingness to dismiss legality raised an ugly specter for men who prized order. It encouraged the drift of many moderados towards more conservative stances. It also increased personal bitterness and animosity towards Feijó, a fact that later weakened him when he served as Regent.¹²

In the short run, however, even a failed coup attempt revealed the depth of desire for reform. The following day, the Senate approved a measure to allow the next

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Os Donos do Poder, 306.

¹² Aurelino Leal, Do Ato Adicional a Maioridade (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1978), 16-23; Faoro, Os Donos do Poder, 304-305; Barman, Brazil, 172-175; Octávio Tarquínio de Sousa wrote the classic account of the attempted coup in História de Dois Golpes de Estado (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1939). The new constitution was referred to as the "Pouso Alegre Constitution."

legislature to reform the Constitution. Within several months the Criminal and Procedural Code was passed. In 1834, Dom Pedro triumphed in securing the Portuguese crown for his daughter, increasing expectation of a restorationist attempt in Brazil. This strengthened the hand of those who sought to decentralize power, as doing so would avoid the possibility of a coup in Rio de Janeiro that could seize the locus of institutional power. With this added threat, compromise was reached and the Additional Act of 1834 passed.¹³

Liberals struggling against the legacy of absolutism failed in attempts to abolish the Senate, a bulwark of absolutism, or its life-time appointments, and provincial presidents continued to be appointed from Rio de Janeiro. Nor did the reformers manage to eliminate the Emperor's extensive prerogatives under the constitution's "moderating power," which Frei Caneca, the eloquent leader shot for his role in Pernambuco's separatist rebellion in 1824, had termed the "master key for oppression of the Brazilian nation and the strongest garrote of peoples' liberty."¹⁴ In the Additional Act, they did, however, manage to suspend this power during the Regency. Liberals also succeeded in abolishing the Council of State, an influential policy-making group and advisory body that assisted the Emperor, and was a bastion of support for the absolutist tradition.¹⁵

¹³ Barman, Brazil, 175-177; Faoro, Os Donos do Poder, 22-23.

¹⁴ Cited in Faoro, Os Donos do Poder, 305.

¹⁵ Following the French publicist Benjamin Constant, the Constitution of 1824 invested the Emperor not only with executive authority, but also with the "moderating power," a fourth branch of government. This power enabled the Emperor to oversee the other branches of government and, for example, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and make appointments to the Senate. On the Council, see José Murilo de Carvalho, Teatro de Sombras: A Política Imperial (São Paulo: Vértice and Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Universitário de Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro, 1988), 107-138; José Honório Rodrigues, O Conselho do Estado, o Quinto Poder? (Brasília: Centro Gráfico do Senado Federal, 1978) (continued...)

Liberals firmed up the position of regent, replacing the three-man regency with a single regent, now chosen by the provincial electors. The moderado leader Antônio Diego Feijó was elected to the post in 1835. The decisive victory, however, was obtained in delegating considerable powers to the provincial assemblies that replaced the weak provincial general councils.¹⁶

Provincial assemblies were authorized to legislate concerning the civil, judicial, and ecclesiastical structure of the provinces; public education, expropriations for the public good; municipal police; county and provincial taxes and expenditures; the creation and elimination of, and appointment to, provincial and county posts; public works; charitable organizations; and the provincial president's authority to appoint and dismiss provincial employees. The Additional Act at the same time established limits to the province's broad powers. Provincial and county taxes were not to be prejudicial to national taxes, nor were import taxes allowed. Provinces could not legislate to the detriment of the interests of their provinces. Provincial presidents continued to be named from the Court.¹⁷

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and Lydia Magalhães Nunes, "In Pursuit of Order: A Study in Brazilian Centralization, the Section of the Empire of the Council of State, 1842-1889" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins Univ., 1988).

¹⁶ Paulino José Soares de Sousa, Estudos práticos sobre a administração das províncias no Brasil, pelo Visconde do Uruguay. Primeira parte. Ato Adicional. (Rio de Janeiro: B. L. Garnier, 1865); Aurelino Leal provides a detailed study of the Additional Act in part one, "História Constitucional," of Do Ato Adicional a Maioridade, 23-40; Barman, Brazil, 177-178; Bethell and Carvalho, "1822-1850," 64-65; Faoro, Os Donos do Poder, 306-310; Flory, Judge and Jury, 90, 158-159; Jeffrey Needell, "Brasilien 1830-1889"; João Camillo de Oliveira Torres, A Democracia Coroada: Teoria Política do Império do Brasil (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes Limitada, 1964), 435-440.

¹⁷For the text of the Additional Act, see José Antônio Pimenta Bueno's classic commentary on the constitution, Direito Público Brasileiro e Análise da Constituição do

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Liberal reforms succeeded in undermining rule from Rio de Janeiro, rule associated with absolutism and colonial subjugation. The dependent magistracy that Portuguese rulers, and subsequently Dom Pedro, had relied on saw its power significantly weakened as elected judicial officials gained new powers. The locus of state power shifted decisively towards the provinces, where provincial assemblies exercised broad authority. Yet would localism and increased citizen participation succeed in Brazil? There were high expectations that such liberal institutions from Europe and especially the United States would bring about progressive changes. Popular handbooks and newspaper articles explained the new institutions and suggested paths to responsible citizenship. Optimistic images of Brazil, emphasizing its vast potential and common interests in progress, offered an intellectual foundation for liberal reforms. Yet there were doubters from the start. Those who dissented tended not to see harmony in Brazilian social relations, but diversity, conflict, and danger.¹⁸

Disorder and conflict marked the Regency from its inception. After all, it was the sight of several thousand people gathered in the national capital, including most of the military units there, and the prospect of violence, that had prompted Dom Pedro to abdicate. When word of events in the Court reached the provinces, uprisings erupted in

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Imperio (Rio de Janeiro: Ministro da Justiça e Negocios Interiores, 1958), 506-512, esp. 507-509. Oliveria Torres also makes it available in A Democracia Coroada, 497-501, esp. pp. 498-499; Barman, Brazil, 177-178. Thomas Flory argues that since some of the powers granted to the Provincial Assemblies had previously been located not in the Court, but in municipalities, the Act was actually the first hesitant step away from decentralization. Flory, Judge and Jury, 158-159.

¹⁸ Flory, Judge and Jury, 17-30, on the importance of the liberals' optimism over the country's common interests and potential for the intellectual foundation of the reforms.

various locales.¹⁹ Our concern here, of course, is what transpired in Pernambuco. News of the abdication reached Recife on May 4, where it was greeted with celebrations, fireworks and frequent vivas. Seizing the opportunity, Captain Francisco Ignacio Roma led forty to fifty military men to Olinda, where they were joined by other soldiers and officers, as well as Law School students. They sent a petition requesting the dismissal of fourteen army officers and public employees "well known for their anti-national and openly absolutist behavior and opinions."²⁰ The list of Portuguese and their Brazilian-born absolutist allies to be dismissed included the commander of arms, Bento José Lamenha Lins; the military commander, Lieutenant Colonel Francisco José Martins; and Captain Major Domingo Lourenço Tórres Galindo, all of whom had played prominent roles in putting down the 1824 Confederation of the Equator, as well as two magistrates on the High Court of Appeals and commanders of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Army Battalions.²¹ Two days of riots in Recife strengthened the bargaining position of those making demands in Olinda. The General Council acted with urgency, accepting the

Abdication-
stable
for term
to
break
away?

¹⁹ Silverio Candido Faria, "Breve Noticia dos felizes acontecimentos politicos no Rio de Janeiro nos dias 6 e 7 de abril de 1831," BNRJ/SM, 32, 6, 24, fol. 26-79; Macaulay, Dom Pedro, 250-251; Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho, "1822-1850," pp. 58-59.

²⁰ BNRJ/SM, II 32,44,47 for the petition demanding dismissal of Portuguese-born and names of those to be dismissed.

²¹ The Confederation of the Equator was a short-lived attempt at creating an independent republic.

demands, and thus defusing the tense situation.²² Far more dramatic, however, would be events in September of 1831.

Military troops provided the most significant armed force in the province. Paradoxically, however, these forces, crucial for social control, were also a source of considerable turmoil. Forcibly recruited for lengthy terms of service, poorly paid, and subject to harsh discipline, soldiers were quick to desert or rebel. It was the most vulnerable among the generally Afro-Brazilian poor, those without powerful patrons to protect them, who were arrested, in order to recruit them for military service. Lack of discipline thus reflected not only problems specific to service in the military, but discontent among the poor generally.²³

volatile
soldiers
- similar to
other
soldiers

Brigadier General Francisco de Paula Vasconcellos, the commander of arms in Pernambuco, was keenly aware of the unreliability of the troops. Salaries were a particularly sore point with the soldiers. Not only was the salary quite small at 126 milreis a day, but it was routinely late, often many months in arrears.²⁴ Compounding matters was the widespread counterfeiting of copper coins, the currency in which soldiers

²² "Acta da Sessão extraordinária do Conselho Geral do Governo de 6 de Maio de 1831, presidida pelo Ex^{mo}. S^r. Presidente Joaquim José Pinheiro de Vasconcellos", Francisco Augusto Pereira da Costa, Anais Pernambucanos: 1824-1833, Vol. 9 (Recife: FUNDARPE, 1983), 392; BNRJ/SM, II 32, 44, 47; Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 192-194; Manuel Correia de Andrade, Movimentos Nativistas em Pernambuco: Setembrizada e Novembrada (Recife: Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 1971), 54-60.

²³ Graham, Patronage and Politics, 27-31; Michael Mc Beth, "The Brazilian Recruit during the First Empire: Slave or Soldier?" in Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville: Florida International University, 1977) ed. Dauril Alden, 71-86; Correia de Andrade, Movimentos Nativistas, 75-77.

²⁴ Correia de Andrade, Movimentos Nativistas, 77. Official correspondence of the period is full of requests to pay back salaries.

were paid, that led many merchants to refuse payment in coin.²⁵ The commander of arms pushed for prompt payment of salaries, but the issue was outside his control. He also tried to reduce wasteful use of military funds, terminating contracts of suppliers who failed to adequately meet their obligations and eliminating payments to officers no longer on active duty.²⁶

At the same time, Vasconcellos insisted on strict discipline, and was not averse to the common practice of corporal punishment to enforce it. It was the commander of arms' efforts to impose discipline which sparked a military rebellion on the night of September 14, 1831. Brigadier General Vasconcellos' recent order to lock the gates to the barracks and carry out inspection of the troops at eight o'clock PM, the same time as a curfew imposed on slaves a month before, was deeply resented, and, combined with indignation over the corporal punishments inflicted on several soldiers that afternoon, proved unbearable.²⁷ controls
backfire

At nine o'clock, soldiers of the Fourteenth Battalion from Rio de Janeiro, stationed in Santo Antônio, began shouting against the commander of arms. Notified, he quickly arrived at the barracks, only to be met with gunshots. Brigadier General Vasconcellos immediately sent his adjunct to the Thirteenth Battalion barracks to summon help, and set

²⁵ In September alone, the government discovered two counterfeiting operations. In an attempt to limit access to necessary materials, the government prohibited the sale of sheets of copper. Correia de Andrade, Movimentos Nativistas, 77.

²⁶ "Correspondencia," signed Caheté, Diário de Pernambuco, October 4, 1831, pp. 854-855; Mário Márcio de Almeida Santos, "A Septembrizada," Clio: Revista do Curso de mestrado em História 5 (1982) p. 177.

²⁷ "Comunicado: Nota sobre a rebelião do 14 do corrente," signed D. M., Diário de Pernambuco, September 30, 1831, pp. 841-842; On corporal punishment, see "Narração Official dos Acontecimentos da Provincia de Pernambuco nos Dias 14, 15, e 16 de Setembro," Revista do Instituto Arqueológico e Geográfico de Pernambuco 10, no. 56 (1902), 79; On the slave curfew, see Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 204-205.

off himself for the Presidential Palace. The rebellion, however, spread too quickly to be contained. Some rebels immediately went to the Campo de Erário, where artillery troops needed little convincing to join the revolt. When they rose up, they brought artillery pieces with them. Troops broke into the Laboratório, an arms deposit, and seized more weapons and ammunition, setting fire to the building afterwards. Soon troops throughout Recife had defied their superiors and were running rampant. Rebellious soldiers were shooting wildly, looting stores and taverns, calling for death to the commander of arms, an end to corporal punishment and crying out against the Portuguese. Prisoners were freed from jails. Some slaves and some of the urban poor joined in the looting. By eleven o'clock, another arms deposit, the Trem, was broken into and its arms distributed. The ever present fear of anarchy, so often a subtext in the political discourse of the period, was being realized.²⁸

military
revelts
- not as
clear genl
in rebellion
slave
revelts

That evening, the commander of arms went to the Cinco Pontas fort to gather troops and exhort civilians to arm themselves and help regain control of the city. With only twenty policemen and civilians at his command, however, he opted to withdraw to Afogados district on the city's outskirts to gather forces, mobilizing a military unit there, as well as alerting nearby militia units and sending a justice of the peace to gather civilians. The next day Commander Vasconcelos returned with these forces, augmented

²⁸ President of Pernambuco to Minister of Empire, Recife, Sept. 20, 1831, BNRJ/SM, II-32,34,51, no.1, fol. 1-6; Commander of Arms to President of Pernambuco, Recife, Sept. 20, 1831, printed in the Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 23, 1831, 821-823; Commander of the 13th Battalion to Commander of Arms, Sept. 23, 1831 printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 12, 1831, pp. 881-882; Captain in Charge (capitão mandante) of the 4th Artillery Corps to Commander of Arms, Sept. 22, 1831 printed in Diário de Pernambuco Oct. 1, 1831, pp. 845-848 and Oct. 3, 1831, pp. 849-851; Bússola da Liberdade, Sept. 21, 1831, pp. 127-129 provides a narrative that follows closely the Sept. 20 report of the Commander of Arms to the President of the Province; "Narração Oficial," p. 80 refers to "scum and slaves" joining in the looting.

by soldiers who claimed to be opposed to the rebellion, to the Cinco Pontas fort. There, soldiers left the fort and fraternized with Vasconcellos' men. With cries of "traitors," and "death to the colunas," the soldiers turned on Vasconcellos and the other officers and civilians there, firing on them. After being chased to Afogados, the commander of arms retreated from the city entirely, marching to the district of Boa Viagem. From there he sent messengers to gather militia troops in the interior of the province and collect gun powder and lead. Francisco Ignacio Ribeiro Roma was sent to Cabo and his brother João Ignacio Ribeiro Roma to Casa Forte to gather army battalions. By mid day on September 16, the commander of arms, with 100 cavalry, 200 infantry and additional civilian volunteers was ready to enter the fray again.²⁹

The intendant of the Navy, Lieutenant Captain Antônio Pedro de Carvalho, attempted to impede the spread of the rebellion to the Bairro do Recife. When the rebellion broke out in Bairro do Santo Antônio, Carvalho was worried by the large crowd that gathered at the Arco da Conceição, by the bridge linking the Bairro do Recife with Santo Antônio. He went to the Arsenal, gathered a few troops and had the justice of the peace gather civilians. He sought to cut off contact with the disorder by using axes to make unpassable the bridge linking Santo Antônio with the Arco da Conceição in the Bairro do Recife. The civilians strongly opposed this, however, and prevailed by claiming the disturbances were simply arguments among soldiers and were not serious. Despite the intendant's requests, they simply dispersed.³⁰

²⁹ Commander of Arms to President of Pernambuco, Sept. 20, 1831, Diário de Pernambuco, Nov. 8, 1831, pp. 965-967.

³⁰ Intendant of Navy to President of Pernambuco, Sept. 20, 1835, printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 28, 1831, 838-839.

baptists
revolt

Navy v.
Army
(liberalism vs. conservatism)

On the fifteenth, when looting spread to the Bairro do Recife, the intendant managed to gather civilians from Fora de Portas. Seventy volunteers from Olinda, including fifty students from the Law Faculty there, added to the police and Arsenal Guard at his command. After setting out to impede further looting, however, about forty of the police and Arsenal Guard rebelled, turning on the intendant. The remainder of his force quickly dispersed under fire. The law students regrouped and went to the Fortaleza do Brum, only to discover that the soldiers there had rebelled when their officers began firing on rioters on the bridge to the Bairro do Recife. Led by the intendant, however, the law students managed to take back the fort when the rebellious soldiers abandoned it to join the assault on the Armazem de Intendencia and seize more artillery pieces. On the sixteenth, the intendant ordered the war schooner Rio da Prata to fire on the barricades in the Arco da Conceição. Once they were demolished, order was soon reestablished in the Bairro de Recife.³¹

By the afternoon of the sixteenth, the bulk of the rebels were concentrated, along with their artillery pieces, in the Bairro de Santo Antônio, near the Palácio Velho. The groups attempting to reestablish order converged there. João Ignacio Ribeiro Roma brought eighty to a hundred men gathered in Casa Forte. Militia Colonel Francisco Jacinto Pereira, who had entered Santo Antônio the night before but had been expelled when some of the soldiers he brought turned on him, brought his force of three to four hundred men from Olinda. The students and other civilians in the Fortaleza do Brum joined in, as did various civilians from the Bairro do Recife, who had gathered on the

³¹ Intendant of the Navy to President of Pernambuco, Sept. 20, 1831, printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 28, 1831, pp. 838-839; President of Pernambuco to Minister of Empire, Recife, Sept. 20, 1831, BNRJ/SM, II-32,34,51,no.1, fol. 1-6; Captain in Charge of the 4th Artillery Corps to President of Pernambuco, Sept. 22, 1831, printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 1, 1831, pp. 845-848 and Oct. 3, 1831, pp. 849-851.

bridge linking the bairro to Santo Antônio. When the rebels opened fire at two o'clock, Colonel Francisco Jacinto's men and the civilians from Recife led the attack and the rebels were soon defeated. The revolt was over.³²

This series of events, called the Setembrizada, demonstrated the precarious nature of social and political order. Even the most important repressive force, the military, was itself a source of instability. Contemporary observers were quick to point out the inherent risks in forced recruiting of the poor. The Sociedade Harmonizadora, a moderate liberal group, noted the dangers of relying on "those cohorts of mercenaries often pulled from prisons to which they had been sent for their immoral acts."³³ A letter to a newspaper characterized forced recruits as "[e]xtracted from the most vile and most corrupt class of society . . . (with) all the attendant vices and crimes of an entirely brutal education and without the slightest honor or virtue."³⁴ Forcibly seized, poorly fed and clothed, paid little and late, and punished severely, the armed men of the marginal poor had proven their unreliability.

In the aftermath of the rebellion, Pernambucan authorities briefly relied on troops from other provinces to guard prisoners and law students consented to man forts for

³² President of Pernambuco to Minister of the Empire, Recife, Sept. 20, 1831, BNRJ/SM, II-32,34,51, no.1, fols.1-6; "Narração Oficial," pp. 80; Olindense, Sept. 20, 1831, lengthy excerpts of which appear in Helio Vianna, Contribuição à História da Imprensa, p. 52.

³³ Sociedade Patriótica Harmonizadora to President of Pernambuco, Sept.22, 1831, printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 5, 1831, p. 855. This organization, like the Sociedade Defensora da Liberdade e Independência Nacional in other provinces, was an instrument of moderate liberals, opposed to both restorationism and radicalism, and supportive of constitutional legality as the surest means to maintain order.

³⁴ "Comunicado: nota sobre a rebelião de 14 do corrente," signed D. M., Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 30, 1831, pp. 840-840 (misabeled in the original, should read 841-843).

several months.³⁵ The ranks of the Municipal Guards were raised to five hundred.³⁶ The measures taken by the justice of the peace of Santo Antônio reveal great anxiety. He prohibited dancing in the streets by slaves during the festival of Our Lady of the Rosary. He further instructed police to prohibit gatherings of any kind, shouting in the streets, batuques of Afro-Brazilians, and any incidents in which individuals incited others to anger, whether by showing a lack of respect, by drunken behavior or by throwing stones.³⁷ Efforts to retrieve the arms stolen or distributed to civilians putting down the rebellion met with little success.³⁸ The Diário de Pernambuco suggested diminishing the size of the army, dispersing soldiers in the countryside to perform agricultural labor, and replacing it with a small, well-paid army composed of property-owning citizens.³⁹ The paper thus anticipated reforms recently passed in the Court (but news of which had apparently not yet arrived in Pernambuco) which reduced the size of the army and created a citizens' militia. This liberal institution, the National Guard, was composed of

³⁵ José Octávio, "Septembrizada e Novembrada - Fontes de Irradiação Nordestina," in Movimentos Populares no Nordeste no Período Regencial (Recife: Massangana, 1989) ed. Manoel Correia de Andrade, 54, on troops from Ceará manning prisons in Recife. See the letter of Sept. 19, 1831 signed by 193 law students, offering to serve to help keep order, Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 26, 1831.

³⁶ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 213.

³⁷ Edital from the Justice of the Peace of Santo Antonio, Oct. 1, 1831, printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 3, 1831, p. 851; "Circular. Instruções para os Delegados do Bairro de S. Antonio do Recife," Oct. 1, 1831, printed in *Ibid.*, pp. 851-852. Batuque refers to a gathering in which Afro-Brazilians, especially slaves, drank and danced, accompanied by percussion instruments.

³⁸ Edital from the President of Pernambuco Oct. 3, 1831, printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 5, 1831, p. 856.

³⁹ "Comunicado," Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 26, 1831, pp. 829-831.

propertied citizens, and was designed to maintain order and carry out various police functions.⁴⁰

The reports of the provincial president, commander of arms, and several military leaders, as well as journalistic accounts, emphasized the spontaneous nature of the uprising, denying any political connotation.⁴¹ The provincial president declared to the minister of the empire that it had "no political character." He reported that "[i]t was not possible to deal with rebels, who, armed, and spread across the entire city in groups, demanded nothing and did not have a leader." He also noted that there was no attempt to seize the Presidential Palace, nor any attempt on his life.⁴² There seems to have been little effort to organize an effective rebel defense.⁴³ Indeed, many of the rioters abandoned themselves to drinking and the pleasures of houses of prostitution. Many of the stolen goods were subsequently found in brothels.⁴⁴ Nor were any officers inciting

⁴⁰ On the National Guard, see Jeanne Berrance de Castro, A milícia cidadã, a Guarda Nacional de 1831 a 1850 (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1977) and Fernando Uriceochea, Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1980).

⁴¹ The United States Consul dissented from this view, reporting that the insurrection was premeditated, but that its goals were unknown. Consul John Mansfield to Secretary of State, Oct. 2, 1831. Despatches from the United States Consuls in Pernambuco, 1817-1906, T-344 roll 1 (hereafter consul reports are cited as Consul (name) to Secretary of State, date, index number, and roll).

⁴² President of Pernambuco to Minister of the Empire, Recife, Sept. 20, 1831, BNRJ/SM II 32, 34, 51, no. 1, fols. 1-6; Commander of 13th Battalion to Commander of Arms, Sept. 23, 1831, printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 12, 1831, pp. 881-882; "Narração Oficial," p. 79; Commander of Arms to President of Pernambuco, Sept. 20, 1831.

⁴³ Almeida Santos, "A Setembrobrizada," Clio: Revista do Curso de mestrado em História 5 (1982), 170, 183.

⁴⁴ "Olindense," Sept. 26, 1831 [published in Olinda] in Vianna, Contribuição à História da Imprensa, 52.

the men to riot. Numerous reports had soldiers consistently expelling officers from their midst. The commander of the 13th Battalion, for example, reported that his troops were furious in their insistence that they would not accept orders from him, nor any other officers.⁴⁵

why then?

Harsh discipline was generally invoked as the cause. The major exception was the half-hearted suggestion by the Diario de Pernambuco two weeks afterwards, that it may have been the result of a restorationist conspiracy. The paper noted that a few people asserted that fireworks had gone off just before the outburst, possibly as a signal to begin the rebellion. The paper asked rhetorically why the restorationists would not sow disorder to open the way for Pedro's return. The Diario de Pernambuco also suggested that troop disorders in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Bahia may have been similarly motivated.⁴⁶ By the journalistic standards of the day, however, such an effort lacked conviction. Nor was any evidence presented. Nor did leading officials and military officers, including the commander of arms, a noted sympathizer of the extreme liberals and a proponent of federalism, report evidence, or make charges, of such a conspiracy. Moreover, the greatest losses were suffered by the small businesses dominated by the Portuguese--the thirty-three stores and twenty-one taverns looted in Santo Antônio, the

inventing
a restorationist
conspiracy

⁴⁵ Commander of the 13th Battalion to Commander of Arms, Sept. 23, 1831, printed in Diario de Pernambuco, Oct. 12, 1831, pp. 881-882; President of Pernambuco to Minister of the Empire, Sept. 20, 1831 BNRJ/SM, II-32,34,51 no. 1, fols. 1-6; Commander of Arms to President of Pernambuco, Sept. 20, 1831, printed in Diario de Pernambuco, Sept. 23, 1831, pp. 821-823; Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 205.

⁴⁶ Diario de Pernambuco, Sept. 28, 1831, p. 839-840. Also, "Correspondencia," signed Caheté, Diario de Pernambuco, Oct. 4, 1831, pp. 854-855 and "Correspondencia," signed Chanchan, Diario de Pernambuco, Oct. 17, 1831, pp. 897-898 for similar charges.

nine stores and four taverns in the Bairro de Recife, and the three taverns in Boa Vista.⁴⁷ The Diário de Pernambuco's suggestion seems to have been part of the jostling for partisan advantage--this newspaper and the Bússola da Liberdade disputed who deserved more credit in putting down the rebellion. Restorationists maneuvered for political advantage as well, making an appeal to people of color, trying to drive a wedge between them and the restorationists' political opponents.⁴⁸

The anarchy that gripped Recife was clearly not in the interests of any of the politically active groups of propertied men. Faced with the breakdown of order, the elites of the region, of all political colors, came together--militia units, civilian volunteers rounded up by the Justices of the Peace, and law students from Olinda were crucial in restoring order.⁴⁹ Assistance from the interior of the province, after a delay in its arriving, was crucial. Regaining control of the city was achieved at no small cost; contemporary estimates placed the number of rebels killed between one and three

⁴⁷ BNRJ/SM, II-32,34,51 no. 1, fols. 1-6, President of Pernambuco to Minister of the Empire, Sept. 20, 1831. Also, see below the section on the shouts of the rebels, which contradicts the notion of the rebellion being the works of restorationists.

⁴⁸ On this so-called intriga de cores, see correspondence critical of it in Bússola da Liberdade [(trans.) Compass of Liberty] Oct. 9, 1831; "Correspondencia," signed Fonseca Capibaribe; Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 13, 1831, pp. 887-888 disputes the praise offered by the Echo d'Olinda of some of their partisans' roles in the repression. The Bússola da Liberdade complained on Sept. 21 that liberals did much to restore order, but now others tried to deny this.

⁴⁹ This included the extreme liberals. Note, for example, the editor of the Bússola da Liberdade, an exaltado newspaper, volunteering to assist in putting down the rebellion. See Coronel Comandante Militar de Olinda to Interim Director of Law Faculty, Sept. 17, 1831, and Sept. 19 letter signed by 193 law students assuring their continued willingness to help maintain order, printed in the Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 26, 1831; Intendant of the Navy to President of Pernambuco Sept. 20, 1831, printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 28, 1831, pp. 838-839. Students continued to help man forts for some time afterwards. In mid-October there were fifty students helping at the Brum fort and twenty at the Buraco fort. Pereira da Costa, Anais Pernambucanos 9, 432.

hundred, with about thirty deaths among their opponents. About one thousand rebels were arrested, including over eight hundred soldiers. Most of these were immediately sent to ships in the harbor, and many were subsequently banished to the distant island of Fernando de Noronha for imprisonment.⁵⁰

A reference in the official narration of the events to abuses during the reestablishment of order, as well as a proclamation circulated by the provincial president and conselho warning against excesses in searches for, and arrests of, criminals, raises the issue of how serious acts of vengeance were. Given the low number of casualties among those repressing the rebellion, it seems possible that many of the deaths of the defeated *den* may have come not in pitched battles, but from retaliatory acts. Mário Márcio de Almeida Santos has gone so far as to argue that most of the rebels, whose number killed he gives as five hundred, were massacred, as those repressing the rebellion responded to their terror of anarchy with acts of utter savagery. Almeida Santos judges the repression as thoroughly excessive, noting that there was a lack of any sadistic desire to kill among the rebels, that there were no rapes reported and that only one house was burned down.⁵¹

Statements and testimony of the rebels have not survived, but the attitudes of the rebels can be inferred. There were various reports of shouts against the commander of

⁵⁰ José Ignácio Abreu e Lima, a contemporary of the events, states that 300 rebels were killed, according to Francisco Augusto Pereira da Costa, Anais Pernambucanos 9, p. 428. Presumably the figure comes from Abreu e Lima, Synopsis ou Dedução Chronológica dos Factos mais Notáveis da História do Brasil (Recife: M. F. de Faria, 1845). See Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 206.

⁵¹ Mário Márcio de Almeida Santos, "A Setembrizada," Clio 5 (1982), 185. For the figure of 500 he cites Milton Mello A Setembrizada (Recife: Directoria de Documentação e Cultura, 1951); "Narração Oficial" p. 80-81; "Bando" Sept. 17, 1831, reprinted in the collection of documents entitled "A Sedição Militar de Setembro de 1831" in Revista do Instituto Arqueológico e Geográfico de Pernambuco 10, no. 56, 1902, p. 81.

arms, corporal punishment, and the Portuguese. One shout, sounded repeatedly during wild shooting of firearms, summed up the complaint, "Out with the colunas (restorationists)! Out with the castigo de espada (being struck with the flat of the sword)! Out with the Brigadier (Commander of Arms Vasconcellos)! Out with the marinheiros (sailors, i.e., Portuguese)! Long live Dom Pedro II, Long live Brazilians!"⁵² A revealing point is the fusion of the outrage against the commander of arms and the Portuguese. There were many cries against Brigadier General Vasconcellos, some of them denouncing him as a restorationist. "Out with Vasconcellos, who's a coluna, death to the colunas!"⁵³ The commander's political orientation was far different, however. He had played a key role in providing military pressure against Dom Pedro, helping to force his abdication.⁵⁴ He was sympathetic to the radical liberals and was elected the first vice-president of the Federalist Society which formed in October.⁵⁵ In the course of military reforms he had angered various restorationists when he terminated their contracts as suppliers to the military.⁵⁶ Yet in the minds on many of the aggrieved soldiers, the commander, hated for his efforts to impose discipline, was equated with the evils of the Portuguese and their restorationist Brazilian allies.

⁵² Captain of Fourth Artillery Corp to Commander of Arms, Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 1, 1831, p. 845.

⁵³ Bússola da Liberdade, Sept. 21, 1831, p. 128. Another was "death to the Commander of Arms and long live our liberty!" Thirteenth Battalion Commander to Commander of Arms, Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 23, 1831.

⁵⁴ Bússola da Liberdade, on Nov. 2, 1831, p. 175 referred to Vasconcellos as "the hero of April 7 (whose only crime in this province was to join the Pernambucan liberals)"

⁵⁵ Bússola da Liberdade, Oct. 19, 1831, p. 159.

⁵⁶ "Correspondencia," Diário de Pernambuco, Oct. 4, 1831.

The Septembrizada demonstrated that the doubts about social stability, the ever-present fear of anarchy, were indeed well founded. Just two months after the violent eruption of poor, forcibly conscripted soldiers in September, a different type of challenge arose. Exaltados, or extreme liberals, took control of the Cinco Pontas fort, the principal one in the city. The Novembrada, as the revolt came to be known, contrasted sharply with events in September. The second revolt was staged by officers and propertied citizens, with clear leadership and well-defined political goals. There were no rampages of destruction and looting; indeed, no one was killed at all.

The exaltados' demands centered upon displacing the Portuguese and their Brazilian allies from their government posts. A list was prepared of thirty-three people who were to be dismissed from judicial, military, and other posts and deported, including prominent restorationists such as Manuel Pedro de Moraes Mayer, Domingo Lourenço Tôrres Galindo, Colonel Bento José Lamenha Lins, and even the Marques of Recife, Francisco Paes Barreto. Another list named eight others who were to simply be dismissed from their posts. All adoptivos, Portuguese-born individuals who had become naturalized Brazilians, were to be fired from public posts as well, except those who had distinguished themselves in service to Brazil.⁵⁷

All Portuguese with less than two million reis (the large majority of Portuguese residents) were to be deported, as well as those who were single or "enemies of liberty." No more Portuguese with less than two million reis were to be allowed to enter Pernambuco. Public weapons which had been distributed to the Portuguese, including militia members, were to be confiscated. Finally, the ban on foreign societies, or political groups, was to be enforced. The rebels' petition also railed against the restorationist

⁵⁷ BNRJ/SM, II-32,34,4, "Representação da gente reunida em Cinco Pontas."

political society Coluna do Throno e Altar and warned against an attempted military invasion by the "despot" Dom Pedro.⁵⁸

The revolt seems to have been set off by the dismissal of Commander of Arms Vasconcellos. In the first days of November, word reached Pernambuco that the minister of war had replaced Vasconcellos, upon receiving news of the Septembrizada.⁵⁹ Both radical liberal organs, such as the Bússola da Liberdade, and more moderate papers, such as the Diário de Pernambuco, criticized the move.⁶⁰ A petition to rescind the measure was circulated by the extreme liberals.⁶¹ Apparently, the loss of a powerful supporter may have prompted the exaltados to resort to violent means to press their nativist agenda.⁶²

The events of the revolt itself are suggestive. On the night of November 15, a group overpowered those guarding the Cinco Pontas fort. Provincial President Francisco de Carvalho Paes de Andrade immediately sent the justice of the peace of Santo Antônio to disperse those occupying the fort, but they refused to leave. The rebels argued that they did not comprise an illegal gathering of armed men; rather, they were citizens

⁵⁸ BNRJ/SM, II-32, 34, 4 "Representação da gente reunida em Cinco Pontas"; Diário de Pernambuco, Nov. 25, 1831, pp. 1017-1018.

⁵⁹ Minister of War to the President of Pernambuco, Oct. 20, 1831, informed that the Commander of Arms was being dismissed for having allowed the Septembrizada, reprinted in Diário de Pernambuco, Nov. 4, 1831, pp. 953-954.

⁶⁰ "Comunicado," Diário de Pernambuco, Nov. 14, 1831, pp. 989-990; Bússola da Liberdade, Nov. 2, 1831, pp. 175-176.

⁶¹ Diário de Pernambuco, Nov. 5, 1831, p. 958 prints the petition.

⁶² The absence of a demand for the reinstatement of the Commander of Arms leaves a degree of ambiguity on the point. Marcos Carvalho has argued for this link, asserting that those who signed the petition were the same people who staged the revolt. The newspaper transcription he cites to support this, however, does not present the names of those who signed. At any rate, it is a plausible position.

peaceably gathered insisting on their constitutional right to petition the government.⁶³

Without sufficient force to overwhelm the fort, the provincial government bided its time.

On the sixteenth, emissaries from the government were told to wait, that a petition would be issued. The rebels were gaining strength as people entered the fort to join them. Even some of the soldiers instructed to impede such actions went over to the rebel side.

Meanwhile, some inhabitants of the city, with memories of the Septembrizada still fresh in their minds, abandoned Recife for the safety of ships in the harbor, carrying what possessions they could. Francisco de Carvalho Paes de Andrade left the Presidential Palace for the Brum fort.⁶⁴

The government, deprived of its normal allotment of military troops, many of whom were incarcerated or dismissed after the Septembrizada, amassed some eight hundred people, between militia and civilians gathered by the justices of the peace.⁶⁵ Yet the efforts to apply force were undermined by the refusal of citizens to fire on the rebels. After all, unlike the lower-class soldiers of the Septembrizada, these rebels were of similar background to the propertied militiamen and citizens. The Olindense reported that they argued that "Those in the fort are Brazilians . . . they have not yet acted

⁶³ Diário de Pernambuco, Nov. 29, 1831, pp. 1029 for the Nov. 16 message from the rebels to the Provincial President.

⁶⁴ Olindense, Nov. 28, 1831, reprinted in Vianna, Contribuição à História da Imprensa, 59-61.

⁶⁵ Olindense, Nov. 28, 1831, in Vianna, Contribuição à História da Imprensa, 61.

aggressively, is there any need to spill blood?"⁶⁶ The Diário de Pernambuco later criticized the insistent claim that "We will not fire on our countrymen."⁶⁷

On November 17, the rebels finally issued their petition, which was promptly rejected.⁶⁸ The provincial president, who had consistently tried to avoid bloodshed, instructing troops not to fire unless fired on first, allowed the Federalist Society to send a commission to the fort to convince the rebels to put down their arms.⁶⁹ The Federalist Society shared many of the rebels' goals and the commission was met enthusiastically. It failed, however, to convince the rebels to abandon the fort. The Society sent a second commission the following day, which was joined by several members of the Law Faculty, including future statesmen João Lins Vieira da Canção and José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, as well as Francisco Carneiro Machado Rios. The rebels issued to the commission a reduced, though still considerable, list of demands--that the Portuguese be disarmed, that Portuguese without two million reis be deported and that the government not treat the rebels as engaged in a criminal act.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Diário de Pernambuco, Dec. 7, 1831, pp. 1055-1056.

⁶⁸ BNRJ/SM, II-32, 34, 4, no. 3, fol. 5-7.

⁶⁹ Examples of the president's emphasis on avoiding bloodshed are numerous. On Nov. 19 he instructed the commander of arms to seize the fort "with all prudence and moderation, avoiding insults, and demonstrations of enthusiasm for the triumph . . . (proceed) vigilantly and carefully, so that not even one drop of blood is spilled, it that is possible." printed in the Diário de Pernambuco, Dec. 1, 1831, p. 1034. Also see the Nov. 16 instructions of the president to the commander of arms and intendant of the Navy in Diário de Pernambuco, Nov. 29, 1831, pp. 1029-1030 and p. 1030 respectively and the president's Nov. 18 instructions to each of these men, as well as to various Commanders of troops, printed in the Diário de Pernambuco, Dec. 1, 1831, p. 1033.

⁷⁰ Nov. 18, 1831 statement from the Federal Society Commission to the Provincial President, printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Dec. 1, 1831, pp. 1033-1034.

Though the government had by this time assembled more forces, it did not attack.

One historian has seen this as evidence of the provincial president's indecisiveness, yet it was consistent with his manifest desire to avoid bloodshed, and it was tactically sound, as the rebels would only weaken over time; they were trapped in the fort, without supplies, while the government accumulated forces from the interior of the province.⁷¹ Indeed, the weakness of their position was becoming clear and on the eighteenth some rebels abandoned the fort. The next morning, nearly all the rebels left the fort and it was taken without resistance.⁷²

The Novembrada demonstrated Pernambuco's rough and tumble political struggle in a period of fluidity. After Dom Pedro's abdication, there was no charismatic force symbolizing the unity of Brazil and the stability of its institutions. The Regency which ruled in place of Dom Pedro's son could not embody authority and stability as fully as an Emperor exercising his powers. Political institutions and practice were open to challenge. In Pernambuco extreme liberals resorted to violence to pressure the government to carry out their favored policies. The government's tenuous control of armed force made such a tactic feasible. The government possessed no monopoly over the instruments of coercion. Various groups could mobilize armed men.

violence
possible
after DPI

In this particular instance, the exaltados' armed efforts were not effective. Some restorationist army officers were dismissed, but otherwise the demands for action against the Portuguese and their allies went unsatisfied. Indeed, Colonel Pereira dos Santos, an ally of the dismissed commander of arms, was briefly jailed, and the two exaltado

⁷¹ Correia de Andrade, Movimentos Nativistas, 122-123.

⁷² Olindense, Nov. 28, 1831, reprinted in Vianna, Contribuição à História da Imprensa, 64.

officers who led the rebellion were jailed for several months.⁷³ Moreover, the rift between the moderates and the extreme liberals, allies during the struggle against Dom Pedro, was significantly exacerbated.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, the government's conciliatory efforts and pursuit of a peaceful resolution, as well as the refusal of the militia and citizenry to fire on the rebellious officers and citizens, made it clear that the resort to arms could be a viable tactic in political struggle.

In December of 1831, a restorationist rebellion led by Joaquim Pinto Madeira erupted in the sertões and agreste of Ceará and quickly spread to the backlands of nearby provinces.⁷⁵ Fearful of a broader conspiracy to facilitate Dom Pedro's return to the Brazilian throne, and worried by rumors of an uprising in Pernambuco to support Pinto Madeira, security measures were tightened. Influential restorationists Domingos Lourenço Tôrres Galindo and Bento José Lamenha Lins were ordered to appear in Recife for questioning and many Portuguese houses were searched for arms. The effect, however, was to prompt, earlier than planned, the rebellion known as the Abrilada.⁷⁶

The conspirators were mainly restorationists--both Portuguese-born adoptivos and their Brazilian-born allies. In a period of ferment of liberal ideas from abroad, consequent institutional reform, and turbulent challenges to traditional authority,

⁷³ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 234-235.

⁷⁴ Correia de Andrade, Movimentos Nativistas, 124-125; Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 235.

⁷⁵ Justice of the Peace of Flores to President of Pernambuco, Flores, Feb. 8, 1836, BNRJ/SM, II-33, 6, 41, and accompanying documents; Sócrates Quintino da Fonseca e Brito, "A Rebelião de Joaquim Pinto Madeira: Fatores Políticos e Sociais," (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 1979).

⁷⁶ Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 32-34; Diário de Pernambuco, April 28, 1832, pp. 1441-1442; "Correspondência," signed Feliciano Joaquim dos Santos, May 4, 1832, pp. 1453-1454.

restorationists sought a retreat from unsettling change. The return of Dom Pedro, they hoped, would also allow them to recover positions and privilege lost or threatened in recent years. Portuguese-born military officers, for example, were deeply resented by Brazilian-born officers. At independence the small number of Brazilian-born officers made it imperative to allow many Portuguese-born officers to remain in the Brazilian army.⁷⁷ In Pernambuco, many had been expelled, or threatened with expulsion, after the riots in May of 1831 when news arrived of Dom Pedro's abdication and after the Novembrada.⁷⁸ Such officers played a prominent role in the Abrilada. Likewise, absolutist senhores de engenho in the interior who had lost their positions as colonial militia officers when that militia was eliminated, fearful of persecution by their local enemies, conspired with restorationists in Recife to open a second front in the interior of the province. Portuguese shopowners, clerks, and artisans in Recife, victims of the heightening nativism of the times, and no doubt resentful of calls for their expulsion, were active in the 53rd Militia Battalion that was central to the rebellion. In addition, wealthy Portuguese merchants were significant in the restorationist milieu. With large loans extended to Brazilian landowners, and valuable merchandise warehoused in Recife, they potentially had much to lose if nativism spread dramatically.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ At the time of the abdication over half the brigadier generals and generals were Portuguese-born. Décio Freitas, *Os Guerrilheiros do Imperador* (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1978), 79.

⁷⁸ Compare the names of men implicated in the Abrilada, "Relação dos cúmplices na revolta aparecida nesta Provincia na noite de 14 do corrente," BNRJ/SM, II-33,6,33, with names of individuals whose dismissal was demanded in May of 1831, BNRJ/SM, II-32, 34, 47, and with a similar list prepared during the Novembrada, "Relação para fora da Provincia," BNRJ/SM-II, 32,34,4 no. 3, fols. 6-7.

⁷⁹ Freitas, *Os Guerrilheiros*, 77-81 on restorationism; Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 239-247.

A different source of support came from leaders of the prominent Cavalcanti family, on whose properties some of the conspirators met. The Cavalcantis, along with Francisco Paes Barreto (the Viscount, and future Marquis, of Recife), were definitively not interested in restoration. They did, however, see a chance to topple the provincial government of Francisco de Carvalho, so that one of their own, provincial Vice-President Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, could assume the presidency. When the urban rebellion failed, however, they quickly withdrew their support.⁸⁰

The conspirators counted on the relative weakness of the government's armed support. In the aftermath of the Septembrizada many of the military troops had been imprisoned or dismissed, while the Novembrada had opened a rift between the government and the radical liberals, whose combativeness made them especially valuable, beyond their numerical importance and significant presence in the army. With the government relying on the volunteer Municipal Guard and the militia, many of whom were Portuguese and favorable to their cause, the conspirators' plan to launch a simultaneous rebellion in Recife and in the countryside was a threat of formidable potential.⁸¹

On the night of April 14, 1832, the 53rd Militia Battalion, composed largely of Portuguese-born men and stationed in the Bairro do Recife, the commercial district with a heavy Portuguese presence, rose in rebellion. Some militia men in Santo Antônio, mainly Portuguese, crossed over to the Bairro do Recife in support of the movement. The rebels damaged the bridge linking the Bairro do Recife with Santo Antônio, built barricades from the Customs Building to the Arco da Conceição next to the bridge

⁸⁰ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 238-239.

⁸¹ Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 31-32.

low-port
recife

barricades from the Customs Building to the Arco da Conceição next to the bridge connecting the Bairro do Recife with Santo Antônio, and placed an artillery piece there as well. Through the Brum and Buraco forts, whose lack of resistance indicated connivance on the part of their commanders, they commanded control of the isthmus to Olinda that provided the only other access to the peninsula on which the Bairro de Recife is built. The Bairro secure, they planned to await news of the uprisings in the interior.⁸²

Deprived of significant military troops, the government relied on the 54th Militia Battalion, the Permanent Municipal Guards, the National Guard of nearby towns, Olinda law students, and volunteers. Colonel José Joaquim Coelho led these forces.⁸³ On the fifteenth, with the schooner Rio da Prata firing on the Arco da Conceição, four hundred to four hundred and fifty men attempted to enter the Bairro do Recife, but failed as they could not cross the damaged bridge and artillery fire forced the ship to withdraw. In the meantime, the students from Olinda, led by the commander of arms, Major Joaquim Jose da Silva Santiago, crossed the isthmus from Olinda, took the Buraco fort, and fired artillery shots at the Brum fort for the rest of the day. On the sixteenth, the fort fell to the

⁸² President of Pernambuco to President of Paraíba, April 15, 1832 in Diário de Pernambuco, April 26, 1832, p. 1434; Bússola da Liberdade, April 14, 1832; Commander of Arms to President of Pernambuco, "Exposição dos acontecimentos, que tiveram lugar nesta Provincia nos dias 14, 15, e 16 d'Abril do corrente anno," April 17, 1832 in Diário de Pernambuco, April 26, pp. 1434-1436 and April 27, 1832, pp. 1437-1438; "Circular da Sociedade Patriótica Harmonizadora," May 6, 1832 in Pereira da Costa, Anais Pernambucanos 9, pp. 484-486; M. Lopes Machado, "O 14 de Abril de 1832, em Pernambuco," Revista do Instituto Archeológico e Geográfico Pernambucano 6 no. 38 (1890), 55; Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 34-35; Felix Fernandes Portella, "A Setembrizada, a Abrilada, e a Guerra dos Cabanos: Apontamentos para a Historia Patria," Revista do Instituto Archeológico e Geográfico Pernambucano 10 no. 58 (1903), 429.

⁸³ Portella, "A Setembrizada," 430; Lopes Machado, "O 14 de Abril," 57; Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 35. Coelho years later would lead the military forces that put down the Praieira Revolution.

students. On the sixteenth, Coelho's forces from Santo Antônio, carrying large wooden boards to pass over the damaged areas of the bridge, successfully passed into the Bairro do Recife.⁸⁴

The rebels, already in flight, put up no resistance to the forces from Santo Antônio. Casualties up until this point were relatively low; one source cites sixteen dead, but now the killing began in earnest. An eyewitness subsequently wrote of massacre. Rebels who surrendered were murdered, some were marched off the damaged bridge to drown. Others were shot on jangadas as they tried to reach ships in the harbor. Some sought refuge in churches, but those in the Madre de Deus Convent found no succor. Amidst angry screams and the echo of repeated gunfire, rebels were systematically killed, a contemporary reported. Others escaped the Bairro do Recife, however, including the leaders of the rebellion Colonel Francisco José Martins and Sergeant Major Jose Gabriel de Morais Maier.⁸⁵

In the meantime, the rural uprising that became known as the Guerra dos Cabanos erupted.⁸⁶ Men who had participated in the repression of the 1824 Confederation of the Equator, and had benefitted in the provincial administrations that followed until Dom Pedro's abdication in 1831, planned and led the insurrection. Captain Major Domingo Lourenço Tôrres Galindo, a cotton planter in Vitória, dismissed after the events of May,

⁸⁴ Portella, "A Setembrizada," 430-431; Lopes Machado, "O 14 de Abril," 56-58; Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 34-36; Commander of Arms to President of Pernambuco, April 17, 1832 in Diário de Pernambuco, April 26, 1832, pp. 1434-1436 and April 27, 1832, pp. 1437-1438; Bússola da Liberdade, April 19, 1832.

⁸⁵ Portella, "A Setembrizada," 431-432; Lopes Machado, "O 14 de Abril," 58-59. Both sources note that cadavers were dragged to the cemetery of the convent. Lopes Machado gives sixty as the number of bodies brought there.

⁸⁶ Cabano means a dwelling for the rural poor, a shanty. In this case, cabano refers to the inhabitants of such dwellings that fought in this rural rebellion.

1831, was active not only in plotting against Francisco de Carvalho's government in Pernambuco, but also in aiding Pinto Madeira's restorationist rebellion with men and supplies.⁸⁷ Supporters in the south of the province were led by Sergeant Major Manuel Affonso de Mello. From Barra Grande, Lieutenant Colonel João Batista de Araújo mobilized support, including financial support from the Portuguese community in Barra Grande. There was considerable support for the rebellion in the south of the province, where the government had rewarded landowners for their support against the 1824 Confederation of the Equator. Across the province, former captain majors and sergeant majors of the extinguished colonial militias played leading roles in the rebellion.⁸⁸

The rural rebellion proved far more long lasting than the barracks uprising in Recife. Forests and mountains impeded rapid movement of forces and facilitated ambushes by the rebels. The government's shortage of arms and ammunition, as well as the habitually late payment of salaries, damaged morale and effectiveness. The rebel forces were substantially enlarged when Antônio Timóteo, a small property owner in Panellas de Miranda, mobilized hundreds of Indians from Jacuípe for the struggles. The rebels then numbered over one thousand. Abuses by soldiers, such as theft and rape, helped alienate the rural population, many of whom were already sympathetic to the rebel cause. Nevertheless, over the course of 1832, local opponents of the rebels, armed by the provincial government and aided by the five-hundred-member Municipal Guard of the capital and by newly organized National Guard of various towns, managed some

⁸⁷ Note that Tôres Galindo was also on the Novembrada rebels' list of people to be expelled from the province. "Relação para fora da Provincia," BNRJ/SM-32, 34, 4 no. 3, fols. 6-7.

⁸⁸ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 243-248; Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 38-39.

victories. Tôrres Galindo fled the province in September. Manuel Affonso de Mello and João Batista de Araújo were arrested in October. The following month in Ceará, the militia and army troops sent from Rio de Janeiro succeeded in capturing Pinto Madeira. The leadership of the restorationist rebellion had been eliminated.⁸⁹

The conspirators behind the Abrilada and the rural rebellion in support of it had expected a quick victory. With the failure of the urban rebellion, they shifted to a guerrilla strategy. In light of the considerable elite preoccupations with social control, this was a dramatic decision; mobilizing the lower classes for intra-elite conflict and engaging in prolonged violence was fraught with risks. Indeed, when the bulk of the restorationist leadership fled, was captured, or simply abandoned arms, the rebellion did not end. Rather, the character of the struggle changed as it was transformed into the first major peasant rebellion in Brazil.

Absolutist senhores de engenho had, in time-tested fashion, mobilized their retainers to supply the bulk of their forces. In the south of the province, especially in the Jacuípe Valley and in Panella, this involved mobilizing Indians. There was nothing new about this. As early as the seventeenth century, Indians had fought against the Dutch and against the maroons of the quilombo at Palmares. Indians had fought in the independence struggles. Although in some cases, when they lived in their own communities and possessed land grants, they had a greater degree of independence than personal retainers on landed estates, their leaders were still subordinate to the locally

⁸⁹ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 249-251; Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 51-55, 59.

powerful and were incorporated into clientelistic networks. Exercise of their rights may have depended, de facto, on understandings with the locally powerful.⁹⁰

If many were mobilized through clientelistic ties, others joined the rebel cause due to the hardship that was imposed on them during the rebellion. The government authorized large-scale forced recruitment in the areas of the struggle. In Panellas, attempts to draft all men between eighteen and twenty-five years of age set off a rebellion, and brought large numbers of Indians into the battle against the government. Many of the Indians and other rural poor who joined the rebels continued the struggle for three years because they had been evicted from their lands. While it seems there had been encroachment on lands for some time, there is little doubt that this accelerated in the course of the war. Area landlords who sided with the government seized the opportunity to expel Indians from their lands. This was doubtless crucial in the mobilization of the Jacuipe Valley, a key area of Indian support for the rebellion, because it was the only area of the province with significant amounts of fertile, legally unclaimed land.⁹¹

By the end of 1832, when the upper-class leaders of the rebellion had been eliminated, Vicente de Paula emerged as the undisputed leader of the movement. This former army sergeant and deserter, son of a priest from Goiana, proved to be a charismatic figure who effectively led the cabanos throughout the rest of the war. He preoccupied political leaders afterwards, as well, with raids by his armed bands in the

⁹⁰ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 261-264. Marcus Carvalho places great emphasis on the significance of clientelism in mobilizing the Indians of Jacuipe. The rural poor generally often gained access to land, of course, through clientelism. On clientelism, patronage and access to land see Graham, Patronage and Politics, 20-23; Freitas, Os Guerrilheiros, 37-39. For a study of the war focussing on the Indian communities in the south of the province, see Dirceu Lindoso, A Utopia Armada: Rebeliões de Pobres nas Matas do Tombo Real (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1983).

⁹¹ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 262-270; Freitas, Os Guerrilheiros, 94-95.

1830s and 1840s. In the 1840s, various Conservative and Liberal leaders attempted to attract him to their side in armed struggles. He molded a fighting force from Indians, others of the rural poor, and runaway slaves that used guerilla tactics to stymie the government for three years. Vicente de Paula organized his forces in accord with his military experience, and took the title of General of the Royalist Force.⁹²

Vicente de Paula's calls for restoration of Dom Pedro responded to the upheaval of recent years. He crystallized the discontent of the rural poor, blaming the various crises that buffeted them on the liberals who had overthrown the emperor. Liberal reforms, in shifting the locus of political power to provinces and municipios, had made the locally prominent even more powerful, diminishing what mediating role the state had previously played. Creation of the National Guard had led to drafting the rural poor to serve in it. With the opening of the ports to international trade in 1808, significant inflation began. By the early 1830s, counterfeit copper coins were increasingly common, and merchants' frequent refusals to accept copper coins at all presented difficulties for the poor. Land encroachment increased. Even the law protecting the forests as a monopoly of the government was repealed after the abdication, facilitating the seizure of lands by powerful landowners. Vicente articulated a belief that the litany of problems affecting the rural poor were the handiwork of irreligious jacobins, liberals who respected neither property, tradition, nor God. His proclamations and letters urged the return of an absolutist regime, in which Dom Pedro would not be restrained by a constitution.⁹³

⁹² Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 63, 205-209; Freitas, Os Guerrilheiros, 106-109, 116. The name was later changed to Restorationist Forces.

⁹³ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 255-259, 266-270, 277-279; Freitas, Os Guerrilheiros, 53-63; Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 205-209; Nov. 16, 1833 proclamation by Vicente de Paula, reprinted in Pereira da Costa, Anais Pernambucanos 9, (continued...)

Under Vicente de Paula's leadership, the cabanos were composed almost entirely of the rural poor. Yet they attracted the support of restorationists elsewhere. They periodically received aid from Recife. Ammunition was occasionally supplied from Maceió, the capital of Alagoas. Operating in that province, they benefitted from such indecision on the part of the provincial president and Army that one historian has speculated that they may have been sympathizers.⁹⁴ Even prominent Pernambuco restorationists in Rio de Janeiro maintained hopes for their cause. General Abreu e Lima wrote from the Court to his brothers Luís and João, both of whom were also involved in the restorationist cause, urging Luís to go to the battlefield in Jacuípe and assume leadership of the movement. "Do not delay one moment, apart from the cabanos, I do not see any solution for Brazil." He assured his brother that with a prominent victory, and his own subsequent public incorporation into the movement, a wide-spread restorationist movement would erupt.⁹⁵

(...continued)

pp. 535-536. The rural poor making common cause with conservatives was not unprecedented at this time in Latin America. On such support for Rafael Carrera, see Ralph Lee Woodward, Rafael Carrera and the Emergence of the Republic of Guatemala, 1821-1871 (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1993) and Miles Wortman, Government and Society in Central America, 1680-1840 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 261-268. For Venezuela, see Germán Carrera Damas, Boves: aspectos socioeconômicos de la guerra de independencia (Caracas: Ediciones de la Biblioteca, Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1972). For a later period in Brazil, see Euclides da Cunha, Os Sertões (Campanha do Canudos) (Rio de Janeiro: F. Alves, 1914) and Robert Levine, Vale of Tears: Revisiting the Canudos Massacre in Northeastern Brazil, 1893-1897 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1992).

⁹⁴ Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 211.

⁹⁵ Quote from a Nov. 29, 1833 letter printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Jan. 12, 1834, reprinted in Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 227-229; Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 209-213.

Outside support, however, was never enough to greatly aid the cabanos. Still, the provincial government, with its limited resources, was unable to easily impose itself in the countryside against an often hostile population. In 1834, it adopted a scorched-earth policy that finally proved decisive. Everyone in the theater of operations was warned to leave the area or be treated as cabanos. A fierce campaign by the government followed. Offers of amnesty then separated many rebels from the cause. In 1835, the Bishop of Pernambuco toured the region, preaching among the rebels and convincing most to lay down their arms. Vicente de Paula and a small number of followers, mostly escaped slaves who feared bondage and punishment, refused. They founded a community, Riacho do Mato, of difficult access in mountainous forests, and were not captured. However, the Guerra dos Cabanos was over.⁹⁶

Nonetheless, the weakness of the government had been seen by all. Undermined by conflict among its supporters, lack of supplies for its troops, inability to control the excesses of its soldiers or avoid their desertion, the government needed three years to win the war. Much of the fighting had been carried out by local senhores de engenho and their retainers, supplied and funded from Recife, with the aid of government troops.⁹⁷ The government's authority in the countryside was still, to a considerable degree, delegated to the locally powerful. All of this pointed to a significant political reality: preservation and retention of power depended upon local elites' social control; conflict among the elite could threaten social stability. If powerful senhores de engenho had been

⁹⁶ Correia de Andrade, Guerra dos Cabanos, 127-154, 175-185; Freitas, Os Guerrilheiros, 151-155.

⁹⁷ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 265-266.

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accustomed to thinking of the poor as resources to be mobilized for their own purposes, the Guerra dos Cabanos showed another possibility. The rural poor, led by a shrewd and charismatic leader, carried on their own struggle long after the absolutist senhores had abandoned the battle field. Actively intervening in politics in the most direct of ways, waging war, they stymied the government for several years. In demonstrating the possibility of independent action on their part, they added a new element into future calculations of political struggle.

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CHAPTER 2 REACTION, 1836-1841

Brazilian elites were deeply concerned with maintaining order. They were keenly aware of the profound divisions of class and race which structured their society, a society in which slavery played so prominent a role. Thus, restructuring political institutions offered not only promise, but risks as well. The crucial test of any reform effort would be if the promised improvements could be attained without upsetting social and political stability. We have seen the danger to order posed by armed revolts. In this chapter, we will continue examining the problem of order, focusing on the formal institutions of social control and the routine challenges they faced, particularly the pervasiveness of crime. Much of the discussion will draw on material from the Court, but evidence from Pernambuco will also appear. We will see how difficulties in maintaining order, both in terms of revolts and in terms of crime, facilitated the success of a conservative critique of liberalism that would have a profound and enduring impact.

For Joaquim Nabuco (1849-1910), a deputy from Pernambuco, a noted abolitionist, a diplomat, and the Monarchy's historian, Dom Pedro's shocking abdication on April 7, 1831 ushered in, de facto, a decade-long republic and with it, a threat to the nation's integrity and order.¹ Bereft of the stabilizing influence of the monarchy, fundamental fear of disorder and anarchy increased. Order was tenuously maintained in the best of

¹ Nabuco, *Estadista*, 33.

circumstances. A subjugated slave population, many of whom were African-born, large numbers of the oppressed rural poor, often mixed-race white and Indian caboclos, and urban poor, often Afro-Brazilian, might rise up at a given provocation. Juxtaposed to a fragile state presence, whether in the form of administrative agents or a repressive force, social control was a constant concern. With the abdication, and especially with the liberal reforms that shifted the locus of state power from the Court to the provincial capitals and counties, political struggle was unleashed. Long standing elite fear of the breakdown of hierarchy and order was confirmed, as intra-elite struggles spilled over to the lower classes, largely people of color, providing openings for contests that challenged the social order.

In Recife, the abdication ushered in an era that saw the provincial government forced to dismiss many Portuguese-born military officers and office holders. The Novembrada demonstrated the willingness of urban radicals, especially those in the military, to resort to armed force to realize nativist goals. The Abrilada of 1832 and the Guerra dos Cabanos, in turn, showed the restorationists willing to attempt an armed uprising in Recife and rural guerrilla war in pursuit of their aims. When the restorationist leaders lost the appetite for rural warfare, they discovered that they could not control what they had begun. A rural insurgency of the poor, led by individuals from their own ranks and marked by scenes of great violence and destruction ravaged the south of the province until 1835. If the Septembrizada had exposed the fragility of the repressive apparatus in the capital, where forced conscripts from the poor had thrown off the command of their superiors, looting, drinking, whoring, seizing artillery pieces and battling the ad hoc forces gathered to repress them, the Guerra dos Cabanos revealed the inadequacy of the state's capacity to marshal efficient repression in the countryside.

meaning
of
soldier
rebels

Nor was Pernambuco unique by any means. Revolts rocked various provinces. An elite-led separatist struggle brought civil war to Rio Grande do Sul from 1835 to 1845. A rebellion by Muslim slaves in Salvador, Bahia, brief in duration, but powerful in the fear of "Haitianismo" it enflamed, gripped the consciousness of elites across Brazil. Even four decades after the Haitian Revolution, that Caribbean uprising and slaughter of white elites continued to provoke anxiety among Brazilian upper classes. In Pará, fierce struggles among the elites led to civil war in January of 1835; by August, a general conflagration had erupted in which Indians and caboclos slaughtered the wealthy. Not until 1840 was the Cabanagem, as this rebellion was called, repressed, and the cost was startling; a fifth of the population, about 30,000 people, perished. In Salvador, resistance to perceived efforts to "recolonize" Bahia, this time in subservience to the Court at Rio de Janeiro, led to the Sabinada. Intra-elite conflict quickly spilled over to a mass movement. Rebels seized Salvador and only after four months and at a cost of 1,800 lives did government troops defeat them. Maranhão likewise saw elite conflict spread to a mass movement, the Balaiada (1838-1841). Thus, across Brazil, time and again, violent, frightening upheavals erupted as slaves, Indians, and the urban and rural poor, largely people of color, in different combinations at different times and places, seized the opportunities presented by intra-elite conflicts.²

² Bethell and Carvalho, "1822-1850," 68-75; Barman, Forging of a Nation, p. 170 presents maps that locate the revolts and chapter 6 includes summaries of them; Thomas Flory, "Race and Social Control in Independent Brazil," Journal of Latin American Studies 9:2 (Nov., 1977). On individual revolts, see Moacyr Flores, A Revolução Farroupilha (Porto Alegre: Univ. Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 1990); Walter Spalding, A Revolução Farroupilha (Porto Alegre: Petroquímica Triunfo, 1987); João José Reis, Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1993); Júlio José Chiaventto, Cabanagem: o povo no poder (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984); Pasquale di Paulo, Cabanagem: A Revolução Popular da Amazônia (Belem: Centro de Estudos Jurídicos do Pará, 1986); Hendrik Kraay, "'As
(continued...)"

Maintaining order had always been a fundamental concern of the upper classes and the government in Pernambuco. There were vast stretches of thinly populated lands, difficult to police and in which people could easily hide. In the more populated zona da mata, there were concentrations of slaves and free poor on plantations. With very limited government presence, slow communications, and widespread ownership of guns, many regions, though long settled, bore a certain resemblance to a frontier zone.³

The provincial government and representatives of the imperial government in Recife found considerable obstacles in working their will throughout the province. Bureaucratic capacity was sharply limited. Indeed, one provincial president, Francisco do Rego Barros, once explained to the Provincial Assembly that he was unable even to report crime statistics, or the number of National Guardsmen in the province, as the district judges (juizes de direito) and National Guard leaders had failed to provide such information, despite requests to do so.⁴ A similar situation prevailed in other provinces,

(...continued)

Terrifying as Unexpected': The Bahian Sabinada, 1837-1838," Hispanic American Historical Review, 72:4 (Nov., 1992); Paulo César Souza, A Sabinada: a revolta separatista da Bahia, 1837 (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1987); Maria de Lourdes Mônaco Janotti, A Balaiada (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1987); Maria Januária Vilela Santos, A Balaiada e a insurreição de escravos no Maranhão (São Paulo: Ática, 1983).

³ Relatório que á Assembleia Legislativa de Pernambuco apresentou na Sessão Ordinaria de 1839 o Exmo. Presidente da mesma Provinica Francisco do Rego Barros, p. 15 on widespread use of arms. Hereafter cited as Relatorio . . . 1839 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco).

⁴ Falla que, na occazião da abertura da Assembleia Legislativa Provincial de Pernambuco no 1º de Março de 1838 recitou o Exm. Snr. Francisco do Rego Barros, Presidente da mesma Provincia, pp. 16, 21. Hereafter cited as Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco).

as the minister of justice indicated in 1838 when he reported the same inability to present crime statistics, as many provincial presidents could not supply the relevant information.⁵

Across Brazil the police suffered poor organization, and Pernambuco was no exception.⁶ In 1842, discipline difficulties were so pervasive that most police units employed National Guardsmen to supplement their numbers. This presented problems as well, as using Guards from the same region was unsatisfactory, presumably because they were subject to local influences, prompting the use of National Guards from other regions.⁷ The police cavalry was so ineffective, due to the poor condition of its horses, that the provincial president recommended that if new horses were not purchased that the cavalry be disbanded. More generally, effective police work depended on diligent and competent work by the justice of the peace, who exercised key police functions.⁸ Unpaid police officials, subprefeitos and commissarios de policia created in 1836, generally did not devote sufficient time to their official duties, a complaint that continued even after the reorganization of 1841 that reduced the functions of the justice of the peace and

⁵ Relatório da Repartição dos Negocios da Justiça Apresentado á Assembleia Geral Legislativa na Sessão Ordinaria de 1838 pelo Respectivo Ministro e secretario de Estado Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos, p. 8. Hereafter cited as Relatório . . . Negocios da Justiça . . . 1838.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12. The Minister of Justice lamented that "It is not possible, *senhores*, for the police, as it is currently organized, to carry out the important functions of this ministry." p. 11. On the police in the Court, see Thomas Holloway, Policing Rio de Janeiro: Repression and Resistance in a 19th-Century City (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993) and Bernice Cavalcanti Brandão, Ilmar Rohlf de Mattos, and Maria Alice Rezende de Carvalho, A policia e a força policial no Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: PUC/RJ, Série Estudos, no. 4, 1981)

⁷ Relatório . . . 1843 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), 5.

⁸ Relatório . . . Negocios da Justiça . . . 1838, p. 11; Relatório Apresentado á Assembleia Geral Legislativa na Sessão Ordinaria de 1840, pelo Ministro e secretario de Estado dos Negocios da Justiça, p. 22. Hereafter cited as Relatório . . . 1840 . . . Negocios da Justiça.

created unpaid delegados (police commissioners) and subdelegados (deputy police commissioners).⁹

The National Guard was the largest force in the province.¹⁰ In theory it numbered about 19,000 members, but the number actually available, trained, and armed was far less.¹¹ As in other provinces, Pernambuco's National Guard was poorly organized and generally poorly led, though the problems were less severe in Recife and Olinda.¹² There were insufficient arms, as the frequent, almost routine, requests for weapons demonstrate. Many of the arms available were defective, being leftovers from the extinct colonial militias.¹³ Training and discipline were poor. Many of the leaders had no knowledge of military organization and tactics. Leaders often resided far from their units, there being no requirement that the officer live in the same district or county. Consequently, rapid mobilization was undermined.¹⁴ Men often sought positions as officers only for the

⁹ See Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 18-19, which contains a call for salaries under the earlier system, and ANRJ IJ¹322, President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, Recife, April 8, 1843, for a suggestion that delegados and subdelegados earn a salary, to allow them to devote more time and vigor to their duties.

¹⁰ On the National Guard, see Jeanne Berrance de Castro, A milícia cidadã, a Guarda Nacional de 1831 a 1850 (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1977) and Fernando Uricoechea, The Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1980).

¹¹ Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 21.

¹² Relatório da Repartição dos Negocios da Justiça Apresentado á Assembleia Geral Legislativa na Sessão Ordinaria de 1841 pelo respectivo Ministro e Secretario de Estado Paulino Soares de Sousa, p. 30, hereafter cited as Relatório . . . 1841 . . . Negocios da Justiça; Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 22. On Recife and Olinda, see Relatório . . . 1839 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 20.

¹³ Relatório . . . 1841 . . . Negocios da Justiça, p. 30.

¹⁴ Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 22; Relatório . . . 1843 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 5-6.

associated honors and then evaded the responsibilities. A common tactic was to resign, on the pretext of illness, immediately following appointment; the law allowed one to continue to enjoy the honors.¹⁵ As there was rapid turnover among officers, there was little incentive for improvement; the fruits of one's efforts might be enjoyed by someone else.¹⁶ Registration boards, composed of the justice of the peace and the electors, determined the eligibility of men to serve in the Guard. They often became embroiled in disputes, due to their considerable partiality, providing troops for units led by allies and impeding the filling of position in units commanded by rivals.¹⁷ Yet, despite all the problems, the National Guard was crucial. In areas with little military presence, the Guard was the only significant force available to repress political disputes that erupted into violence, to capture criminals, and to guard prisoners.¹⁸

Arb.
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The military provided the most reliable troops, though troop riots in the 1830s, and desertion throughout the period under study, caution against overestimating their reliability. Soldiers were forcibly recruited for extended military duty, with meager (and often late) salaries and harsh discipline. Recruitment was a common tactic to deal with troublemakers, vagrants, and, in general, those among the poor who lacked the protection of a powerful patron.¹⁹ Along with the National Guard, they were the linchpin of repressive strategies in the event of major disturbances.

¹⁵ Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 22.

¹⁶ Relatório . . . 1841 . . . Negócios da Justiça, p. 31.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁹ Graham, Patronage and Politics, pp. 27-31.

The police, National Guard, and Army could put down major disorders, but were not capable of assuring order on a daily basis. In the countryside, this depended largely on the efforts of planters, whose groups of armed retainers provided the force to impose their wills. A *senhor de engenho's* power depended in part on his ability to mobilize armed followers to defend his interests.²⁰ Planters allowed various free poor people to squat on their land in exchange for labor and loyalty, including armed service when needed. There were limits to the effectiveness of such a system, for while planters controlled their own lands, conflicts with other planters could arise, pitting one armed group against another. There were also bands of outlaws that roamed the countryside, and whose mobility allowed them to escape the forces of the *senhores*, as well as those of the government. Such bands often made use of provincial borders, crossing from one province to another to elude capture.²¹

In 1843, the minister of justice, Paulino José Soares de Sousa, one of the chief spokesmen for the Conservative Party, explained the rise of powerful bosses, surrounded by numerous armed retainers, as a consequence of the backwardness of the interior. There, he reported, the inhabitants lived in isolation, out of the reach of governmental authorities, without morality, religion or the benefits of civilization. They were

²⁰ Ibid., 20-23.

²¹ Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios da Justiça Apresentado á Assembleia Geral Legislativa na Primeira Sessão da 5ª Legislatura pelo respectivo Ministro e Secretario de Estado Paulino José Soares de Sousa (1843), p. 26, hereafter cited as Relatório . . . 1ª Sessão . . . (1843) . . . Negócios da Justiça, on the armed bands operating on the Pernambuco / Alagoas border.

characterized by barbarous customs, ferocious behavior and horrible crimes, constituting a distinct society from that of the littoral.²²

Interestingly, the minister of justice explained the predominance of powerful senhores, protecting large groups of men in exchange for their loyalty, in terms of an adaptation to these severe conditions in the interior, which he conceived of as outside the littoral society.

[E]ven the notables that inhabit those places are forced, in self defense, to oppress in order not to be oppressed themselves; they create small centers of power, to which the persecuted agglomerate...[E]ach one attempting to achieve greater preponderance and become feared in order to be respected seeks to protect the largest number of villainous criminals and turbulent individuals.²³

This description could also apply to senhores de engenho in the zona da mata (though perhaps to a lesser degree), yet the minister invokes the barbarous condition of the interior as his explanation. Perhaps to recognize openly the predominance of such a

²² The minister clearly differentiated himself and his audience from this culture and people by referring to the contrast with "our littoral." Sarmiento advanced a similar argument for Argentina, although his argument is ambiguous about how much weight is assigned to the isolation of the interior and how much to the influence of what he saw as the backward civilization of Spain, symbolized by Córdoba, in explaining the barbarous backlands of Argentina. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Facundo: Civilización y barbarie (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1975). Incidents like the human sacrifices that had occurred in Pernambuco's sertão may well have been on the minister's mind as he spoke of barbarous customs and behavior. In 1838, a woman by the name of Pedra Bonita convinced her neighbors that an enchanted kingdom existed, but was about to lose its enchantment. A follower of hers preached that human sacrifice was needed to restore the enchanted kingdom and that people should be burned and the soil irrigated with their blood. All the victims would be resuscitated rich, powerful, and happy. The Provincial President reported that fathers, ignorant and superstitious, handed over their children in good faith. In all, forty-two people were sacrificed. The nearest police unit attacked, killing twenty-nine, arresting others and losing five of their own forces. See Relatório . . . 1839 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 3-4. For a twentieth-century novel revolving around this incident, see José Lins do Rego, Pedra Bonita, published along with two other of the author's works, Pureza: Pedra Bonita: Riacho Doce (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1961).

²³ Relatório . . . Negócios da Justiça . . . 1841, p. 19.

system across the entire province might have admitted too great a contradiction between the ideals of a constitutional system, in which free citizens respect the rule of law, and the every day reality.²⁴

Government leaders were greatly distressed by the high incidence of crime. In 1841, the same minister, Paulino José Soares de Sousa, blamed Brazil's "state of civilization," its sparsely populated large territory, and the government's lack of resources; in 1843 he lamented the spread of immorality.²⁵ In a similar vein, Provincial President Francisco do Rego Barros blamed backwardness in customs and civilization, as well as the apathy of eyewitnesses, for the increasing numbers of crimes, their gravity and the boldness of criminals.²⁶ Even in the provincial capital, in plain day, people were not safe—on June 28, 1841 a man was murdered and witnesses were too fearful to point out the perpetrator. Likewise, at midday on January 25, 1842, two men, described as blacks dressed in mourning, knifed a man to death on the Rua da Cadeia, "the busiest street" in the center of Recife. Again, witnesses failed to intervene, or even to shout to alert the police. Subsequent investigation revealed it was an act of vengeance of which

*Murder
1841
1842*

²⁴ Relatório . . . 1839 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 15, Provincial President Francisco do Rego Barros expressed his frustration with "professional criminals" who worsened the effects of impunity. He suggested adopting a law similar to one passed in Maranhão in 1830 that punished property owners who allowed people without honest occupation to reside on their lands as agregados or for other specious reasons. This seems as unrealistic as the Minister of Justice's 1841 comments, in that the practice was so widespread.

²⁵ Relatório . . . 1841 . . . Negocios da Justiça, pp. 18-19; Relatório . . . 1a Sessão . . . 1843 . . . Negocios da Justiça, p. 4.

²⁶ Relatório . . . 1842 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 4.

the victim had been warned, but he failed to believe he was in danger in the capital.

Again, no witnesses identified the guilty.²⁷

Nor were the victims of crime restricted to the poor. In July of 1842 the interim delegado of Rio Formoso, Pedro Cavalcanti de Albuquerque Uchoa, was murdered near the engenho Genipapo. In response, a group of armed men surrounded the engenho and killed a man they thought to be the murderer. On October 19, 1842, a group again surrounded the engenho and proceeded to kill two individuals. On January 6, 1843, Antônio Francisco do Rego Barros, the owner of the engenho, arrived from Ceará, to which he had earlier fled to protect his life. Though he returned backed up by armed men, a local police official convinced him to disband the armed men. Once disarmed, however, Antônio Francisco was murdered, just as he had feared.²⁸

This general reality of unpunished criminality was exacerbated by the violence and terror associated with slavery. Slaveowners inherently ran risks in employing coerced labor. Antônio Rabello da Silva Pereira, for example, long feared an attempt on his life by his enemies. When he was murdered on the evening on March 27, 1843, suspicion

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4; President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, Recife, Feb. 12, 1842 and the appended letters, Prefeito of Recife to President of Pernambuco, Feb. 5, 1842 and Juiz de Direito Primeira Vara do Crime to President of Pernambuco, Feb. 11, 1842, ANRJ/SM, IJ'322.

²⁸ Relatório que a Assembleia Legislativa de Pernambuco Apresentou na Sessão Ordinária de 1843 o Excellentíssimo Barão da Boa Vista Presidente da Mesma Província, pp. 4-6, hereafter cited as Relatório . . . 1843 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco); Relatório Apresentado á Assembleia Geral Legislativa na 2ª Sessão da 5ª Legislativa de 1843, pelo Ministro e Secretario de Estado dos Negocios da Justiça, p. 6, hereafter cited as Relatório . . . 2ª Sessão . . . 1843 . . . Negocios da Justiça; on Antônio Francisco's murder, see Diário Novo Jan. 13, 1843 and that issue's reprinting of Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Jan. 8, 1843 and First Police Commander to President of Pernambuco, Jan. 8, 1843; Diário Novo Jan. 18, 1843 and Jan. 27, 1843. On the absolving of the police officials involved, see the various documents in President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, May 10, 1843 and Oct. 27, 1843, ANRJ/SM, IJ'322.

immediately fell on one of his slaves. The police speculated that the slave may have been hired by an enemy of Antônio's.²⁹ In another case, Manuel Xavier de Vasconcellos went to sleep drunk, only to be shot at midnight by his slave Isabel, who had been aided and taught to use the gun by another slave, José.³⁰

Conservatives endlessly denounced liberal reforms for exacerbating the difficulties of maintaining order in such a society. Depicted as theoretical, uninformed by Brazilian realities, the result of an excessive reaction against Portuguese colonial rule and as based on doctrines of exaggerated and impractical liberty, Conservatives blamed liberal reforms for undermining what little security there was. In particular, the jury system and the extensive powers of the justice of the peace were routinely attacked. Indeed, reports of Conservative ministers of justice can be read as salvos in the intellectual assault on the liberal reforms. Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos, chief architect of the Conservative Party in 1837, and Paulino José Soares de Sousa, the prominent Conservative spokesman, whose ministerial reports of 1838 and 1841 are cited above, were the principal authors of the laws that would overturn the liberal reforms.³¹

Central to the Conservatives' attack were repeated denunciations of the alleged impunity that criminals enjoyed. The term implied not only high frequency of crime with little chance of being punished, but an upsetting of the moral order. The ill-disposed, disorderly, criminal elements brazenly attacked, offended and disrupted decent, law-

²⁹ President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, Recife, April 8, 1843, ANRJ/SM, IJ'322.

³⁰ President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, July 11, 1843, ANRJ/SM, IJ'322. Isabel was subsequently executed and the slave José who assisted her was condemned to life in prison.

³¹ Relatório . . . Negocios da Justica . . . 1838, pp. 10-18, esp. 12-13; Relatório . . . 1841 . . . Negocios da Justica, p. 18-30, esp. 18-19.

abiding society. In 1841, Paulino José Soares de Sousa noted that nearly all provincial presidents complained that impunity prevailed.³² A number of causes were cited, chief among them, the organization of the judiciary that placed excessive power in ill-prepared, elected Justices of the Peace and the jury system.

Poor judicial organization, specifically the liberal reforms that assigned extensive responsibilities to Justices of the Peace, who were not required to have legal training, were blamed for undermining the capture and conviction of criminals. District judges, the nominal police chiefs, were unable to achieve much if the justice of the peace, who actually wielded considerable police powers, was not effective. Earlier, Minister of Justice Bernardo de Vasconcellos had lamented the impossibility of the police carrying out their functions when power rested with inexperienced Justices of the Peace and County Judges elected by the Camaras; in such circumstances, the police chief's authority was "to not say ridiculous, nominal and illusory."³³ He called for police authorities with wider jurisdiction and nominations by the government, in order to assure the selection of competent individuals.³⁴

When criminals were arrested and charged, the Justices of the Peace were entrusted with the formação da culpa--gathering the facts of the case, explaining the circumstances, citing which laws were broken, and justifying charges with statements and evidence. Conservative ministers of justice denounced the inadequacy of incompetent, ignorant, sometimes dishonest, justices of the peace. These men were criticized as unprepared

³² Relatório . . . 1841 . . . Negocios da Justiça, p. 20; Relatório . . . Negocios da Justiça . . . 1838, p. 8.

³³ Relatório . . . Negocios da Justiça . . . 1838, pp. 10-11.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-18.

professionally for their responsibilities and for routinely failing to successfully prosecute individuals of whose guilt there was little doubt.³⁵

Conservatives were scathing in their denunciation of another liberal reform--the jury system. Above all, the institution was attacked for routinely absolving individuals despite considerable proof of guilt. Selection of inappropriate members, who would be subject to the influence of the locally powerful, was criticized, as was the failure to convene juries at appropriate intervals.³⁶ In decrying the low rate of convictions, Pernambucan Provincial President Francisco do Rego Barros noted that only three of the twenty-six individuals brought before juries in the district of Santo Amaro in 1837 were convicted, sarcastically suggesting that this may have been due to the bonhomie of the jury. He went on to lament the demoralization that resulted from juries absolving criminals and the resulting atmosphere of impunity.³⁷ Several years later he addressed the same issue, blaming it for the spread of immorality in Brazil.³⁸

Increasing the difficulties of arresting and convicting criminals was the unwillingness of witnesses to testify. Impunity assured that powerful figures were likely to escape punishment, making witnesses fearful of retaliatory acts by the accused. The mayor of Recife complained of the apathy of the witnesses to a murder who failed to help, or even alert the police. In frustration, he declared that if only witnesses would

³⁵ Relatório . . . 1840 . . . Negocios da Justiça, p. 14; Relatório . . . Negocios da Justiça . . . 1838, pp. 14-15.

³⁶ Relatório . . . Negocios da Justiça . . . 1838, p. 15; Relatório . . . 1839 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 14; Relatório . . . 1841 . . . Negocios da Justiça, pp. 22-23; President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, June 10, 1843 and the appended Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, May 11, 1843, ANRJ/SM, IJ¹322.

³⁷ Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 14.

³⁸ President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, April 8, 1843, ANRJ/SM, IJ¹322.

testify it would be easy to get convictions, or at least to publicly accuse the guilty.³⁹ In 1841 Paulino José Soares de Sousa insisted on the necessity of surrounding those making accusations with sufficient force to protect them. In 1843 this same minister of justice reported the comments of a police chief regarding the intimidation of witnesses, who observed that his jurisdiction did not seem to be part of a constitutional empire of free citizens, but a complex of fiefs with lords and vassals, on which the police authorities and criminals were completely dependent.⁴⁰ Even in the case of the different murders at the Genipapo estate noted earlier, of which there had been various witnesses and a lengthy investigation, no one could be found willing to testify.⁴¹

If arrest and conviction were demanding tasks, the inability to keep prisoners jailed made for more complications. Police records are full of reports of jailbreaks. Prisons were often in woeful condition, leading provincial presidents to call repeatedly for improved penitentiaries. Moreover, there was a shortage of guards, and those that were available were sometimes bribed.⁴²

³⁹ President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, Feb. 12, 1842 and the appended Prefeito interino to President of Pernambuco, Feb. 5, 1842, ANRJ/SM, IJ'322.

⁴⁰ Relatório . . . 1ª Sessão . . . 1843 . . . Negocios da Justiça, p. 25.

⁴¹ Relatório . . . 2ª Sessão . . . 1843 . . . Negocios da Justiça, p. 6.

⁴² See any Falla or Relatório of the President of Pernambuco to the Provincial Assembly in this period. Also see "Ouvidor da Comarca do Sertão to President of Pernambuco," Aug. 22, 1831, reprinted in Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 26, 1831, who communicated complaints that prisoners were being kept in jails for too long, leading to escapes. After the Septembrizada, prisoners were kept on ships in the harbor, because the prisons were under repair. See President of Pernambuco to Minister of the Empire, Sept. 20, 1831, BNRJ/SM, II-32, 34, 51, no. 1, fol. 1-6. In 1841, the Minister of Justice also asserted the need to build better prisons to reduce the likelihood of escape. Relatório . . . 1841 . . . Negocios da Justiça, p. 24.

By the latter 1830s, the Conservative critique found much resonance in public opinion. The optimistic images of Brazil that liberals had earlier favored, emphasizing common interests and the possibility of significant improvement through institutional reforms, seemed out of touch with the disorder and violence that marked the Regency. Elected Justices of the Peace seemed not to offer improved justice administered by people who were intimately familiar with local conditions, but incompetent judicial practice that undermined effective police work, by people chosen through coercion of the electorate. Citizen juries, susceptible to intimidation by those they judged, seemed to assure impunity by lawbreakers. Even the most prominent of liberals, statesmen like Antônio Diego Feijó and the influential editor of the Aurora Fluminense, Evaristo da Veiga, were conceding the failures with the reforms.⁴³

For many people, a pessimistic interpretation of Brazil had displaced the seemingly ill-founded optimism of First Reign and Regency liberalism. Brazilian civilization was depicted as in an early state of development. Brazilians, especially the masses, were seen as not yet possessing sufficient "civilization" to participate in modern liberal institutions of Europe and North America. Foreign models, many now thought, might work in their lands of origin, but only impractical theorists, out of touch with local realities, could still have hopes for them in Brazil.⁴⁴ *Henio Zava*

⁴³ Flory, Judge and Jury, 134-139, 142-144 and especially Feijó's article in the Aurora Fluminense on Jan. 26, 1835.

⁴⁴ See the quotations from Ministers of Justice Vasconcellos, in 1838, and Paulino Soares de Sousa, in 1841, four paragraphs below; Flory, Judge and Jury, 144-148; This argument provided an important foundation for Brazilian conservative thought; its influence continues to this day. Oliveira Viana, a particularly influential conservative thinker in this century, explicitly used the experience of the First Reign and Regency as evidence for his reactionary critique of democracy in Brazil. He also made a parallel argument against the "liberal" restructuring of power in the Old Republic. See Viana, (continued...)

Leading the reevaluation was a group of politicians opposed to the liberal leader Regent Antônio Diogo Feijó. All of them had figured among the moderado leadership. Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, and Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos, two Coimbra trained magistrates well-versed in liberal constitutionalism, who had earlier broken with Dom Pedro I over his absolutist tendencies, were the key figures of the Regresso, or *rise of moderates* Reaction. Supporting them were three astute politicians known as the squaremas, Paulino José Soares de Sousa, Eusébio de Queirós Coutinho Matoso Camara, and Joaquim José Rodrigues Tôrres, whose estate near Squarema supplied the nickname for the three. These men, the core of what would become the leadership of the Conservative Party, marshaled the opposition to Feijó from 1835 to 1837.⁴⁵

The bitter experience of the Regency prompted many to abandon liberalism and to embrace the Regresso. Vasconcellos epitomized this shift in attitude. On the floor of the Camara he declared that in the First Reign

✱ I was a liberal. Then liberty was new in the country; it was in everyone's aspirations, but not in the laws, not in practical ideas. [State] power was everything; I was a liberal. Now, however, society has changed. Democratic principles have prevailed everywhere and have proved prejudicial. Society, which was then threatened by [state] power, is now threatened by disorganization and anarchy. Today, I want, as I wanted then, to serve society, and save it, and therefore I am a regressista. I am not a turncoat. I do not abandon the cause I

(...continued)

who is v. 1.1?
Populações Meridionais do Brasil. On Viana, see Jeffrey D. Needell, "History, Race, and the State, in the Thought of Oliveira Viana," Hispanic American Historical Review 75:1 (Feb., 1995), 1-30. Similar critiques of liberalism could also be found elsewhere in Latin America at this time. See, for example, Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, Cesarismo Democrático: estudos sobre las bases sociológicas da la Constitución efectiva de Venezuela (Caracas: Empresa El Cojo, 1919).

⁴⁵ Jeffrey D. Needell, "Brasilien, 1830 - 1889," chapter in Raymond Buve and John Fisher, eds., Handbuch der Geschichte Lateinamerikas, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, Oct., 1992), 2: 441-97. I have used the unpublished, English-language version of this piece, provided to me by Jeffrey Needell. Page numbers refer to the English language version. See pp. 13-14, 26-27. Also see Rohloff de Mattos, O Tempo Squarema.

defend in its time of peril and weakness. I abandon it when it is so secure in its triumph that its excesses damage it.⁴⁶

Like Vasconcellos, many other moderates split from their allies. This was made much easier by Dom Pedro's death in 1834, which ended any chance of restoration. Former restorationists, no longer discredited by association with the cause of restoring a Portuguese-born monarch, joined former moderate liberals in a formidable parliamentary majority in opposition to Regent Feijó. Utterly blocked in the Chamber, Feijó resigned in 1837. Under the new Regent, the Pernambucan conservative, Pedro de Araújo Lima, Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos and other regressistas took office and began the struggle to dismantle the liberal reforms.⁴⁷

In 1838, Minister of Justice Vasconcellos asserted that "Unhappiness will always be excited, clamor will always be produced, grave inconveniences will always follow legislative changes which are rapidly introduced, when they are not in complete harmony with the country's habits and customs."⁴⁸ The fundamental regressista verdict on the liberal reforms was thus declared. Liberal reforms inspired by European and North American success were not always attacked frontally as inherently mistaken; rather, they were judged inapplicable to the particular circumstances of Brazil. In 1841, Minister of Justice Paulino José Soares de Sousa declared that "[h]aving recently left the colonial

⁴⁶ Nabuco, Estadista, p.41; For an analysis of Vasconcellos' shift, see Leal, Do Ato Adicional, 77-82.

⁴⁷ Leal, Do Ato Adicional, 72-76; Needell, "Brasilien," 19-20; Flory, Judge and Jury, 132. The first regresso cabinet included, along with its leader Vasconcellos, who served as both minister of justice and minister of the empire, two Pernambucans, Antônio Peregrino Maciel Monterio and Sebastião do Rego Barros, a brother of the Pernambucan Provincial President Francisco do Rego Barros; a sagquarema, Joaquim José Rodrigues Tôrres; and Miguel Calmon do Pin e Almeida, the Marquis of Abrantes.

⁴⁸ Relatório . . . Negocios da Justiça . . . 1838, p. 12.

regime, too mistrustful and fearful of arbitrariness, we avidly embraced vague doctrines of exaggerated liberty, putting aside . . . the facts, whose observation, analysis and study, pours immense light on the applicability of legislative, political and moral questions of a country.⁴⁹

Radical innovations had resulted in "calamity," "anarchy," and "sad lessons."⁵⁰ Paulino, as minister of justice in 1843, affirmed that "Nothing is more fatal and demoralizing for a country than weak (government) power."⁵¹ Regressistas thus sought a return to strong centralized rule. Above all, by insulating power from local influences and by making government officials in the provinces dependent on, and agents of, the central government, firm rule could be reestablished and crime and political instability reduced. Much of the struggle to shift power from the provinces to the Court would be fought in the Chamber, with key battles over undoing the localism of liberal judicial reforms.

Reestablishing the prestige and authority of the monarch was an essential element of strong central rule. In part this involved such institutional issues as recreating the Council of State, which offered advice on the exercise of the moderating power, extending to influence on the cabinet, including legislative opinions and programs. Yet an effective centralized monarchy required more than a particular machinery of government and corresponding legislation. It required integrating the institution in to the traditions and habits of society, to create what Walter Bagehot later described as the British monarchy's "dignified" aspect, in contrast to its efficient aspect (the actual making

⁴⁹ Relatório . . . 1841 . . . Negocios da Justiça, pp. 18-19.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18; Relatório . . . 1ª Sessão . . . 1843 . . . Negocios da Justiça, p. 18.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

and implementing of public policy). To achieve this "dignified" element, a theatrical show of prominent persons identified with the government that reinforced public acceptance and the colonial traditions of the monarchy was needed.⁵² Even in 1843, the leading Conservative journalist in Brazil, Justiano José da Rocha, wrote that "Public spirit is clearly tending towards monarchy, yet that tendency, born of reason, inspired by love of order, is not aided by our laws, nor by our customs, nor by our habits: the throne does not have a foundation."⁵³

Establishing the dignified aspect of the monarchy, to help strengthen an emotional, intuitive embrace of the monarchy, was an important aspect of creating a strong, stable centralized monarchy generally overlooked by the historiography. Yet one notes that to this end, the trappings of the monarchy were refurbished by the Conservatives quite carefully. Traditional rituals of court ceremony were reintroduced. In 1837, the new regent, Pedro de Araújo Lima, complemented the legislative battle for regresso by kneeling before the eleven-year old emperor in a public street, and humbly kissing the child's hand. This ritual, revived by the regent, with its emphasis on hierarchy and obedience, was known as the beija mão (hand kiss). Portraits of the emperor were distributed to bring his image to presidential palaces, provincial assemblies and town halls in all the provinces. In Recife's presidential palace, on the emperor's birthday in 1840, a three-hour ceremony, also referred to as a beija mão, was held. Prominent

⁵² See Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1986). It is worth noting that Bagehot saw an evolution, from a time when the dignified and efficient elements were united in an absolute monarch to a period (Bagehot published his work in 1867) in which the efficient aspect of government was directed by the cabinet in parliament. In the Brazilian constitution the monarch possessed a significant portion of the efficient aspect of government.

⁵³ Cited by José Murilo de Carvalho in Teatro de Sombras: A Política Imperial (São Paulo: Vértice and Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ, 1988), 16.

individuals of the province, elegantly dressed, filed one by one in front of a large portrait of the emperor that was flanked by the Provincial President and the Bishop. Pernambuco's leading citizens each bowed to the portrait, flanked by Church and State, and paid their respects.⁵⁴

The Regresso, although it found broad support, was most closely associated with one province, Rio de Janeiro. In the 1830s coffee had overtaken sugar as Brazil's leading export. Coffee exports initially came almost entirely from Rio de Janeiro's Paraíba Valley, and subsequently spread to the provinces of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. The tremendous boom in coffee exports, and the revenues that taxes on increased imports and exports allowed the state, facilitated a mutually beneficial relationship between a strong monarchy and wealthy fluminense planters and merchants.⁵⁵

Coffee planters needed a stable government with considerable authority. Slaves, the majority of whom were African-born and potentially more likely to rebel, provided the bulk of the labor pool. The fear of rebellion, even the dreaded possibility of race war as in the Haitian Revolution, was ever present. Particularly worrisome were unstable political conditions, in which upheavals of any nature might create divisions and openings which slaves could seize. A strong and stable government, with an effective Army and National Guard, was the surest guarantee. Stability was important as well to assure the credit worthiness of Brazil in foreign financial markets where long-term loans

⁵⁴ Barman, Brazil, 197, 202, 296 (note 64); Louis Léger Vauthier, Diário Íntimo de Louis Léger Vauthier, reprinted in its entirety in Gilberto Freyre, Um Engenheiro Francês no Brasil 2º Tomo (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1960), 646-647.

⁵⁵ Needell, "Brasilien," 16-17; Barman, Brazil, 196-197; Flory, Judge and Jury, 133. For a broad ranging, yet detailed, local study of fluminense coffee, see Stanley Stein, Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

were sought. A strong national government also had a role to play in providing basic infrastructure for a an expanding export economy.⁵⁶

Conservative fluminense planters and merchants shared this interest in a strong state with large-scale exporters elsewhere, particularly in the sugar, tobacco, and cotton areas of Pernambuco and Bahia, but with an important distinction. Rooted in the port and province of Rio de Janeiro, they were best positioned to establish connections at the Court and influence politics there. The prominent politicians that led the regresso were well-connected with the closely inter-knit Portuguese and fluminense merchant and planter elite of the Court and its hinterland. Consider, for example, the saquaremas.
 Paulino José Soares de Sousa, from a prominent family in Minas Gerais which married into various fluminense families, himself married a woman from a prominent planter clan of the province, whose sister married Joaquim José Rodrigues Tôrres. Rodrigues Tôrres, born in Itaboraí to a prominent local Portuguese and his fluminense wife, himself headed an extended family of planters with relations throughout the old plantation region of the baixada fluminense (Rio de Janeiro's provincial lowlands). Eusébio de Queirós, a Portuguese born in Angola, son of a prominent crown magistrate who had set down Brazilian roots, himself married into a prominent Portuguese merchant family in Rio de Janeiro; his mother-in-law, after the death of her husband, remarried to José Clemente Pereira, a key Portuguese-born statesmen of the First Reign and former restorationist. Likewise, an important ally, the strong-willed Conservative leader Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, with roots in Minas Gerais, married a cousin, the daughter of a prominent Rio merchant, and became a fluminense planter in time. Thus, this elite, with interests ranging from Crown magistracy through Portuguese commerce and provincial planting,

⁵⁶ Needell, "Brasilien," 17-18; Flory, Judge and Jury, 134; Barman, Brazil, 192.

had especially strong reason to see its future and fortune identified with the monarchy, and provided it with solid political support and, via taxes on its exports and imports, a strong revenue base for the state.⁵⁷

As we have seen, the tumultuous years of the Regency discredited political innovation. After Dom Pedro's abdication removed the key symbol of authority and legitimacy, resorting to force to achieve political goals became widespread. The reader may recall that decentralizing reforms only increased local struggle, as the stakes were that much higher. Liberal judicial reforms, although crucial to restructuring political power, seemed to unleash waves of crime, summed up in the complaint of impunity. With authority and order undermined, increasing numbers of politically active Brazilians accepted the conservative critique of liberal reformism. As this chapter has shown, it was the regressista triumph, intimately associated with the fluminense elite, that ultimately gave significance to the Regency, by drawing the conclusions that led to the strengthened state that emerged in the 1840s. For this reason, Nabuco would later describe the interregnum as "The agitation of . . . ten years [that] produced the peace of the fifty years that followed."⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Needell, "Brasilien," 17-19.

⁵⁸ Nabuco, Estadista, 32.

CHAPTER 3
CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS, 1837-1847

and JCP.

If Joaquim Nabuco looked upon the instability of the 1830s as the key to understanding the Empire, it was the following decade in which the implications of the Regency were worked out. Making sense of political competition in the period requires attention to competing groups of elite families, although individuals of any position might participate in political struggle. In the dramas played out, the question of order was never far from center stage. Criminal violence, armed political struggle, the possibility of violent upheaval of the lower classes, and how the newly emerging institutions of the state could impose the law in distant and often unruly reaches of the Empire were crucial to political discourse. Nonetheless, the dynamics of local and provincial competition, with intimate links to the "high politics" of the Court, led to intense polarization that made appeals to the lower, and potentially "dangerous," classes attractive.

Much of Pernambuco's rich littoral was covered by great estates. There, relatively small numbers of men exercised control over vast dependent populations. Large-scale commercial activity in Recife revolved around export of the estates' production, especially sugar, and the import of a wide variety of goods that such exports made possible. Not surprisingly, wealthy landowning families possessed considerable political influence.

landowners

The most powerful of all were the Cavalcanti de Albuquerque. Joaquim Nabuco noted that the so-called Cavalcanti family was not, strictly speaking, one family, but "diverse circles, formed by the old families," which controlled a large portion of the land in the province.¹ Captain-Major Francisco de Paula de Holanda Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, an organizer of turn of the century conspiracies against Portuguese rule and a significant figure in the failed struggle for an independent Pernambucan republic in 1817, was descended from four powerful families that settled in early Brazil, three of them in the sixteenth century--the Coelhos, Cavalcantis, Albuquerque, and Holandas. He in turn fathered four sons who were ennobled, three of whom became significant political leaders in their own right--the Liberal leader, Antônio Francisco de Paula Holanda Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (the Viscount of Albuquerque) and the Conservatives Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (the Viscount of Suassuna) and Pedro Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (the Viscount of Camaragibe). Manuel Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti (the Baron of Moribeca) served only one term as a provincial deputy, and did not pursue politics further. Over the course of the Monarchy, the Cavalcanti de Albuquerque and their cousins received fifteen titles, more than any other family in Brazil.²

¹ Nabuco, Estadista, 37. The statement on diverse circles parallels a comment in a newspaper edited by the subject of the biography, his father, José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, from which Joaquim Nabuco quotes. It was presumably in response to denunciations of "the Cavalcantis," whose target was really a broader group of families allied with the Cavalcantis. Joaquim Nabuco was himself quite familiar with the Pernambucan elite. His mother, a niece of Francisco Paes Barreto (the Marquis of Recife and a leader of the 1817 bid for regional independence), belonged to a prominent family. See Nabuco, Estadista, 46-47.

² Eul-Soo Pang, In Pursuit of Honor and Power: Noblemen of the Southern Cross in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988), 78-80. Basic biographical information and brief narratives on prominent Pernambucans are

(continued...)

Elite families were closely inter-knit. The four ennobled Cavalcanti de Albuquerque were cousins of Francisco do Rego Barros, the Baron of Boa Vista (the Provincial President from 1837 to 1844 and leader of the Rego Barros family), by virtue of marriage between a paternal aunt and the Baron of Boa Vista's father. One of the four Cavalcanti brothers, Manuel Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti (Moribeca), was also son-in-law to Francisco do Rego Barros.³ The allied Rego Barros and Cavalcanti de Albuquerque families played the leading role in provincial politics in the 1830s and 1840s. Antônio Francisco (Viscount of Albuquerque) was son-in-law to an imperial senator from Pernambuco, Manuel Caetano de Almeida e Albuquerque. The Viscount of Albuquerque thus served in the imperial Senate with both his brother, the Viscount of Suassuna, and his father-in-law. Along with a handful of other families, such as the Sá Albuquerque and the Paes Barretos in Cabo, the Lins in Escada, the Sousa Leões in Jaboatão, and the Wanderleys, this relatively small elite occupied commanding economic and political positions and enjoyed great prestige.⁴

José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, a leading Conservative politician, defended the Cavalcantis from charges of oligarchical domination by arguing that their influence was natural and appropriate.⁵ He noted the many official positions the Cavalcantis had

(...continued)

available in Francisco Augusto Pereira da Costa, Dicionário de Pernambucanos Célebres (Recife: Fundação de Cultura Cidade do Recife, 1981). On the 1817 Revolution, see Carlos Guilherme Mota, Nordeste 1817: Estruturas e Argumentos (São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1972) and Glacyra Lazzari Leite, Pernambuco 1817: estrutura e comportamentos sociais (Recife: Massangana, 1988).

³ Naro, "Brazil's 1848," p.79. The Baron's brothers Sebastião and João were also active politically and, of course, related to the Cavalcantis.

⁴ Pang, In Pursuit of Honor, 76-80.

⁵ As alluded to earlier, Nabuco de Araújo is the subject of the magisterial biography (continued...)

occupied prior to and after independence, and claimed they owned a third of the sugar estates in the province. Yet he did not see this as evidence of oligarchy:

The influence of the Cavalcanti family is not a fact of 1835, but derives from remote times; that influence is not the work of power or revolution, but proceeds from the nature of things; it is the influence that an old, rich and numerous family that has always occupied the most advantageous social positions has always and will always have.⁶

Araújo -
no
oligarchy -
rich &
numerous!

Powerful as the Cavalcantis were, their predominance did not go uncontested. Much of their opposition coalesced around elite families of the littoral north of Recife. In broad terms, one can speak of an alliance of families of more recent origin, as the dry mata north of Recife had only prospered beginning with the cotton boom of the latter eighteenth-century.⁷ While some of these families gained their wealth through cotton, others grew sugar cane, like their rivals to the south of Recife. When political parties emerged late in the Regency the faction north of Recife tended to ally with the Liberal Party and their opponents with the Conservative Party. This split in the Pernambucan elites was far from clear cut. Some planters in the north supported the Cavalcantis and vice versa. Indeed, a key leader of the faction challenging the Cavalcanti led group, Gervásio Pires Ferreira, owned a sugar plantation south of Recife. Exceptions were not unusual, as local rivals routinely joined opposing parties. Nonetheless, the usefulness of viewing political divisions in terms of these factions is apparent when one observes the continuity over time in the composition of the rival political groupings. Individuals

for opposition
for coalition

(...continued)

Estadista do Imperio by Joaquim Nabuco.

⁶ José Thomaz Nabuco de Araújo, Justa Apreciação do Predomínio do Partido Praieiro ou História da Dominação da Praia (Recife: União, 1847), 4. This piece was published anonymously, but was the work of Nabuco.

⁷ On this cotton boom, see Dauril Alden, "Late Colonial Brazil, 1750-1808," esp. pp. 318-22, in Leslie Bethell, ed., Colonial Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987).

associated with these two groups contested state power from the independence struggles of 1821 and 1822 to the Praieira Revolution in 1848 and 1849.⁸

The Cavalcantis and their allies scored a significant victory when they placed one of their own, Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (the future Viscount of Suassuna), into the provincial presidency in 1835. This they managed, ironically enough, by supporting a radical liberal barracks revolt against Provincial President Manuel Carvalho Paes de Andrade, a leader of the opposing faction.⁹ In 1837, their relative and ally, the Conservative Francisco do Rego Barros, the future Baron of Boa Vista, replaced Francisco Antônio. He served as provincial president, with some interruptions, for the unusually long period of seven years. Under his leadership, the so-called Rego Barros-Cavalcanti oligarchy became thoroughly entrenched in government positions. The Baron was thus a central figure of the era.

Cavalcanti's
son
Cavalcanti
Provincial
Hegemony

Like many members of the elite, Francisco do Rego Barros had undertaken university studies in Europe. Arriving in Paris in 1823, Rego Barros must have felt the same admiration for European civilization that so many of his contemporaries did. Behind them had left a society lacking, in a certain way, self-confidence. Across Latin America, many of the educated in the newly independent countries felt a degree of cultural inferiority in relation to Europe. It was a commonplace of the era that their countries had suffered from colonial rule that had retarded their progress. In the eyes of some, even the Iberian colonial powers that had bequeathed them many of the European

⁸ Carvalho, Hegemony and Rebellion, 32-34.

⁹ Manoel Carvalho had led the Confederation of the Equator, an 1824 attempt at forming an independent republic, against which the Cavalcantis and their southern allies had struggled. Army troops from Rio de Janeiro put down the secessionist attempt.

elements of their culture and population themselves lagged behind in the changes associated with the Enlightenment.¹⁰

In Brazil, as elsewhere in Latin America, these feelings were compounded by the contradictions of living in a society with profoundly racist assumptions, in the midst of a population in which people of color predominated, and in which African-born slaves were present in large numbers. Padre Lopes Gama summed up an attitude common among the elite when he wrote that, "We, unfortunately born in the midst of African slaves, are mainly and almost inevitably, poorly raised. The crude and brutal ways, the vices of that unfortunate race have been inoculated on our people, and that is the seed of our general immorality."¹¹ The view that Brazil possessed less "civilization" than the more advanced countries of Europe was powerfully reinforced by the perceived failures of the liberal reforms of the Regency.

If Brazil was lacking in civilization, Europe was the idealized model to which many looked. French and British literati exerted considerable influence, and not only among those who devoted serious attention to their works. Serialized versions appeared in newspapers, making them available to the broad range of the politically active population. Newspapers provided regular coverage of European politics. One Pernambucan newspaper explicitly stated that it was reprinting an article on the July

dayish
following
of European
future

¹⁰ See Frank Safford, "Politics, Ideology, and Society," in Leslie Bethell, ed., Spanish America After Independence, c. 1820-c.1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987). In Argentina, for example, Sarmiento's depiction of New World barbarism is one in which Córdoba, symbolizing retrograde Spanish influence, is partly responsible. See note 22 of chapter 2.

thesis
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¹¹ "Carapeuceiro. A má criação," Diário de Pernambuco, Feb. 21, 1840, p.2. Diário de Pernambuco, Feb. 21, 1840.

Revolution of 1830 in France and its consequences because of the applicability of its lessons to Brazil.¹²

It is easy to understand how Francisco de Rego Barros, upon arriving for his studies of mathematics, was swept up in the culture and ambience of Paris. In subsequent years, his opponents often noted the manners of a grand seigneur he had acquired in Europe. Immersion in French culture had not simply spurred vanity, however. After his experience in Paris, he was convinced that beautifying Recife and enriching the cultural life of the capital could play an important role in avoiding the flight of talented men and in advancing the province.¹³ He further decided on the necessity of improving the economic infrastructure of the province. Public-works projects were crucial to achieving these goals.

The president lamented the difficulty of implementing projects. He cited the "lack of intelligent workers . . . (and) engineers to direct them" and deplored the absence of people capable of making maps, establishing budgets, and directing the construction of roads, bridges, sidewalks and public buildings.¹⁴ He wanted to establish a School of Architecture to train people, but insisted on the need to hire competent professionals, wherever they might be found. In 1838, the French engineer Boyer was hired to direct port improvements and build the Quay do Colegio. Rego Barros relied mainly, however, on another French engineer, Louis Léger Vauthier. Trained at the renowned École

¹² "Diário de Pernambuco," Diário de Pernambuco, Nov. 17, 1842, p. 2. The same paper later explained that many of the ideas and phrases in one of its articles were derived from a recent article on events in France. See "COMMUNICADO. NOSSA SITUAÇÃO ACTUAL," Diário de Pernambuco, Jan. 5, 1843.

¹³ Nabuco, Estadista, 48.

¹⁴ Falla, . . . 1838. . . Presidente (de Pernambuco) pp. 48-50, p. 49 for the quote.

Polytechnique in Paris, he had been hired in 1840, during Manuel de Sousa Teixeira's brief term as provincial president, to supervise work on a hospital in the Convento do Carmo and the building of a new government school. Rego Barros granted him considerable authority to increase the scope of public works.¹⁵ Vauthier and his team of foreign engineers subsequently oversaw all public works under Rego Barros.

The French engineer met resistance from various quarters. Rego Barros' determination to see the plans through, however, led him to reorganize the Department of Public Works, unifying its three branches. The president fired the head of one branch, the Inspector General of Public Works, Firmino Herculano de Moraes Ancora, a prominent opponent of Vauthier. The German engineer Augusto Kersting, the head of another, was placed under Vauthier's command. The Department of Public Works was placed directly under the orders of the provincial president, avoiding bureaucratic entanglements which could delay projects. Vauthier was given complete responsibility for the preparation and execution of all public works projects, including preparing their technical and administrative aspects, acquiring materials, handling the accounting, and supervising the work performed. The French engineer only needed to submit his plans to Rego Barros and receive his approval. Vauthier's freedom of action was assured.¹⁶

In 1838 the provincial president moved to address the shortage of skilled labor by *labor coach* recruiting artisans from Europe. The following year a Companhia de Operários brought 105 German artisans, masons, carpenters, and blacksmiths. They added considerably to the skilled labor available in the province, working on the construction of roads, bridges,

¹⁵ Relatório... 1841... Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 9.

¹⁶ Freyre, Um Engenheiro Francês, 312-315; Relatório... 1841... Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 8-9.

wharves, and buildings until the company was disbanded in 1843. Their contribution was notable in the two most dramatic architectural achievements of the period--the Teatro de Santa Isabel and the Caxangá suspension bridge over the Capibaribe River.¹⁷

Seeking foreign technical experts was not a novelty. As early as 1825, Provincial President Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque had written to Holland, seeking a hydraulic engineer to direct port improvements.¹⁸ In 1830 the County Council of Recife hired the German engineer João Bloem as Encarregado da Architectura da Cidade. Bloem held various posts over the rest of the decade. He helped develop plans to improve Recife along European lines. The narrow, twisting streets were to be replaced with wider ones, straight, and of uniform sizes and division into blocks. Building codes were to ensure greater uniformity. Contiguous buildings were to be of the same height. The height of new homes, as well as the number and size of windows and doors were regulated, cornices made mandatory and stone sidewalks of determined width were specified.¹⁹

1827
1830

If acquiring access to foreign technical expertise was not new, the scale of the reforms undertaken was indeed unprecedented. Under the provincial president's leadership, old structures, such as the Customs building, were improved, and new ones

¹⁷ Flávio Guerra, O Conde da Boa Vista e o Recife (Recife: Fundação Guararapes, 1973), 87-88, 91-93; Freyre, Um Engenheiro Francês, 291-293, 1839; Relatório... 1840... Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 12; Guilherme Auler, A Companhia de Operários, 1839-1843: Subsídios para o Estudo da Emigração Germânica no Brasil (Recife: Arquivo Público Estadual, 1959).

¹⁸ Freyre, Um Engenheiro Francês, 292.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 285-290. Under Dom João VI (initially as Prince Regent and then as King of Portugal), the prefect of Rio de Janeiro, Paulo Fernandes Viana, had undertaken similar reforms. See Jeffrey D. Needell, A Tropical Belle Epoque: Elite culture and society in turn-of-the-century Rio de Janeiro (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 24-25.

were constructed, including an impressive Presidential Palace. Most striking, however, was the Theatro de Santa Isabel. Francisco de Rego Barros had been taken by French theater, especially the classic works of Molière, Racine, and Corneille. The years of his residence in Paris, 1823-1825, had seen the openings of impressive theaters--the Gymnase, Gaité and Porte Saint-Martin, as well as the rebuilding of the Odéon.²⁰ As president, Rego Barros sought a new theater which, with the "advantages that result for civilization and morality," would play an important role in enriching the capital's cultural life.²¹ The dilapidated old theater, popularly known disparagingly as the Teatro Capoeira, or Bush Theater, was so rundown that few people attended its performances.²²

Rego Barros rejected initial plans for a new building, drawn up by the French engineer Boyer, as too modest. At his first meeting with the French engineer Vauthier he discussed his own ideas for a new theater. Vauthier then drew up plans for an appropriately sumptuous theater. The project was thoroughly foreign in inspiration and architectural models. A Frenchman directed its construction, employing many foreign artisans, using new construction techniques, and various materials imported from abroad--stone blocks from Lisbon, iron from France, copper nails from England, and cement from Sweden.²³

²⁰ Guerra, O Conde, 78.

²¹ Relatório . . . 1839 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 36.

²² *Ibid.*; Guerra, O Conde, 80.

²³ Guerra, O Conde, 82; Francisco Augusto Pereira da Costa, Anais Pernambucanos 10 (Recife: FUNDARPE), 173-175; Freyre, Um Engenheiro Francês on first meeting. Funding cuts under the Liberals delayed its opening to 1850. It was named after the heir to the Brazilian throne, Princess Isabel.

Blog: 5-
Theatres

Beautification of the provincial capital was only part of Rego Barros' plans. His immediate concern upon entering office was to improve the economic infra-structure of the province. In his first report to the Provincial Assembly, in March of 1838, he said that,

[I am] persuaded, Senhores, of how beneficial it would be for the province to establish the means of easy transportation of goods to the market of this city, thus shortening the distance between places, diminishing the risk of travellers and avoiding the increase in costs of production, it was my first and principal care to find out exact information on works in progress . . . I arrived at the conclusion that . . . very little has been done for the material improvement of our land . . . ²⁴

TRANSPORT
and
project

Road construction figured prominently in the president's plans. During his administration considerable progress was made on four trunk roads from Recife to Goiana in the north, Limoeiro in the northwest, Vitória de Santo Antão in the west, and Escada in the southwest. Likewise, his annual reports to the Provincial Assembly were filled with details on the progress of repairs to bridges and earthen embankments around them. Citing the extraordinary costs of continual repair of wooden bridges, the Recife and Boa Vista bridges were rebuilt with iron. Rego Barros also noted that new iron bridges would beautify the city, as well as conserve labor. In 1843 work began on a suspension bridge, a startling innovation in the province, over the Beberibe River near Caxanga. ²⁵

Iron
and
bridge

²⁴ Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 35.

²⁵ Freyre, Um Engenheiro Francês, 307-310; Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 33-53; Relatorio . . . 1839 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco) pp. 28-36; Relatorio . . . 1840 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 10-13; Relatorio . . . Presidente . . . (de Pernambuco), pp. 7-10; Relatorio . . . 1842 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 17-19; Relatorio . . . 1843 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 20-24; Relatorio . . . 1844 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 14-17. For roads, see all the presidential reports to the Provincial Assembly of the period, as well as Naro, "Brazil's 1848," pp. 88-92; for iron bridges, see Falla . . . 1838 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), pp. 41-42; and Relatorio . . . 1841 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 8. On the Caxanga (continued...)

The historiography on the period has depicted a politically calm backdrop for the Baron of Boa Vista in initiating his reform projects. He has been presented conciliating his opponents and achieving a consensus in the early years of his administration. Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, for example, wrote of the moderate policies of the provincial president and understandings he arrived at with provincial liberals. Izabel Andrade Marson considers the 1835-1842 period as one of moderation among the property-owning elite and a period of tenuous party differences. Like Marson, Costa Porto noted what he labeled a "harmony ticket" that prevailed in elections for the 1838 - 1841 Chamber, a ticket that joined elements of the most diverse tendencies, among which were liberals Nunes Machado and Sabino Urbano (sic).²⁶ Indeed, the Diário Novo, the press organ of the praieira opposition to Francisco do Rego Barros, stated that Rego Barros entered office at a time of low political passions, when people were tired of battle.²⁷

It is possible, however, to overstate the consensus or conciliation of 1837 to 1842 period. Partisan struggle certainly continued in some of the localities around the province. The district of Limoeiro, fifty-four miles northwest of Recife, for example, was the scene of frequent conflict. Groups led by João Mauricio Cavalcanti da Rocha Wanderley, a landowner and representative in the Provincial Assembly and National

(...continued)

suspension bridge see Relatório . . . 1843 . . . Presidente (de Pernambuco), p. 21 and Guerra, O Conde, 90-93.

²⁶ Costa Porto, "Prefácio," in Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 10; Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, "Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Melo," Revista do Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano XLVII (1975), 330-331; Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 191-192. None of these authors cite documentation to support these points. Joaquim Nunes Machado (1808-1848) and Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Mello (1811-1870) became parliamentary leaders of the praia party. Nunes Machado, in particular, enjoyed considerable prestige and popularity.

²⁷ Diário Novo, Feb. 6, 1843.

Chamber aligned with the Baron of Boa Vista, and others directed by National Guard Colonel Henrique Pereira de Lucena, a liberal leader and subsequent participant on the rebel side in the Praieira Revolution, were engaged in seemingly endless hostilities. Official documents and newspapers were full of reports on the struggles.

In January of 1840, for example, Lucena complained that João Maurício, then mayor, was abusing his police powers. His agents were intimidating the local National Guard, openly insulting its members in view of other authorities and threatening them with beatings and murder if they followed their officers. These tactics prompted insubordination among Guard members and unwillingness to carry out their duties.²⁸

Later that month João Maurício was brought up on libel charges for pamphlets he had distributed denouncing Lucena.²⁹ Even after being relieved as mayor, charges were made that loyalists of his forcibly released two military recruits.³⁰ In January of 1841 João Maurício was named district judge, prompting a series of vehement protests of people who feared a renewal of hostilities and abuse of power.³¹ Likewise, in the sertão district of Flores the partisans of Francisco Barbosa Nogueira Paz, aligned with the Liberals in Recife, and Leonardo Bezerra da Siquiera Cavalcanti, with the Conservatives,

²⁸ Coronel Chefe da Legião to President of Pernambuco, Jan. 15, 1840; Lieutenant Colonel of the Second Battalion to Chefe da Legião, Jan. 2, 1840; Major Comandante of the Cavalry Squadron to the Coronel Chefe, Jan. 9, 1840; Lieutenant of the First Company of the Cavalry Squadron to Chefe Coronel Jan. 4, 1840; Quarter Master to the Chefe da Legião, all printed in Diário de Pernambuco, Jan. 17, 1841.

²⁹ "Correspondencias," signed Henrique Pereira Lucena, Diário de Pernambuco, Feb. 1, 1840, p. 2.

³⁰ "Noticias de Limoeiro," Diário de Pernambuco, July 14, 1840, p. 3.

³¹ President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, Jan. 20, 1841 and five appended letters, ANRJ/SM, II¹322.

were in frequent conflict. They too defended their actions with appeals to newspapers readers.³²

Personal correspondence of Francisco Anselmo Peretti, a magistrate and politician from Goiana, forty-five miles northwest of Recife, also reveals an agitated and partisan political environment in the late 1830s. Felipe Lopes Neto, a political ally of Peretti's and future Liberal participant in the Praieira Revolution, wrote in July of 1838 that Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (the future Viscount of Suassuna) had substituted the daggers of 1836 (when Francisco was provincial president) with infernal criminal charges. "The intention of that infamous scum is to throw aside, by means of just or unjust sentences, anyone with enough prestige and courage to face him in the next elections."³³ The previous month Lopes Neto had written of how Francisco de Paula, José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo and Félix Peixoto Brito de Melo were working together. Francisco de Paula criticized the liberal Antônio Joaquim de Melo; Nabuco, as prosecutor, immediately charged him and Félix Peixoto, as judge, condemned him.³⁴

The Cavalcantis were well established in the Provincial Assembly. In frustration, Lopes Neto described this body as "stupid and detestable, (that) entirely ignores the obligations that link it to our unhappy population, mocks morality and public opinion to infamously bow down to an ignorant and presumptuous family, indecorously sanctioning

³² See "Publicação á pedido," Diario de Pernambuco, July 15, 1842, p. 2 and "Correspondencias," signed O Pajahuense Imparcial, Diario de Pernambuco, July 30, 1840, p. 3, alternately praising and criticizing the performance of Nogueira Paz as Mayor.

³³ Lopes Neto to Peretti, July 9, 1838, in "Noticia Breve do 2º Reinado NUMA TROCA DE CORRESPONDENCIA," Revista do Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano, XLIII (1950-1953), p. 32.

³⁴ Lopes Neto to Peretti, June 18, 1838, *Ibid.*, p. 31.

its brutal whims."³⁵ Still, such men recognized that the struggle to gain seats in the Assembly would be crucial in this era. Lopes Neto advised Peretti that, in light of the grave criminal charges, they must pretend moderation, to arrive to the elections whole, and only then wage a fierce war.³⁶

Political conflict was not only drawn along lines of the nascent, far from fully formed, Liberal and Conservative parties. Though the historiography has depicted the early years of Francisco do Rego Barros's presidency as one of consensus, there was tension and competition, even among the Conservatives. In February of 1839, Lopes Neto wrote Peretti that their opponents were divided and that Francisco de Paula and the provincial president would lead separate tickets in the election. News had spread of Francisco de Paula promoting an obstinate opposition to the president in the next assembly. Rego Barros responded to this threat by shuffling nominations to judicial positions, placing key judges in Recife that he expected would be grateful for their appointments and loyal to him.³⁷ In the event, the Cavalcantis were divided from Rego Barros and ran competing tickets, as did the Liberals and the extreme liberals.³⁸ By 1844, another Cavalcanti, Pedro Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (the future Viscount of Camaragibe), was emerging as the key Conservative leader, challenging Rego Barros for leadership of the party.³⁹

³⁵ Lopes Neto to Peretti, August 14, 1838, Ibid., p. 36.

³⁶ Lopes Neto to Peretti, July, 9, 1838, Ibid., p. 32; 14 August, 1838, Ibid., p. 36.

³⁷ Lopes Neto to Peretti, Feb. 29, 1839, Ibid., p. 46.

³⁸ Herculano Alves da Silva to Peretti, May 11, 1839, Ibid., p. 78.

³⁹ Joaquim Nabuco wrote that by 1844, Pedro was surpassing Rego Barros among Conservatives. Nabuco, Estadista, 76; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," p. 98, alludes to a split

In 1837, Antônio Francisco de Paula e Holanda Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (Holanda Cavalcanti) joined the nascent Liberal Party. As a prominent defender of provincial autonomy, Holanda enjoyed prestige among Liberals. Yet, his position was complex. His brother, Pedro Francisco, was a Conservative leader in Pernambuco. While political differences existed among the Cavalcantis, there were limits to political struggles among them. When the family faced serious threats, it united in self-defense. Holanda Cavalcanti consistently used his influence in the Court to oppose nomination of any Liberal who might aggressively battle his Conservative family members. He rejected harsh opposition to Provincial President Rego Barros. Holanda was even on good terms with fellow Pernambucan Pedro de Araújo Lima, a key Conservative at the Court. Indeed, the latter, as regent, appointed him, his brother Francisco Antônio, and their cousin Francisco de Paula Almeida e Albuquerque, to the Imperial Senate. Yet, in the Chamber in Rio de Janeiro, Holanda Cavalcanti opposed the centralization project of the Regresso with which Araújo Lima was associated.

With the Cavalcantis in commanding positions in both the Liberal and Conservative parties, and therefore able to promote their interests in the Court regardless of which party was in power, those opposed to the Cavalcantis formed a separate party. The Partido Nacional de Pernambuco was, like Holanda Cavalcanti, allied to the national Liberal Party. Thus, throughout the 1840s, there were two adherents of the Liberal Party in Pernambuco, though the Partido Nacional was by far the larger. The latter party became known as the praieiro party, after the street, the Rua da Praia, where its party organ, the Diário Novo, was printed.

(...continued)

among the Conservatives in 1842, due in part to rivalry between Pedro Francisco and the Baron of Boa Vista, but does not document the point.

two "liberal" parties

JOBS
liberal / 1840

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The praiheiros were a diverse lot. Many well-off families whose opposition to the Cavalcantis can be dated at least to the "Government of the Hicks" in 1822 were affiliated with the party.⁴⁰ The praiia party also had success in appealing to individuals lower in the social order. Considerable numbers of small merchants and artisans also supported the party, particularly in the latter 1840s when the party at various times called for taxes on commercial establishments that had more than one foreign clerk, nationalization of retail commerce, and protectionist measures to ease the burden of foreign competition on artisans. Many members of liberal professions supported it. With a broad appeal, the party was vulnerable to attacks that labeled it as a party of the lower class.⁴¹ The pejorative connotation of such a description was well understood--politically active lower-class members were considered potentially disorderly, unreliable, ambitious in a negative sense, seeking advancement over people more deserving than themselves, and, above all, violent. Joaquim Nabuco described the party in similar terms, though his general analysis is more subtle and sophisticated than the anti-praieira polemicists who were their contemporaries. Nabuco saw "in the praieiro movement the force of a popular whirlwind. Violent, indifferent to laws and principles . . . drunk in its excesses of authority . . . But the truth is that the Praia was the majority, it was almost the entire Pernambuco povo. . . [M]ore than a political movement, it was a social movement . . ."⁴²

⁴⁰ Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 32-35, 39-40. The "Government of the Hicks" (governo dos matutos) was dominated by conservative, southern planters and came to power through a military coup supported by crown agents on September 17, 1822.

⁴¹ Pedro Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, the Viscount of Camaragibe, claimed years later that nine tenths of the population supported the praiheiros. Nabuco, Estadista, note on p. 102.

⁴² Nabuco, Estadista, 102-103.

Descriptions that emphasize a lower-class nature of the praieira movement have the drawback of diverting attention from its character as a coalition, a group that included wealthy sugar planters as well as artisans and shop clerks. In the early 1840s the party adopted doctrinaire Liberal positions such as calling for greater provincial autonomy. Subsequently, the party adopted more radical positions, attacking land monopoly by "Cavalcanti feudalism" and calling for nationalization of retail commerce. Yet even as the party approached a violent break with constitutional norms, indeed, in the midst of an armed revolt, some elements opposed the tendency towards radicalization.

In contrast to Holanda Cavalcanti's Liberal Party, the far larger Partido Nacional de Pernambuco emphasized its combat with Provincial President Rego Barros and his supporters. The praieiros' party organ, the Diario Novo, spearheaded opposition to Regos Barros. Many of the praieiro criticisms of the Conservatives revolved around the theme of order--criminal violence run rampant in the province, politically motivated violence by the governing party and its supporters, and the governing Conservatives' absence of morality, with its baleful consequences on public order.

The Diario Novo often reported on the prevalence of crime and violence, lamenting the impunity that reigned under the Conservative government. In its first issue, the paper denounced the murder of a lawyer in Recife by a man mounted on a horse. The Diario Novo made frequent reference to this and other well-known murders, such as the murder of the planter and politician, Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Cavalcanti Uchoa.⁴³ The paper provided even more extensive coverage of the revenge murder in January of 1843 of Antônio Francisco de Rego Barros, the man believed responsible for the murder.

⁴³ "REVISTA HEBDOMADARIA," Diario Novo, Aug. 1, 1842, pp. 1-2.

Antônio Francisco do Rego Barros had returned from hiding in Ceará backed by armed men. In his absence his engenho had been overrun several times, his crops burned and two of his nephews killed and another wounded. Antônio Francisco and his men were surrounded for twelve hours, before the local police official convinced them to accept an offer of reconciliation. When his armed men disbanded, Antônio Francisco's house was broken into, he was chased out a window, shot on the roof and, after he fell to the ground, repeatedly shot in the stomach. The attackers mutilated the ears and cut the face of the corpse. The victim left a widow and ten children, including a baby born only two days before. The Diário Novo denounced the failure of the government to take adequate and timely preventive measures against a predictable crime.⁴⁴

The opposition paper periodically ran cumulative lists, naming each individual murdered that year.⁴⁵ The paper explicitly rejected the Conservative critique that blamed the customs of the people, weak laws, and judicial organization for the homicides. It countered with the argument that Brazil's population was increasing, its backlands becoming more populated, and there were more frequent interactions and relations among people. Despite these conditions favorable to increasing "civilization," murders increased.⁴⁶ Nor, the opposition organ argued, was the problem elected judicial officials, and proceeded to cite various cases in which government-appointed county judges and

⁴⁴ "Horroroso assassinato," Diário Novo, Jan. 13, 1843, p. 1; Chief of Police to the President of Pernambuco, Jan. 8, 1843, in Diário Novo, Jan. 18, 1843; First Commander to the President of Pernambuco, Jan. 8, 1843, in Diário Novo, Jan. 27, 1843.

⁴⁵ "Os assassinatos em Pernambuco, E OS HOMENS DO PUNHAL E BACAMARTE," Diário Novo, Nov. 23, 1842, pp. 1-3 lists four residents of Recife and thirteen of the interior.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

district judges released criminals.⁴⁷ Rather, the Diario Novo placed the blame for crime and disorder squarely on the provincial government. The problem was the administration's lack of moral authority, as well as its absence of will to confront the problem.⁴⁸

From the opposition's perspective, the administration undermined its moral authority in various ways. Violence by the governing party and its allies was one and provided a constant theme in the praieiro press. Typical of such attacks was the charge that "a few assassins, skilled in wielding daggers and muskets, to attack certain opposition members, who have dared denounce the monstrous crimes of Sr. Barao da Boa-Vista and the infamous sycophants who surround him."⁴⁹ Accusations were particularly frequent at election time.

Violence by Conservatives in Pernambuco was depicted as a regional manifestation of such acts by Conservatives across Brazil. "Do you want to create victims in our province, as your fellow party members did in Minas, Parahiba, Ceará, Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo?! . . ."⁵⁰ Various times the opposition denounced Conservative repression of the 1842 rebellions in Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais as

⁴⁷ "Diario Novo," Diario Novo, Jan. 2, 1843, p. 1.

⁴⁸ "Os assassinatos em Pernambuco, E OS HOMENS DO PUNHAL E BACAMARTE," Diario Novo, Nov. 23, 1842, pp. 1-3. The paper notes the contrast with the abundance of government will at election time, when its agents can seemingly do anything. In 1843, the Diario Novo charged that "the government is the primary cause" of our problems, arguing that the murder of Antônio Francisco do Rego Barros was due either to lack of government will to arrest and punish people or, even worse, because it may have been committed by a government agent. "Horroroso assassinato," Diario Novo, Jan. 13, 1843. For the common charge of a lack of moral authority, also see "Diario Novo," Diario Novo, Jan. 2, 1843.

⁴⁹ "Os assassinos inundão a capital!," Diario Novo, April 22, 1844, p. 2.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

excessive. Instead of employing means proportional to the needs, constitutional guarantees were revoked, terror employed, people were dismissed from their jobs, deported, arbitrarily imprisoned, property was confiscated and hundreds of widows and orphans created.⁵¹ The paper charged that the repression was worse than the rebellions.⁵²

Injudicious use of government power was complemented by selfishness and immorality. Instead of providing positive examples, the Conservatives carried out illegal contraband trade in African slaves and counterfeit money.⁵³ The administration misused government funds.⁵⁴ Its agents arrested people without legal cause.⁵⁵ The Conservatives engaged in widespread electoral fraud, intimidating voters, falsifying electoral documents, and gerrymandering parishes.⁵⁶ The opposition depicted the Conservatives' motivations as purely self-interested, without any genuine principles. A willingness to place opposition figures on the government electoral ticket when it suited its purposes

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⁵¹ "Comunicado. A Camara de 1843.," Diario Novo, Oct. 27, 1842, pp. 1-2; "Comunicado. Nisi utile est quod facimus stulta est gloria.," signed D. M., Diario Novo, Oct. 31, 1842, p. 1, reprinted from Diario do Rio; "A Camara de 1843.," Diario Novo, Nov. 11, 1842, pp. 1-2; "O Governo, o partido da opposição, e a Camara de 1843.," Diario Novo, Nov. 28, 1842, pp. 1-2; "O velho diario," Diario Novo, Dec. 15, 1842, p. 2.

⁵² "O BRASIL," Diario Novo, May 31, 1844, pp. 1-2.

⁵³ "O circulo baronista e os assassinatos.," Diario Novo, April 27, 1844, pp. 1-2; "Diario Novo," Diario Novo, May 11, 1844, pp. 1-2; "Convencer o D. V. é remar contra o maré," p. 1.

⁵⁴ "Comunicado," Diario Novo, March 3, 1843, p. 2.

⁵⁵ "CORRESPONDENCIA," signed O Inimigo dos Despotas, Diario Novo, Nov. 21, 1842, p. 2.

⁵⁶ Among many examples, see "Eleições de Pernambuco.," Diario Novo, Dec. 10, 1842, pp. 1-2 and "As parochias em revolução!," Diario Novo, April 17, 1844, p. 1. The parish was the basic electoral unit.

was presented as one more example of the absence of principles.⁵⁷ In consequence of such behavior, the government suffered from an absence of prestige and support.⁵⁸

Unable to provide firm, respected rule, the province suffered from disorder. "(All the problems) today are due to the provincial government and its lack of prestige. . . . Look at all the districts, and there we will see disorder and intrigue, impunity, and consequently lack of respect for the law and authority."⁵⁹

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improbable will come*

The opposition was not satisfied with criticizing the administration on the issue of order; it also attacked the public works projects, programs that defenders of the administration saw as some of its greatest accomplishments. Conservatives trumpeted these projects as marking significant progress for the province and its capital. In contrast, the opposition was harsh in its condemnation. A strong xenophobic element ran throughout the attacks.

The Diario Novo lamented that foreign engineers, technicians, and artisans were paid high wages, while Brazilians of equal capacities were without jobs. Padre Lopes Gama attacked the provincial president for "extrangerismo," a preference for foreigners. While foreigners received jobs, the lack of employment for Brazilians increased vice,

⁵⁷ "O Diario de Pernambuco n. 239.," Diario Novo, Nov. 22, 1842, pp. 1-3; "Eleições de Pernambuco.," Diario Novo, Dec. 10, 1842, pp. 1-2; "Ainda as Eleições de Pernambuco.," Diario Novo, Dec. 20, 1842, pp. 1-2; "Comunicado.," Diario Novo, Jan. 5, 1843, p. 1.

⁵⁸ On isolation and lack of support for the Provincial President, see "Ainda as Eleições de Pernambuco.," Dec. 20, 1842, Diario Novo, p. 2.

⁵⁹ "COMMUNICADO.," Diario Novo, Jan. 3, 1843, p. 1. This piece develops the theme extensively.

crime, hunger and prostitution.⁶⁰ Arguments like these had a broad and powerful appeal in the face of insufficient employment opportunities.

The supposed superior quality of the foreigners was doubted. Boyer, for example, was mocked when wharves whose construction he had supervised collapsed after three years.⁶¹ Sarcastic references to the superior knowledge of the foreign engineers were frequent. A critic questioned why engineers and artisans of high quality would undertake the rigors of ocean voyages and working in a foreign country, asserting that, of course, they would not and that only those with inferior skills and prospects came to Brazil. The use of new techniques by foreigners spurred resentment. One critic noted that Brazilians had long succeeded in constructing tall, straight buildings, even on marshy soils. Why use new techniques and materials, such as those in the foundation of the Teatro Santa Isabel, when proven methods were already in use?⁶²

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The Diario Novo appealed to the resentments of Brazilians over having to accept orders from foreigners. Much was made of the dismissal of the Inspector General Firmino Herculano de Moraes Ancora. He was depicted as a venerable man of intelligence, unquestioned honesty, and long service who was fired to free Vauthier from any outside inspection. "It is unpardonable, the contempt that is shown to a deserving man, only because it is suspected that he won't humble himself to the command of a

⁶⁰ Freyre, Um Engenheiro Francês, 323-324, citing Sete de Setembro, Nov. 18, 1845.

⁶¹ Ibid., 293-295. Condemnations of the administration routinely cited this project as a dismal failure, in an effort to undermine any sense of achievement on the part of Rego Barros. See "Communicados," signed Intrepido, Diario Novo, Feb. 6, 1843, p. 1.

⁶² Freyre, Engenheiro Francês, 305. Freyre cites Diario Novo, Nov. 16, 1841.

foreigner." Similarly, all public employees "were obligated to stoop down to receive blindly the orders of that senhor (Vauthier) and his partners!!"⁶³

The expenses of the public works projects were routinely attacked. The Diario Novo accused the president of abusive uses of patronage through nepotism. Conservatives and foreigners were enriching themselves while public finances suffered. One critic complained that "Sr. Vauthier, who knows so much about art, doesn't he know that frugality is also an art and very useful?"⁶⁴ The Diario Novo lamented the priorities of the president, complaining that huge sums of money were spent on superfluous projects, while essential needs were ignored. Expensive, unproductive projects, such as the Presidential Palace, the "Boyer Quay (the failed Cais do Colegio)," and the Theatro Santa Isabel made public works "one of the greatest whirlpools [of money lost] of the withered Provincial Treasury."⁶⁵ Yet essentials such as revenue collection, public education, police, religious worship, and public relief were underfunded. Public employees had not been paid in eight or nine months. The Diario Novo lamented that in their suffering some of these employees might abuse their positions. Consequently, "the ties of subordination and obedience were relaxed."⁶⁶

The Diario Novo stated that all public works projects and major expenditures of public money that the president proposed would have constituencies that supported them. Combined with the president's disregard of the government's fiscal possibilities and the

⁶³ For both quotes, "COMMUNICADO," Diario Novo, Dec. 25, 1842.

⁶⁴ Freyre, Um Engenheiro Francês, 304, citing Diario Novo April 27, 1844.

⁶⁵ "COMMUNICADO," Diario Novo, Dec. 25, 1842. p. 1.

⁶⁶ "DIARIO NOVO," Jan. 9, 1843 Diario Novo, p. 2 for the quote; "COMMUNICADO," Diario Novo, Dec. 19, 1842, p. 1; "COMMUNICADO," Diario Novo, Dec. 25, 1842, pp. 1-2; on wrong priorities, see Diario Novo, Jan. 9, 1843, pp. 1-3.

chaotic state of fiscal policy, deficits were assured. Likely, recourse would be made to the "monstrous" policy of printing paper money, or, faced with the necessity of providing the truly necessary services that had not been budgeted for, taxes would have to be raised. New taxes would slow capital formation and lower consumption, reducing public revenues. The deficits might paralyze the very public works projects that caused them.⁶⁷

The praieiro organ attacked the reorganization of the Public Works Department as granting arbitrary power to the provincial president and undermining accounting and control of expenditures. The reorganization eliminated the requirement to make public all expenditures on specific projects so they could be voted on by the legislature. Even under the old system, Boyer had been criticized for dictatorial ways in resisting examination of his accounts.⁶⁸ The new regulations allowed the president to appoint his clientele to positions.⁶⁹ Eased reimbursement requirements would allow false claims to be made, allowing, for example, people to take vacations at public expense.⁷⁰

The praia opposition also consistently leveled charges of despotism against the administration of Francisco do Rego Barros. Many of these charges revolved around accusations of specific abuses by the provincial administration, and its supporters or agents, which, according to the praieiros, resulted from the institutional development of a highly centralized national political system--a fundamental issue of the period.

⁶⁷ "DIARIO NOVO," Diário Novo, Jan. 9, 1843, p. 3. For an attack on the fiscal policies of the Conservatives' allies at the national level, see "A olygarchia e as finanças," Diário Novo, April 20, 1844.

⁶⁸ Freyre, Engenheiro Francês, 298.

⁶⁹ "DIARIO NOVO," Diário Novo, Jan. 9, 1843, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁰ "COMMUNICADO," Diário Novo, Dec. 25, 1842, p. 2.

The Regresso project centered on reversing the Regency experiments with provincial autonomy and establishing firm rule from the Court. The struggle over centralization marked a dividing line between Conservatives and Liberals, as the former embraced the new laws and the latter denounced them as tending towards despotism. The praia press, like Liberals elsewhere, objected to the concentration of power, as well as the potential for abuse that a centralized system facilitated.

The Pernambucan opposition's situation was complex. In 1841 some deputies to the Chamber who subsequently belonged to the praia party voted for the centralizing laws of November 20 that restored the Council of State and December 3 that reformed the Criminal Procedure Code. These laws laid the institutional basis for centralized authoritarian rule.

Joaquim Nabuco's explanation for this contradictory position was that, being interested primarily in ruling in Pernambuco, and willing to make deals in the Court to increase their provincial power, the future praieira leaders of the Chamber traded support for the centralizing laws in exchange for advantages in Pernambuco. Nabuco does not specify what these advantages were.⁷¹ Closely following Nabuco's analysis, Paula Beiguelman argued that Paulino José Soares de Sousa, the Conservative minister of justice in the March 23, 1841 cabinet, made an alliance with the praieiros, even against members of his own party, in order to remove obstacles to the passage of the regresso laws.⁷² Nabuco notes the paradoxically close relationship between the praieiros and Paulino José Soares de Souza, paradoxical in that a sacquarema leader and the

⁷¹ Nabuco, Estadista, 49.

⁷² Paula Beiguelman, Formação Política do Brasil (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira, 1976), 64-65. This author cites only Nabuco, not any primary material, for this argument.

Pernambuco Liberals, on the face of it, ought to be opponents. The fact that the March 23 ministry quickly replaced the Baron of Boa Vista with Manuel Sousa Teixeira, an opponent of the Baronistas, as provincial president, yet returned the Baron on December 7, just days after the passage of the Reform of the Criminal Procedure Code, the last major Regresso law, supports this argument.⁷³

To be sure, there was praeiro opposition to the laws. The Diario Novo, the praeiro press organ that began publishing on August 1, 1842, criticized the Reform of the Criminal Procedural Code.⁷⁴ The paper noted, for example, that despite the new Code, violence continued in the province.⁷⁵ The new law was attacked as unconstitutional, as violating the division of powers, and for nullifying juries, thereby abolishing the last remaining bit of judicial independence. For the Liberal opposition of the period, the charge of ending judicial independence meant excessively centralizing power, making judges political agents of the ruling party in the Court, and creating the conditions for wholesale violation of rights, thus leading to despotism. This imbalance in the distribution of power, one that would facilitate abuse from the Court, contrasted with the paper's proclamation in its inaugural edition that "our political dogma [is] that the extensive territory of Brazil should always constitute a moderate and representative monarchy. The ideas of order are based on this moderate approach to the aggrandizement of all the provinces."⁷⁶

⁷³ Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, "Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Melo," Revista do Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano vol. XLVII (1975).

⁷⁴ "REVISTA HEBDOMADARIA," Diario Novo, Aug. 1, 1842, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁵ "Correspondencias," signed Um Desenganado, Diario Novo, Sept. 12, 1842, p. 2; Diario Novo, Dec. 10, 1842.

⁷⁶ Diario Novo, Aug. 1, 1842.

Some praiheiros were adamant in their opposition to the centralizing laws. Felipe Lopes Netto, for example, introduced several petitions to the Provincial Assembly rejecting the laws of November 20 and December 3, 1841 as unconstitutional. Opponents of the Reform of the Criminal Procedure Law charged that the reform created a dependent magistracy, for the purpose of repressing citizens. They further argued that the reform, which they labeled "blood law," would end the inviolability of one's home. They also claimed that the laws were passed in tumultuous sessions, without proper discussion.⁷⁷ Though Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Melo, a member of the liberal opposition and future praia leader, voted against the proposal, thus demonstrating consistency with his earlier vote in support of the November 20 and December 3 laws, other praiheiros such as Peixoto de Brito and Lourenco Bizzera voted with Lopes Netto. Creation of the Council of State was the less controversial measure of the two. Many who opposed the Reform of the Criminal Procedure Code did not vote against restoring the Council of State. In any case, the proposals were both voted down in the Assembly--the objection to the Reform of the Criminal Procedure Code by eighteen to thirteen and the objection to the creation of the Council of State by twenty-four to seven.⁷⁸

Voting with Lopes Netto in favor of the petitions were the Cavalcanti brothers, Pedro Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque and Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, both leading Conservatives. Likewise, their brother Holanda

⁷⁷ "REFLEXÕES SOBRE A INDICAÇÃO DO SNR. DEPUTADO LOPES NETTO.," Diário de Pernambuco, March 14, 1842, pp. 1-2; "COMMUNICADO. O Snr. Doutor Netto, e a sua indicação na Assembleia Provincial.," Diário Novo, March 15, 1842, pp. 2-3; "COMMUNICADO. A LEI DA REFORMA DO CODIGO DO PROCESSO, E A OPPOSIÇÃO.," Diário de Pernambuco, March 17, 1842.

⁷⁸ "ASSEMBLEA PROVINCIAL. ACTA DA 16a SESSÃO ORDINARIA DA ASSEMBLEA LEGISLATIVA DE PERNAMBUCO EM 22 DE MARÇO DE 1842," Diário de Pernambuco, April 1, 1842, p. 1.

Cavalcanti, the prominent Liberal leader, had opposed the 1840 Conservative measure, the so-called Interpretation of the Additional Act, on the floor of the Imperial Senate.⁷⁹ In opposing the centralizing laws, Holanda Cavalcanti was consistent with Liberals elsewhere in the Empire, for whom provincial autonomy was a key plank.

Holanda Cavalcanti's opposition in the Senate, along with Pedro Francisco and Francisco de Paula's in the Provincial Assembly, was consistent with positions these representatives of the Cavalcanti de Albuquerque had taken since independence. The Cavalcantis were well ensconced in Pernambuco and exercised considerable authority. They had little interest in seeing strong rule by a distant center of power. Indeed, in 1801 Colonel Suassuna, the father of the Cavalcanti brothers referred to above, led a conspiracy to achieve independence from Portugal, under the tutelage of Napoleon.⁸⁰ In 1817, along with much of the landholding elite of Pernambuco, they supported the struggle for an independent republic.⁸¹ Yet in 1822, they supported a coup against the provisional government established by Gervásio Pires and other provincial rivals of the Cavalcantis, the administration that had declared independence from the Portuguese crown. In doing so, the Cavalcantis established a leading role for their family in the so-called Government of the Matutos, the "government of the hicks" controlled by the Cavalcanti and their southern planter allies. In a choice between independence under local rivals and loyalty to the emperor in Rio de Janeiro, this Cavalcanti-dominated provincial government supported national unity under D. Pedro I. In 1824, again, the

⁷⁹ Jornal do Comercio, May 8, 1840, reporting on the session of May 7.

⁸⁰ See Carlos Guilherme Mota, Idéia da Revolução no Brasil: Estudo das Formas do Pensamento (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1979).

⁸¹ See note 2 of this chapter.

Cavalcantis opposed an attempted independent republic, the Confederation of the Equator, led by the opposing faction of landowners. Throughout the latter 1820s, they supported the local governments appointed by the emperor, and in so doing opposed the faction of lesser families that had supported the Confederation, and their sometimes allies, the radical liberals. Yet, at the same time, in Rio de Janeiro they joined the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies that struggled to limit the emperor's power. In 1829, Holanda Cavalcanti prompted a government crisis when he objected to the emperor's heavy-handed repression of a radical liberal coup attempt in Pernambuco, demanding the resignation of the ministers of war and justice. In 1832 the Cavalcantis initially supported the Abrilada restorationist coup, and in 1834 they supported an exaltado coup.⁸² *flip +/op*

Thus, this seemingly curious mixture of positions yields a clear pattern on examination. The Cavalcantis, as extraordinarily powerful members of the local elite, were ill-disposed to the crown increasing its authority in Pernambuco, particularly when the Cavalcantis and their allies controlled the key posts of Provincial President and Commander of Arms. Opposition to extension of imperial authority that would limit their own power was attenuated, however, when the Cavalcantis' provincial influence was threatened by local opposition. The 1822 provisional government of Gervásio Pires, the 1824 Confederation of the Equator, the Francisco de Carvalho administration in 1832 and the Manuel Carvalho Paes de Andrade administration in 1834 all challenged

⁸² On the Government of the Matutos, see Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," pp. 38-40. On the Confederation of the Equator, see Ulysses de Carvalho Soares Brandão, Pernambuco de Out'ora: A Confederação do Equador (Recife: Oficinas Graphicas da Repartição de Publicações Officiais, 1924); Glacyra Lazzari Leite, Pernambuco 1824: a Confederação do Equador (Recife: Massangana, 1989); Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion," pp.50-74. For the events in 1829, *Ibid.*, 152-153. For the 1832 Abrilada, see chapter 2 of this work.

Cavalcanti supremacy in the province. In each case, the Cavalcantis sought to topple the Pernambucan government. When they needed help against their opponents, they appealed to the crown for assistance.⁸³

On December 3, 1843, Dom Pedro II turned eighteen, the constitutional age of majority. For some time, tension between Conservative leaders and the emperor's favorite, Aureliano de Sousa e Oliveira Coutinho (the Viscount of Sepetiba, commonly referred to as Aureliano), had been heightening. An earlier clash between the squaremas and Aureliano had precipitated the fall of the Conservative March 23, 1841 ministry in which Aureliano had served with Minister of Justice Paulino José Soares de Sousa and other Conservatives. The subsequent January 20, 1843 Conservative ministry, formed by Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, excluded Aureliano. When Aureliano's brother Saturnino de Souza e Oliveira opposed the Conservative leaders' ticket in provincial elections in Rio de Janeiro to occupy a Senate seat, Honório responded by asking the emperor for Saturnino's dismissal as Inspector of Customs in Rio de Janeiro. The emperor refused, later noting that "I understood such a dismissal to be unjust, and by the way in which Carneiro Leão insisted, I understood that if I yielded I would be thought weak."⁸⁴ Honório's unacceptable demanding manner in dealing with the emperor, and Pedro's refusal to acquiesce, left Honório little choice but to resign. The January 20, 1843 ministry he led immediately collapsed. The incident suggests an emperor, upon

⁸³ See Marcus Carvalho's incisive discussion, "Hegemony and Rebellion," 151-155.

⁸⁴ Tito Franco de Almeida, Francisco José Furtado: Biografia e Estudo de História Política Contemporânea (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1944), for the quote, p. 33 and pp. 32-33 on the change of ministry. This celebrated contemporary biography had marginalia added to it by the emperor, which appeared in subsequent editions as footnotes. This quote is from one such note.

reaching eighteen years of age, more determined to assert himself and defend his prerogatives.⁸⁵

Dom Pedro did not simply turn over power to leading Liberals. Rather, he first offered a Conservative leader, José da Costa Carvalho, the Viscount of Monte Alegre, the opportunity to form a ministry, with the understanding that the 1842 rebels of São Paulo and Minas Gerais would be amnestied. When Monte Alegre declined, the emperor turned to José Carlos Pereira de Almeida Torres, the Viscount of Macahé, a Bahian close to the emperor and not clearly identified with either political party. Almeida Torres formed the February 2, 1844 ministry amidst talk of conciliation. A conciliatory ministry would reduce excessive partisanship and factionalism, especially in Bahia, Pernambuco, and elsewhere in the North. The rebels of 1842 were to be amnestied. No longer would there be what Liberal leader Paula Souza had denounced as party ministries, rather than national ministries, in reference particularly to the January 20, 1843 cabinet.⁸⁶

pp 11-12
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Implementing idea of conciliation in a highly partisan atmosphere proved extremely difficult. Conservative opposition to the ministerial change and the notion of conciliation was interpreted by the emperor as a continuation of the practice of the previous ministry denounced by Paula Souza--that is, acting for the good of a political party, instead of the nation. A liberal paper denounced the "declaration of war" on the

⁸⁵ Francisco José Furtado, 32-33; Paulo Pereira de Campos, "Política e Administração," 509-511, 517, 519-521; Helio Vianna, Da Maioridade à Conciliação: Síntese de História, Política e Bibliografia do Período 1840-1857 (Rio de Janeiro: Universidade do Brasil, 1945), 13-14, 16-20; Estadista, 57; Beiguelman, Formação Política, 65, 70-71. The significance of the emperor's role in politics continues to be a question of some dispute in the historiography. Compare Graham, Patronage and Politics, and Costa, The Brazilian Empire with Barman, Brazil.

⁸⁶ Paulo Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração de 1840 a 1848," in História Geral da Civilização Brasileira. Tomo II. 2º volume. (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1985), 522-523; Vianna, Da Maioridade, 21; Nabuco, Estadista 75-76.

conciliation ministry by conservative newspapers Sentinella da Monarchia (directed by Vasconcellos) and Echo and lauded the ministry's attempt to convince the opposition of the need to "finish with the fatal designation of winners and losers."⁸⁷ Amnesty of the Paulista and Mineiro rebels was a sine qua non for reconciliation, yet when the emperor decreed the amnesty on March 14, 1844, Conservatives in the Chamber and Senate were adamant in criticizing it. The praia press reprinted Liberal journalism from the Court attacking Conservative opposition to the amnesty, labeling the right to grant amnesty "the most beautiful of royalty's prerogatives," implying that to criticize the amnesty was tantamount to criticizing the emperor.⁸⁸

Opposition to the amnesty contradicted the common practice of leniency once a rebellion's leaders had been punished, the dangers passed and peace had been restored.⁸⁹ The leading Pernambucan Conservative newspaper, rather than support conciliation, argued for the record of achievement of the Conservative ministries since 1837, including the suppression of the 1842 rebellions.⁹⁰ The Conservative organ blamed Aureliano's palace faction for the ministerial change, implying that it did not reflect the will of the people. The Pernambucan Conservative Sebastião do Rego Barros, brother of the provincial president, turned down an offer of a ministerial post, opting for solidarity with other Conservatives in opposition.⁹¹

⁸⁷ "A Conciliação . . . ! vós a não quereis! . . .," Diário Novo, May 7, 1844, p. 1, reprint from the Farol Constitucional.

⁸⁸ "O "Brasil" na opposição!," Diário Novo, May 8, 1844, pp. 1-2, reprinted from Farol Constitucional.

⁸⁹ Barman, Brazil, 220.

⁹⁰ "Diário de Pernambuco," Diário de Pernambuco, March 7, 1844, p. 3.

⁹¹ Nabuco, Estadista, 76.

Many Liberals likewise sought not conciliation, but a complete reversal of political fortunes. Liberals had been through a period of ostracism in which centralization laws had undermined provincial rights the Liberals held dear. Many Liberals that had participated in the 1842 rebellions in Minas Gerais and São Paulo against the centralization measures still suffered from exile, arrest, and loss of political rights.⁹² Moreover, the usual desire to seize patronage prompted many to shy away from conciliation. Liberal party organs such as Novo Tempo argued that the March 23, 1841 Conservative ministry had dismissed office holders appointed by the Liberal majority ministry, and had tried to annihilate the Liberal Party after the 1842 rebellions, and that it was, in effect, now the Liberals' turn. The praieiro paper Diario Novo reprinted such articles.⁹³

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Liberal papers also called for the dissolution of the Chamber elected under the influence of the March 23, 1841 ministry. The Diario Novo argued that the violence and fraud that marked the elections made for an unrepresentative Chamber, and reprinted articles from Liberal papers elsewhere that made similar arguments.⁹⁴ One paper argued that the ostensible reason for the Conservatives' opposition to the current cabinet, disagreement with the amnesty, was not the real source of their opposition. Rather, the goal of the leaders of the "oligarchy" was to annul the emperor's liberty of action, and by

⁹² Barman, Brazil, 220.

⁹³ "Os presidentes da provincia," Diario Novo, April 17, 1844, p. 1.

⁹⁴ "A dissolução da câmara," Diario Novo, 18 April, p. 2-3, reprinted from Pharol Constitucional; "A dissolução da câmara dos deputados," Diario Novo, May 4, 1844, pp. 1-2, reprinted from O Nacional.

limiting his prerogatives, better maintain their own power.⁹⁵ The *Diário Novo* also continued its criticisms of Provincial President Rego Barros, airing the standard charges of electoral abuse, such as falsifying the electoral list of Iguaçu, to exclude Antônio Joaquim de Melo from the Provincial Assembly, and violence by Conservative police or their allied thugs.⁹⁶ The paper charged, for example, that in the parish of Goitá alone, five murders and six serious injuries occurred, yet the known perpetrators were not arrested. The *praieiro* organ explained such impunity by charging that the provincial president's nominations to police posts were motivated by electoral concerns, not justice and the public interest.⁹⁷ The paper also charged Conservative leadership in the Court with ordering allies in the provinces to crack down on the Liberal press. It was in this context that the paper explained charges against the publisher of the *Diário Novo*, João Ignácio Ribeiro Roma, for slander and libel in defaming the Chamber.⁹⁸

Support for the February 2, 1844 ministry initially came from some dissident Conservatives in the north, such as Cansanção de Sinimbu in Alagoas and Sousa Franco in Para, from Pernambucan *praieiros* such as Urbano Sabino and Nunes Machado and from various Bahian deputies. This so-called Northern League was insufficient to

⁹⁵ "A dissolução da Câmara dos Deputados," *Diário Novo*, April 30, 1844, p. 1, reprinted from *O Nacional*. Note that Liberals labeled the Conservative leadership "the oligarchy."

⁹⁶ For charges of electoral abuse, "Dez mil reis para os deputados do Sr. Barão!," *Diário Novo*, April 19, 1844, p. 2; "Comportamento honroso," *Diário Novo*, April 20, 1844, pp. 2-3; on the alleged falsification of electoral documents in Iguaçu, "A acta de Iguaçu e o Diário v. n. 107," *Diário Novo*, May 13, 1844.

⁹⁷ "Os assassinos e a policia," *Diário Novo*, April 27, 1844, pp. 2-3; "O circulo baronista e os assassinatos," *Diário Novo*, April 27, 1844, pp. 1-2.

⁹⁸ "A causa nacional em julgamento," *Diário Novo*, May 2, 1844, p. 2; "Viva a liberdade da Imprensa," *Diário Novo*, May 4, 1844, p. 2 rejoices in Ribeiro Roma's being absolved of all charges.

govern, however. Facing a larger Conservative opposition, the ministry tilted toward the Liberals. An important step in this direction was taken on April 1, 1844 when Aureliano de Sousa e Oliveira Coutinho was selected as provincial president of Rio de Janeiro.⁹⁹

Joaquim Nabuco considered Aureliano's influence in the 1840s to be an enigma of Brazilian constitutional history.¹⁰⁰ Nabuco wrote of him as an "erratic element outside of party classification."¹⁰¹ Aureliano served in the Liberal Majority ministry of 1840, the succeeding Conservative March 23, 1841 ministry, and provided crucial support for various Liberal ministries from 1844 to 1848 as provincial president of Rio de Janeiro. His independence from the political parties was noteworthy. In 1842, a French diplomat reported to Paris that Aureliano had not acquired obligations to any political party, while another reported in 1844 that ministers took no action without consulting him first.¹⁰² His influence was based on his closeness to the emperor, and the widely-held belief that Aureliano represented Dom Pedro's political preferences.¹⁰³ Given the key role of the emperor's moderating power, which, for practical purposes, enabled Dom Pedro to decide when to alternate parties in power, as the electoral system ensured the ministry at the time the elections were called sufficient influence to emerge victorious, those who influenced Dom Pedro could themselves exert considerable influence.¹⁰⁴ Aureliano's

⁹⁹ Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 523-524.

¹⁰⁰ Nabuco, Estadista, 56-57.

¹⁰¹ Nabuco, Estadista, 57.

¹⁰² Vianna, Da Maioridade, 24.

¹⁰³ Nabuco wrote that "where he went he carried with him political fortune," Estadista, 56.

¹⁰⁴ The emperor's moderating power allowed him to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies
(continued...)

influence dated from the Regency. He shared it, to a lesser degree, with his ally Paulo Barbosa da Silva, the palace chief of protocol, who in the 1830s had chosen the individuals to educate the child prince. They led the informal political group nicknamed the Joana Club, after the official residence of the chief of protocol. They were also known the palacianos, or palace faction, and as álucos.¹⁰⁵

Though Aureliano had served as foreign affairs minister in the Conservative March 23, 1841 ministry that passed crucial centralizing measures, the palacianos' influence was deeply resented by Conservative leaders such as Rodrigues Torres, Paulino José Soares de Sousa and Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão. Conflicts between Aureliano and Minister of Justice Paulino José Soares de Sousa and Rodrigues Torres had led to the fall of the March 23 ministry and, as noted, the January 20, 1843 ministry that replaced it fell over a dispute involving Aureliano's brother Saturnino that forced Honório's confrontation with the emperor. Conservative organs, such as the Sentinella da Monarchia, led by Vasconcellos, and O Brasil, directed by the premier Conservative journalist, Justiano José da Rocha, denounced the influence of the palace group. In February 1844, the Sentinella da Monarchia complained that "now we do not have an emperor; Aureliano, Paulo Barbosa and Saturnino give the orders."¹⁰⁶ Likewise, the Diario de Pernambuco blamed the Joana Club for the fall of the Conservative January 20,

(...continued)

and call for new elections at any time. As the emperor chose the individual who would select a cabinet, and as the advantages of incumbency always allowed the ruling party to prevail at the national level in general elections, the emperor's decisions were decisive. See Bueno, Direito Público Brasileiro; Nabuco, Estadista, and Graham, Patronage and Politics, 97.

¹⁰⁵ Nabuco, Estadista, 56-57; Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 509-513, 517-522; Vianna, Da Maioridade, 11-28.

¹⁰⁶ Vianna, Da Maioridade, 24, citing the Feb. 16, 1844 edition.

1843 ministry led by Honório, lamenting that palace intrigues, not parliamentary struggles, would determine the future. The paper saw the hidden maneuvers of an "impure black trinity" of Aureliano, Saturnino and Paulo Barbosa behind the rise and fall of political leaders and parties.¹⁰⁷

Named provincial president of Rio de Janeiro by the February 2, 1844 ministry, Aureliano decisively challenged the Conservative saquaremas in the very base of their power, the fluminense bailiwicks of the coffee planters. There, he could undercut their electoral support through patronage, fraud, and violence. Joaquim Nabuco considered Aureliano's support of the Liberal ministries of 1844 to 1848 as their principal support, because of Aureliano's alleged favor with the emperor. Thus, the praieiros were shrewd enough to gain influence in the Court through an alliance with Aureliano.¹⁰⁸

In May, 1844 two Liberals, Holanda Cavalcanti and Manuel Galvão, joined the ministry, shifting its composition further to the Liberals. The emperor dissolved the Chamber and new elections were called, as partisan Liberals had hoped for. Electoral fraud and violence by the ruling party, norms of electoral practice, assured Liberals control of the Chamber. In the province of Rio de Janeiro, where saquarema power was the greatest, violence was particularly widespread. In Alagoas, a significant rebellion erupted. Nonetheless, the elections returned a huge Liberal majority to the Chamber. In Pernambuco, only Francisco do Rego Barros and Pedro Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque managed to win seats for the Conservatives, and they declined to occupy their seats. Across Brazil, Conservatives were forced to adjust to the prospect of a

¹⁰⁷ Diário de Pernambuco, "Comunicado," March 25, 1844, p. 3. The term used was trindade negreção.

¹⁰⁸ Vianna, Da Maioridade, 11, 13-28, 21-28; Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 517, 519-521, 523, Nabuco, Estadista, 56, 75, 77; Beiguelman, Formação Política, 70-71.

lengthy exclusion from office. Pernambuco's Conservatives reacted by forming closer ties with saquarema leaders in the Senate.¹⁰⁹

Even with Liberals ensconced in the cabinet there was tension over the political line to pursue. Minister of Justice Manuel Alves Branco (the second Viscount of Caravellas) and Foreign Affairs Minister Ernesto Ferreira França favored partisan conflict with the Conservatives at national and provincial levels. Holanda Cavalcanti, while supporting struggle at the national level, was an advocate of moderation within Pernambuco. Many of his relatives were Conservatives and had close links with the Conservative administration there; indeed, his brother, Pedro Francisco (the future Viscount of Camaragibe), was rapidly rising to predominance within the party. Accordingly, Holanda Cavalcanti wanted a moderate policy in the province that would minimize the challenge to his relatives' interests. In contrast, the prajeiros were bitter enemies of the Conservative administration and sought all-out conflict in the province. In the Court, they sought alliances and deals that would further their provincial interests, and were willing to take a more moderate stance nationally when it favored their provincial interests.¹¹⁰

Conflict within Pernambuco was intense. The powerful Cavalcanti oligarchy had prompted a determined opposition. The curious party alignment, with competing Liberal groups, one seeking accommodation in the province and the other full-scale conflict, can be explained as an adaptation to the oligarchy's control of both parties. With Cavalcantis prominently represented in both the Liberal and Conservative parties, they were assured political influence whichever party was in power in the Court. The emergence of the

¹⁰⁹ Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 523-524; Nabuco, Estadista, 75-77.

¹¹⁰ Beiguelman, Formação Política do Brasil, 64, 70-71; Nabuco, Estadista, 76.

praieiro party gave expression, within a Liberal party affiliated with Liberals in the Court, to the oligarchy's opponents. Thus, the national two party system, generally deemed to be controlled by a small oligarchy, was in fact sufficiently flexible to allow representation for opponents of the dominant groups, at least at the provincial level.

Holanda Cavalcanti's prestige and influence in the Court, where, in May, he became the minister of the Navy, was sufficient to enable him to influence the choice of a new Pernambucan provincial president. Presumably to assure the continued support of the minister of the Navy, an ally of Holanda Cavalcanti's, Joaquim Marcellino de Brito, was sent to Recife in June of 1844 to replace the Conservative president, Rego Barros. Ironically, the Diario Novo's language in its response to these events invoked the praia attacks on feudalism and oligarchical control, rejoicing that the February 2 ministry "recognized that [the province] is not the entail of Sr. Rego, who believed he had the right to control its destiny, as if it were his estate!"¹¹¹

Their nemesis departed, the praieiros hoped for dramatic gains. As they had earlier argued the necessity of a provincial president compatible with the Liberal cabinet in Rio, so they sought wide-spread dismissals and appointment of praia partisans to police, National Guard, judicial and military positions of leadership.¹¹² The new cabinet would be unable to implement its policies if key positions were occupied by

¹¹¹ "O novo presidente." Diario Novo, May 8, 1844, pp. 2-3. The article precedes Marcellino de Brito's June 6 arrival and informs of his coming appointment.

¹¹² Among numerous examples, see "A nomeação de novos presidentes," Diario Novo, May 23, 1844, pp. 1-2. This article argues that "one of the most indispensable conditions [for any government] for carrying out its tasks is the uniformity of its views and sentiments and those of its functionaries."

Conservative loyalists of the former president. The Diario Novo argued that such sweeping changes in personnel was the normal practice in constitutional governments.¹¹³

Praieiro hopes for an "inversion," as sweeping reversals of officeholders along party lines were called, were soon dashed. A praieiro police chief was named, but the provincial president did not authorize wide-spread substitutions among officeholders.¹¹⁴ The Diario Novo subsequently lamented that Provincial President Marcellino de Brito left in place the partisan Conservative officialdom which Francisco do Rego Barros had, with perseverance, constructed over many years, substituting only five delegados.¹¹⁵ Indeed, relations between the praieiros and the provincial president deteriorated to the point that Marcellino de Brito, in correspondence with the Court, declared that a decent man, like himself, would not join with a party composed of such insignificant people. The meaning of "insignificant" people in this context is clear--lower class and potentially dangerous. The president unsuccessfully requested the dismissal of the praieiro police chief, arguing that his recommendations of such lowly, useless people for police posts were clearly unacceptable.¹¹⁶

Despite the lack of a general "inversion," the weakening of the political and administrative apparatus constructed by former President Rego Barros was sufficient that

¹¹³ "O que fará o novo presidente?" Diario Novo, June 7, 1844, p. 2.

¹¹⁴ Marson, O Imperio do Progresso, 235.

¹¹⁵ "Justa apreciação do predomínio do partido praieiro," Diario Novo, May 6, 1847, pp. 1-3. This document is a party history and statement of aims. The Conservative press published lengthy responses to this piece. These articles, written by Figueira de Mello (although the author was not specified at the time) were subsequently released in book form. They are cited here in book form, with Figueira de Mello as the author. Marson, O Imperio do Progresso, 235, gives the figures of eight delegados and ten subdelegados replaced.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

the praiheiros were able to win sweeping victories in elections for justices of the peace and county councilmen in August and September of 1844.¹¹⁷ The political climate was extremely tense. The United States consul wrote of rumors of a disturbance planned for September 7, the anniversary of independence (as well as election day in the interior of the province), in which a National Guard battalion would demand changes in local authorities. He reported that "politics and party spirit (were) daily becoming more violent, as the time approached for the elections."¹¹⁸

The rumored National Guard rebellion did not erupt, but the elections did witness considerable violence. Violence in elections was not an aberration, though the reported incidents in Affogados, a suburb of Recife, were unusually large.¹¹⁹ There were various points in the electoral process at which violence might break out. When each bloc of voters went to the polling place at the parish church battles might erupt. Once inside, the proceedings of the electoral board might be interrupted by violence. The board played the key role of making final decisions on who might vote, identifying the individuals present as the same people on the electoral roles. Disputes over these points could lead to physical confrontations. As votes were cast, or afterwards, violence could flare if a faction that feared losing attempted to steal the ballot box in order to invalidate the election. The mere threat of violence might also be effective if it scared off one's opponents. Intimidation was an important element in electoral battles. It must have been an unsettling experience for the twenty Conservative voters at one polling place on

¹¹⁷ "O triumpho da Praia," Diario Novo, August 26, 1844, p.2 and Sept. 7, 1844.

¹¹⁸ Consul G. T. Snow to Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, September 6, 1844, Consul in Pernambuco T344, roll 3.

¹¹⁹ Graham emphasizes that violence was a normal and essential part of elections. Patronage and Politics, 123.

September 22 to face the three hundred praia voters, accompanied by a huge number of supporters, who lined the other side of the church where the elections were held.¹²⁰ Even if an opponent's control of the electoral board allowed little chance of winning the election, a significant display of force might demonstrate sufficient strength so that the board would record complaints concerning the validity of the electoral process. The very recording of such objections, in demonstrating a degree of power by a challenger, could constitute a partial victory.¹²¹

The violence in Affogados on September 7, 8, and 9 was unusual in its proportions. Conservatives claimed that the praieiros were unable to win if there were a free expression of public opinion, and that they therefore resorted to fraud, and when it failed, violence. The guabirus argued that on election day praia leaders Nunes Machado and Vilella Tavares harangued crowds, following the praia principle of inciting popular passions.¹²² The praieiro police chief, Antônio Affonso Ferreira, tried to convince the justice of the peace to continue with the elections, but the Conservative judge refused, claiming that the crowds of praia partisans which Affonso Ferreira had dispersed were milling around town, ready to return and disrupt events. The Diário de Pernambuco claimed that when Manuel Joaquim de Rego e Albuquerque arrived on horseback with armed men to restore order, he was surrounded by a thousand men armed with clubs and

¹²⁰ "As eleições da capital," Diário Novo, Sept. 26, 1844, p.1

¹²¹ Graham, Politics and Patronage, 102-107, 122-123, 134-135, 139-140.

¹²² Guabiru, literally an alley rat, was a common term for Pernambucan Conservatives. "Diário de Pernambuco," Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 10, 1844, pp. 1-2; "Correspondencia," signed "O inimigo da anarchia," Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 12, 1844, pp. 1-2; "QUIS TULERIT GRACHOS DE SEDITONE QUAERENTES," Diário de Pernambuco, Sept. 16, 1844, pp. 1-2. The paper referred to the crowds as massas heterogeneas do povo.

knives and subjected to cries of "Out with the despot, out with the cabano Baronist."¹²³ The police chief provided no support to Manuel Joaquim, who was saved by two cavalry detachments. Conservative newspapers further charged that the crowds unleashed anarchy, beating people and sacking stores. Reports of violence against merchants led to American, Sardinian, French, and Portuguese ships being sent to Recife from Bahia. The Diario de Pernambuco also levelled the charge that praieiro leaders Nunes Machado, Vilella Tavares, and the police chief returned to Recife from Affogados that night with three hundred men marching in close order and continued their work of intimidation, this time at a church in Santo Antônio.¹²⁴

Praia journalists, in contrast, played down violence and illegality. They depicted events in Affogados as the action of people who were fed up with being excluded from political influence through violence and arbitrary acts. Two thousand people peacefully gathered on election day to protest electoral abuses and to make their presence felt, but they did not break the law.¹²⁵ They dispersed at six o'clock PM at the urging of Nunes Machado. The Diario Novo also argued that part of the crowd gathered out of curiosity to see why troops had been called to assemble and insisted on the illegality of the calling

¹²³ The reader will recall the Guerra dos Cabanos, the restorationist, peasant rebellion of the 1830s, as well as the term "Baronist," to refer to Conservative supporters of the Baron of Boa Vista. Thus, "cabano Baronist" invoked two associations to attack Manoel Joaquim.

¹²⁴ "POR TODA PARTE RESSUCITÃO AS ELEIÇÕES A CACETE," Diario de Pernambuco, Sept. 10, 1844, p.2; "Correspondencia," signed O inimigo da anarquia, Diario de Pernambuco, Sept. 12, 1844, pp. 1-2; "Correspondencia," signed Manuel Joaquim do Rego e Albuquerque, Diario de Pernambuco, Sept. 17, 1844; "Maravillas do Guararape!!," Diario Novo, Sept. 19, p.2; "A Pandilhocracia convicta e confessa," Diario Novo, Sept. 30, 1844.

¹²⁵ Diario Novo, Sept. 13, 1844.

of the troops by Conservative Captain Mathias de Albuquerque.¹²⁶ The paper argued that the praiheiros had no motive to disrupt the election, which they handily won. It also insisted on the beneficial effects of the praia leaders' efforts to disperse the crowds. The praia organ also assured that the city and suburbs were calm and denied Conservative claims of widespread violence, noting that customs receipts were not down, even when anarchy had supposedly reigned and commercial houses had purportedly been sacked.¹²⁷

Praia gains made it increasingly difficult for President Marcellino de Brito. In October of 1844 the U.S. consul reported that "owing to the excited state of the Province" the government had replaced Marcellino de Brito with Conselheiro Thomás Xavier Garcia d'Almeida. The consul further noted that the new president was to be supported by additional troops sent from Rio De Janeiro.¹²⁸ Holanda Cavalcanti's influence was felt again in the selection of this new president. Equally telling, Tomás Xavier Garcia d'Almeida was also a friend of the Conservative Baron of Boa Vista and had substituted for Rego Barros as provincial president in 1838.¹²⁹

The praiheiros did not immediately attack the new president appointed at the Court. The Lidador, the newspaper directed by leading Conservatives such as Figueira de Melo and José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, noted that the praiheiros exhibited a pattern

¹²⁶ "Os baronistas conspirando," Diário Novo, Sept. 16, 1844.

¹²⁷ "Diário Novo," Sept. 12, 1844, Diário Novo, pp. 1-2; "Correspondencia," signed Joaquim Nunes Machado, *Ibid.*, p. 2; "Correspondencia," signed Francisco Carneiro Machado Rios, *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3; "Quis tulerit Grachoas de seditore querentes," Diário Novo, Sept. 13, 1844, pp. 2-3; "Os baronistas conspirando," Diário Novo, Sept. 16, 1844, p. 1; "A Pandilhocracia Conspirando," Diário Novo, Sept. 26, 1844; "O saque entrou todo para a Alfandega!," Diário Novo, Oct. 1, 1844.

¹²⁸ Consul G. T. Snow to Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, Oct. 8, 1844, Consul in Pernambuco, T344 roll 3.

¹²⁹ Nabuco, Estadista, 77 and Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 106.

of welcoming new presidents, in the hope of controlling them, and then stridently opposing those whom they were unable to dominate.¹³⁰ Indeed, the praieiros welcomed Xavier Garcia d'Almeida's reduction of revenues for public works.¹³¹ It was soon clear, however, that Holanda Cavalcanti's choice as president would not go far towards satisfying the praia.

It was working against the new president that the praieiros managed a victory in the senate elections of January, 1845. Allying with the Paulista Liberals (luzias) and with the palace faction, the praia successfully ran the prominent politician Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada Machado e Silva.¹³² The Conservatives attempted to sway opinion in the Court, against such praia influence. They argued that of the two liberal parties supporting the ministry, one (Holanda Cavalcanti's) was orderly, with a history of principled opposition to Conservative ministries and policies, while the other was merely opportunistic, and therefore undeserving of ministerial support. Nonetheless, the praieiros' strength could not be ignored indefinitely.¹³³

Indeed, Holanda Cavalcanti, minister of the Navy and war since May, 1845 finally yielded in allowing appointment of a provincial president more suitable to the praieiros. He apparently expected that Antônio Pinto Chichorro da Gama would exercise restraint and that the praia could be contained.¹³⁴ On June 4, 1845 the steamship Q

¹³⁰ Lidador, Aug. 6, 1845.

¹³¹ Diario Novo, Feb. 13, 1845, p.2, cited by Naro, "Brazil's 1848," p. 106.

¹³² Justa Apreciação May 6, 1847, Diario Novo, pp. 1-3; Marson, p. 247. She has followed Pereira de Castro's analysis, "Política e administração."

¹³³ "Diario de Pernambuco," Diario de Pernambuco, Oct. 7, 1844, pp.2-3.

¹³⁴ Nabuco, Estadista, 77.

Imperador arrived in Recife with news that Antônio Pinto Chichorro da Gama had been appointed provincial president, and that, until his arrival, Vice-President Manuel de Sousa Teixeira would serve.¹³⁵ Contrary to Holanda Cavalcanti's expectations, Sousa Teixeira, as the interim executive authority, immediately made clear his intentions of presiding over a fundamental change in the balance of power in the province. His first day on the job, he replaced the provincial police chief and the director of the municipal police. In short order, 300 delegados, subdelegados, alternates for these posts, officers of the Municipal Police and National Guard, and district attorneys were dismissed and praia partisans took their places.¹³⁶ When the new provincial president, Chichorro da Gama, arrived, he set to dismissing another 340 office holders.¹³⁷

The United States consul reported on the charged political atmosphere, stating that "party spirit runs higher than I have known it during any of the revolutions of the last twenty-one years" and that "[p]olitical intrigues have led to violent animosities and I have serious cause for fearing some outbreak . . . much bloodshed and destruction of property."¹³⁸

Debate over the reversal of power centered on the issue of order. Conservatives argued that the changes undermined the "legitimate influence" of prestigious, influential

¹³⁵ "Viva o Imperador! Viva o Ministerio!," Diário de Pernambuco, June 5, 1845, p. 2.

¹³⁶ The Lidador published lists of all those dismissed, in a series of articles entitled O Lidador Monstro. The paper published a special edition with the complete lists in Sept. of 1845. José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, one of the leading Conservative politicians and polemicists, and an editor of the Lidador, also published the list in Justa Apreciação do Predomínio do Partido Praieiro ou História da Dominação da Praia, 64-71.

¹³⁷ Nabuco de Araújo, Justa Apreciação . . . ou Historia, 71-73.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, for the first quote; for the second, included in the above despatch, see July 30, 1845, Consul Snow to Commanding Officer of the U.S. Brig of War Bainbridge.

families, "citizens distinctive for their merit, for their services and social importance" in favor of "proletarians, agitators, and the disorderly."¹³⁹ The Conservative organ Lidador lamented the "immense abundance of principles of conflagration, that every day accumulate and ferment in the middle of certain classes of society."¹⁴⁰ The paper elaborated on this depiction of the beneficiaries of the changes with charges that they were hostile to the monarchy, a threat to national unity and would soon raise the banner of 1824, that is, seek an independent republic.¹⁴¹ Conservative journalists deplored the "exterminating instinct of the disorderly party" (the praieiros) and warned that "Pernambuco is on the crater of a volcano, ready to explode."¹⁴²

The praieiros also focused on the theme of order, depicting the changes in police posts as the necessary step for ending the unpunished murders, theft, embezzlement of public funds and bands of bandits that characterized the Conservatives' "reign of the dagger and musket."¹⁴³ The Diario Novo claimed that the police force was ineffective, staffed by people chosen on the basis of political favor, some of whom behaved

¹³⁹ "A GUARDA NACIONAL, E O NOVO FUTURO.," Lidador, July 9, 1845, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴⁰ "O LIDADOR," Lidador, June 7, 1845, p.1 for quote, also see p. 2.

¹⁴¹ "PROFECIA.," Lidador, July 2, 1845, p. 1. These charges were reprinted each day for several weeks. For a more extensive development of the charge that the praieiros were hostile to the monarchy, see "A GUARDA NACIONAL, E O NOVO FUTURO.," Lidador, July 9, 1845, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴² "O LIDADOR," Lidador, June 9, 1845, p. 1 for the first quote and "O LIDADOR," June 7, 1845, p.1 for the second. The U.S. Consul echoed these views, informing Washington that many police authorities had been "replaced by men who are, known to be anything but friendly to the preservation of good order, in fact, the mob are now in power . . ." American Consul G. T. Snow to Secretary of State James Buchanan, June 9, 1845, T344 roll 3.

¹⁴³ "DIARIO NOVO," Diario Novo, June 5, 1845, p. 2 for the quote. Also see "Viva o Imperador! Viva o Ministerio!," *Ibid.*

irregularly, facilitated prisoner escapes, were alcoholics, even murderers.¹⁴⁴ Scandalous police behavior included electoral fraud and arbitrary acts of personal vengeance.¹⁴⁵ The police needed to be reorganized to prevent crime and arrest those who broke the law, instead of protecting criminals.¹⁴⁶

Once their partisans had replaced Conservatives in official posts, the praieiros were ready to further the assault on Conservative power. The central contention in praia polemics was the need to impose the law on the unrestrained, corrupt, personal power of the Cavalcantis and their Conservative allies. This power was depicted as "feudal" (complete with images of Cavalcanti castles) and immune to public authority. The praieiros, in control of the provincial government, would bring law to the feudal redoubts of the Conservatives.

liberal
campaign

The principal charges to justify police action were illegal slave trafficking and slave theft, murder, harboring (or even leading) criminal gangs, and illegal possession of large stores of weapons. On the basis of such charges, legal action was taken against Conservative senhores and police searches of their properties conducted.¹⁴⁷ José Maria Paes Barreto's Pindoba and Crusahy estates, for example, were "invaded," as Conservatives termed it, various times. At Pindoba, police found slaves who had been stolen in Recife for resale in the sertão. Finds like this provided valuable

¹⁴⁴ "As baixas dos soldados de Policia.," Diario Novo, July 11, 1845, p. 3.

¹⁴⁵ "Communicado.," Diario Novo, Sept. 19, 1845, pp. 2-3, offers a detailed rebuttal to Lidador Monstro's defense of Conservatives dismissed from office with a series of accusations, including these.

¹⁴⁶ "DIARIO NOVO," Diario Novo, June 6, 1845, p. 2.

¹⁴⁷ See Marcus Carvalho's discussion of police searches of plantations, "Hegemony and Rebellion," pp. 42-44.

material for praia newspapers, which printed the statements of the slaves over the course of January, 1846. The Diário Novo mocked recent Conservative defenses of José Maria, who had claimed praia police were harassing him. The paper sarcastically claimed that José Maria could not lay eyes on a slave without stealing him.¹⁴⁸

Later that year the praia police entered José Severino Cavalcanti de Albuquerque's Cacimbas estate and located the buried remains of a man. A slave and several others on the estate confessed that they had committed the murder in the purging house and then buried the corpse in a cave on the property.¹⁴⁹ The victim, known as Alexander the Great, had been receiving the affection of José's mistress and wanted to marry her, prompting José to order the murder.¹⁵⁰

In September, it was José Maria Paes Barreto's turn again, as his Crusahy plantation was searched for the fifth time. The Lidador indignantly reported that the police "witnessed with a smile the tears and discomfort of his family; and insulted them . . . in the presence of the riff raff . . . José Maria saw his house invaded by his personal enemies, invested with public authority, accompanied by the curious riff raff and over a hundred armed men."¹⁵¹ The humiliation to which the planter's family was subjected was

¹⁴⁸ Among the articles and testimony of the slaves, see "De bom a melhor," Diário Novo, Jan. 7, 1846, pp. 1-2; "Os salteadores em debanada em todas as comarcas da provincia e acastellados na freguezia do Cabo!," Diário Novo, Jan. 14, 1846, p. 2; "Não merecia resposta; porém vá que seja.," Jan. 27, 1846; "Não ha remedio; assim o querem, assim o tenho.," Diário Novo, Jan. 28, 1846, p. 2; "A isso somos obrigados: queixme-se de si.," Diário Novo, Jan. 30, 1846, p. 2; "Estamos promptos, não recuamos.," Diário Novo, Jan. 31, 1846, p. 1.

¹⁴⁹ The purging house was a structure where part of the purification process was carried out to produce sugar in a crystalline form. See pp. 24-25 of the introductory chapter.

¹⁵⁰ "Perseguições da Praia!," Diário Novo, Oct. 15, 1846, p.2.

¹⁵¹ "O NOVO CERCO DE CRUSAHY.," Diário Novo, Sept. 28, 1846, p. 3.

no small matter. A senhor's power depended, in part, on his prestige and reputation as an effective patron and protector. These characteristics helped earn planters the loyalty of their clients and contributed to their ability to marshal armed men when needed. Yet even the poor had seen him helpless to protect himself, his family or his property, in the face of his enemies.¹⁵²

Curiously, even as the Conservative politician and polemicist Nabuco de Araújo denounced these searches, he recognized validity to the principle of imposing the law on the rural senhores, even if he stridently rejected the partisan manner in which it was done.¹⁵³

[T]hat feudalism . . . that haughty and arrogant spirit that seeks to undermine public authority, or dominate or despise it, is it exclusive to the Cavalcantis? No, a thousand times no; that anti-social, absurd and dangerous spirit is a vice rooted in the property owners in the interior of Pernambuco, and perhaps (all) the Empire.¹⁵⁴

make praieiros out of the lords

Nabuco de Araújo further characterized the praieiro discourse against the "feudalism" of the senhores as an important service to the country, which, if it had been carried out honestly, would have earned glory that even Conservatives whose immediate interests were prejudiced would have conceded.¹⁵⁵ Nabuco de Araújo lamented,

¹⁵² Marson emphasizes the importance of demoralizing the praia's opponents, Imperio do Progresso, 258.

¹⁵³ See Nabuco de Araújo, Justa Apreciação, 42, for an example of his denunciation of the searches.

¹⁵⁴ Nabuco de Araújo, Justa Apreciação, 10.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 10. Nabuco de Araújo's biographer, his son, Joaquim Nabuco, followed this line of argument when he wrote that "the praieira invasion was a necessary imposition; afterwards would come a democratic reconstruction, or perhaps not; the essential point, of course, was the conquest of the interior by the law." Nabuco, Estadista, 85. He added that "[T]he change that began gradually occurring in the feudal character of great sugar estates dates from that tumultuous invasion of the sugar estates by the praieira police in
(continued...)

however, that the praijeiros only manipulated these ideas; their implementation was thoroughly partisan and unjust--only Conservatives felt the force of the law.¹⁵⁶

Nabuco de Araújo's comments reflect a degree of ambiguity inherent in the Conservatives centralizing project. From the colonial period, rural elites had been accustomed to a very small state presence. The government largely ruled through local elites and only in larger cities were the Crown's agents particularly visible. As long as peace was maintained and revenues collected there was generally little need for a greater permanent presence than the routine presence of the church, periodic appearances of circuit judges, and perhaps occasional demonstrations of strength. In independent Brazil, however, Conservatives concluded from the experience of the Regency that only a strongly centralized system could maintain order. Though conflict among local elites appeared to require the state to play a significant mediating role, the practical difficulties of exercising that role were formidable.

Centralizing reforms in the early 1840s did establish a substantial role for professional magistrates appointed from the Court (and routinely rotated among various locations), yet the most common contact with state authority continued to be with police officials, the delegados and subdelegados.¹⁵⁷ These posts were staffed by prominent individuals on the winning side of political struggles. The Lidador's objections to the search of José Maria Paes Barreto illustrate the problem. José Maria "saw his house

(...continued)

sugar estates by the praieira police in 1846." Ibid., 88.

¹⁵⁶ Nabuco de Araújo, Estadista, 10.

¹⁵⁷ Professional magistrates were, of course, political appointees. Nabuco de Araújo, for example, whom I have usually cited in his role as a Conservative polemicist, was also a professional magistrate assigned to Pernambuco in much of the period under study.

invaded by his personal enemies, invested with public authority . . . "¹⁵⁸ Nabuco de Araújo objected to the partisan nature of the praia police activities, but what else could one expect? The state did not have the resources or bureaucratic capacity to staff a professional police force across the vast Empire in order to rule directly.¹⁵⁹ While elections may have kept the Court somewhat in touch with the balance of power across the Empire, helping maintain stability, the paradox of playing a mediating role, while delegating considerable powers to local partisan actors, continued.¹⁶⁰

The praieiros did not only exercise authority delegated from the Court, they also attempted to consolidate their position in the institutions housed there. Their struggle to place Antônio Pinto Chichorro da Gama and Ernest Ferreira da França, Pernambuco's provincial president and police chief, in vacant seats in the imperial Senate became a cause célèbre debated in newspapers across the country. Twice the praieiros won elections to nominate the six candidates from which the emperor would choose two men to occupy the most coveted positions in the Empire, life-time appointments to the imperial Senate. In each instance, the emperor chose the leading candidates of the praia

¹⁵⁸ "O NOVO CERCO DE CRUSAHY," Diário Novo, Sept. 28, 1846, p. 3.

¹⁵⁹ Even the professional judges which the court did employ were not immune to local influences (and therefore local conflicts). Thomas Flory and José Murilo de Carvalho have emphasized the mediating role they played, in not only enforcing the will of the Court, but also in tempering actions so as to suit local interests and in representing those interests to the Court. Of course, it bears repeating that professional judges were political appointees. See Flory, Judge and Jury, chapter 10, esp. pp. 189-194; José Murilo de Carvalho, A Construção da Ordem. Astute magistrates could sometimes manipulate this mediating role to personal benefit, such as marriage into a powerful family. On marriage, see Flory, Judge and Jury, pp. 193-194. Nabuco de Araújo's marriage affords an example, as his marriage to a niece of Francisco Paes Barreto, the future Marquis of Recife, strengthened his political standing. See Nabuco, Estadista, 46-47.

¹⁶⁰ See Graham, Patronage and Politics, 122-145, on the role of elections in keeping the Court in touch with the balance of power in far flung communities.

party. In an unprecedented, and never again repeated, maneuver, Conservatives in the Senate rejected the imperial choices, invoking the senators' authority to verify election results and declaring that fraud and irregularities rendered the elections invalid.¹⁶¹

The dispute over the Pernambucan elections took on special significance nationally because of the on-going struggle between the Chamber and the Conservative-dominated Senate. The Senate, long a Conservative bulwark, had survived liberal attempts to eliminate its life-time appointments during the Regency. During the so-called "liberal quinquennium," a five year period of Liberal ministries in the Court from 1844 to 1848, tensions mounted between the two representative bodies. In 1845, Paulista Liberals in the Chamber led a battle against Senate Conservatives in seeking an electoral reform law. The southern Liberals called for a joint session of the Senate and Chamber to handle the issue, invoking article sixty-one of the Constitution. The Senate, in turn,

¹⁶¹ Violence, intimidation, and fraud, of course, were routine elements of the electoral process. See Graham, Patronage and Politics, chapter 5. Reports from the United States Consul cast doubt on the charges of unusual election irregularities in the first Senate election. In May of 1846 the Consul reported to Washington that though elections were generally preceded by disturbances, the recent senatorial elections had witnessed no serious incidents, as a result of the measures by the Provincial President. In July he wrote that the elections had "been conducted with the greatest order." T-344, roll 3, Consul George Manouvier to Secretary of State James Buchanan, May 14, 1846 and July 7, 1846, T-344, roll 3. Mutual accusations were routine following elections. Praieiro police authorities charged that Conservatives, fearing defeat in the second senatorial election, had tried to disrupt voting at two polling places. At one church, they reportedly stole the ballot box and at another the Justice of the Peace arbitrarily tried to postpone the election. See Subdelegado of First District of S. Amaro, Jaboatão to Police Chief, Sept. 25, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 168, on the first incident and Subdelegado of Escada to Chief of Police Sept., 22, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 161 on the second. The subdelegado of Affogados reported to the Chief of Police, Sept. 23, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 156, that a Justice of the Peace attempted to pressure voters, first by spreading rumors of the likelihood of much bloodshed on election day, then by having his father prohibit access to wells on his land from which people had always drawn water. The father also threatened a ward inspector with expulsion from his land, despite contractually specified right to the land as a foreiro, and armed his slaves for his son's use on election day.

asserted its right to block such a fusion of the two institutions. Tensions between the two bodies could easily rise any time Liberals in the Chamber saw their efforts impeded by the Senate.¹⁶²

The mineiro Cristiani Ottoni succinctly expressed the liberal view of excessive senatorial power when he asserted that "[l]ife-time appointments were a public danger, modified only by two correctives: the gradual recomposition brought about by death and (subsequent) admission of new senators and by fusion (with the Chamber)." If the Senate insisted on annulling elections like those in Pernambuco and refusing fusion, there would be no choice but to reform the Senate, diminishing its powers.¹⁶³

The first election in Pernambuco was held in 1846. When the emperor chose the new Senators from the list of the six most-voted candidates in May of the following year, he disregarded Holanda Cavalcanti's lobbying against the praia candidates. Holanda Cavalcanti had little choice but to resign his post as minister of treasury, and the May 2, 1846 ministry quickly fell. This ministry was known as a "conciliation" ministry, because, while headed by the Liberal Holanda Cavalcanti, it had the support of the saquaremas.¹⁶⁴ These Conservative leaders were bitter enemies of Aureliano, the valued praia ally in the Court. The ministry also enjoyed the support of praia opponents in Pernambuco.¹⁶⁵ The saquarema Paulino José Soares de Sousa cooperated with this ministry as the lesser of evils and to avoid a "violent coalition of Alencar, Aureliano,

¹⁶² Pereira de Campos, "Política e Administração," 534-537 on the tension between the Chamber and Senate.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 537.

¹⁶⁴ This is not to be confused with the better known conciliação of the mid 1850s. The term usually refers to this latter period.

¹⁶⁵ Vianna, Da Maioridade, 27-28.

(and) the Praieiros.¹⁶⁶ He observed that "A ministry that seeks to live with everyone (which is impossible) and that fears everyone, is ready to do favors for us, to nominate a vicar, a county judge."¹⁶⁷

The May 22, 1847 ministry that replaced the conciliation ministry was composed of staunch, partisan Liberals such as Manuel Alves Branco and Nicoláu de Campos Vergueiro, who, like their praia allies, were interested in battle with the Conservatives. The saquaremas were incensed with Aureliano, whom they blamed for the nomination of the praieiros for the Senate, and whose support for the new ministry was clear in his brother Saturnino's membership in the cabinet as minister of foreign affairs.¹⁶⁸ The Senate's June 1, 1847 annulment of the Pernambucan senatorial elections was thus not only a rejection of partisan liberals for membership, but also partly a reprisal against Aureliano.¹⁶⁹

Conservative leaders saw themselves as the great champions of the monarchy. They had struggled against liberal efforts to reduce the crown's influence during the Regency and then led the regresso movement's consolidation of centralized authority and

¹⁶⁶ Paulino José Soares de Sousa to Figueira de Mello, Nov. 29, 1846, BNRJ/SM, Figueira de Melo Collection. Alencar referred to José Martiniano de Alencar (1798-1860), a Liberal senator from Ceará. He is not to be confused with the celebrated novelist and playwright (and politician) of the same name.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. In the same letter, Paulino also noted that while the praieiros in the Court were always grumbling about the ministry, there was no choice but to accommodate themselves to it.

¹⁶⁸ "A QUEDA DO 2 DE MAIO," Lidador, June 16, 1847, p.3.

¹⁶⁹ Nabuco, Estadista, 79-81; Beiguelman, Formação Política, 74-75; Marson de Andrade, Imperio do Progresso, 337.

refurbishing of the trappings of monarchy.¹⁷⁰ This made Aureliano's influence on the emperor all the more galling. In their minds, the emperor was forsaking his real supporters and bestowing favors on Aureliano and his praiçeiro allies.¹⁷¹ A Conservative paper, lamenting the selection of the praiçeiro candidates for the Senate, noted that they could only hope "that one day, the clamor of the people could reach the crown, across Aureliano's trenches that obstruct the road."¹⁷² No effort was made to hide the sting of the perceived injustice at the hands of the monarch. "As for His Royal Majesty, we have nothing to do but adore him, and respectfully kiss his august hand for this slap in the face."¹⁷³

liberal motivation
The Conservative nullification of the Senate elections placed these stalwart defenders of royal prerogatives in the awkward position of committing an unprecedented act of open defiance of the emperor. The liberal press made much of this. Liberal papers in the Court warned that "an oligarchical faction entrenched in the life-term Chamber [i.e., the Senate] intends to dictate the law to him who is above the laws (the emperor),"

¹⁷⁰ Indeed, in their vocabulary the term "republican" was one of immense opprobrium.

¹⁷¹ See "OS VIVAS DOS DIAS 11 E 12," Lidador, June 16, 1847, p. 3, an article on the two days of celebrations by praia partisans upon receiving the news of the imperial selections of Chichorro and Ferreira França to the Senate. "[O]ne day when He (the Emperor) remembers His Father, His minority, the reign of his sister, he will remember us, we who are dedicated to the real monarchy, we who have defended the monarchy, against which the dominant faction (the praiçeiros), the Palace, and the very Monarch have conspired; we will be in favor, in defense of the Son of the Founder of the Empire, the Orphan of 1831, whom we saved from the perils of July 30, from the insidiousness of December of 1832 plotted by the new senator Chichorro and by the omnipotent Aureliano, and from the extermination against him proposed by Sr. França aided by his son and new senator Ernesto: We exposed ourselves to the danger and confronted the revolutionary waves to save Him from your claws."

¹⁷² "A ESCOLHA DO SR. CHICHORRO DA GAMA PARA SENADOR POR PERNAMBUCO," Lidador, June 13, 1847, pp. 2-3, quote on p.3.

¹⁷³ "Fiat Episcopus, et discedat a nobis," Lidador, June 18, 1847, p. 1.

and that under the squarema plan "the moderating power will no longer be the key to our political organization, because another power raises itself higher--the irresistible power of the squaremas in the life-term Chamber (ie. the Senate)."¹⁷⁴ Another paper declared that "The squarema faction judges itself born with the right to perennially govern not only the country, but the very Crown," and asserted that "[s]ince the elevation of the meritorious cabinet of February 2 [1844] those proud oligarchs nourish profound resentments against the crown." ¹⁷⁵

The Liberals' argument that they had the emperor's support was a strong one; the emperor twice chose the praia candidates, when either time he could have chosen the Baron of Boa Vista, who, though with fewer votes, also appeared on the list of Senatorial candidates from which the emperor chose. The praieiros' alliance with Aureliano further deepened their confidence in the emperor's support. The Liberals' unusual open invocation of the emperor's support nonetheless infuriated Conservatives.¹⁷⁶

Much as the Conservatives attempted to justify their actions as something other than an infringement of the emperor's power, in the end it was clear that in defending the Senate's prerogatives they were willing to do precisely that, challenge the crown's authority. The elder Conservative statesman and senator from Pernambuco, the Viscount of Olinda, spelled it out explicitly on the floor of the Senate--"The descendants of those

¹⁷⁴ "PARTE NÃO OFFICIAL," untitled, Diario Novo, July 12, 1847, p. 2, reprinted from Diario do Rio de Janeiro and signed O observador.

¹⁷⁵ "A corôa e a facção," Diario Novo, Aug. 4, 1847, p. 2, reprinted from Conservador in Rio de Janeiro. Liberal papers ran a series of articles developing the theme under this title.

¹⁷⁶ Nabuco, Estadista, 81-84.

who knew how to resist the King in order to better serve the King will also know how to resist the oppression of the ministers to better serve the emperor."¹⁷⁷

Born of the annulment of the Senate election, the combative May 22, 1847 Liberal ministry was unlikely to prove any more accommodating than their enemies, the Conservatives in the Senate. The cabinet's leader, Manuel Alves Branco, did not disappoint his praia allies and other Liberal partisans with his letters that declared the obligation of all public employees to provide political support during the November elections to the Chamber. These instructions, tantamount to an invitation to abuse official positions, have been interpreted as an attempt to rally Liberals and avoid intra-party dissension.¹⁷⁸

In Pernambuco, the spirit of the new ministry was mirrored in the polarized atmosphere of provincial politics. Contributing to the heightening tension in the province were the numerous incidents of Conservative senhores openly defying praia police in the countryside. By 1847, many guabirú planters had had enough of their enemies, invested with police authority, "invading" their estates. Police reported individual cases of overt resistance and Conservative senhores coordinating their activities in the countryside, as well as criminal bands led by guabirús roaming the countryside. Delegados blamed the Conservative press for inciting resistance, with declarations, for example, that praia

¹⁷⁷ Cited in Pereira de Campos, "Política e Administração," 537. After the second annulment, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão went even further, implying a willingness to use armed force to defend the Senate's prerogatives. See Ibid. On the Viscount, and future Marquis, of Olinda, see Luis da Camara Cascudo, O Marquez de Olinda e Seu Tempo (1793-1870) (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938).

¹⁷⁸ Beiguelman, Formação Política, 75, offers this interpretation, based on a reading of Nabuco. See Nabuco, Estadista, 84-85.

police actions against Conservative estates would be defeated through armed responses.¹⁷⁹

In March of 1847, a group of a hundred men impeded the execution of an arrest order by a civil judge in Caruaru, eighty-seven miles southwest of Recife, in the agreste, and proceeded to chase local judicial officials and fifty soldiers out of town. The police reported that while the incident appeared to have originated in a private squabble, it was, in fact, a rehearsal for a larger uprising and a means of testing public support for the government. The president responded by sending over four hundred armed men, but they found only barricades and trenches, as the rebels had abandoned the town.¹⁸⁰

As early as August of 1846, police authorities in Limoeiro, fifty-four miles northwest Recife, had warned of gatherings of armed men. Sebastião Lins de Araújo was reported to be planning a revolt with Vicente Ferreira de Paula, the leader of the Guerra dos Cabanos in the 1830s.¹⁸¹ In December of that year, Sebastião reportedly led a gang of fourteen well-armed men that committed various thefts and murders. Maintaining order in Limoeiro proved difficult, as Sebastião and his ally João Maurício Cavalcanti da Rocha Wanderley when pursued would take shelter on the Natuba estate in the

¹⁷⁹ For complaints that Conservative papers were inciting resistance, see Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, July 3, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 3 and President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, July 14, 1847, ANRJ/SM, IJ¹324. On the Conservatives' armed resistance of praia police authorities, see Marcus Joaquim Maciel de Carvalho's meticulous study "A Guerra do Moraes: A Luta dos Senhores de Engenho na Praia" (M.A. thesis, Univ. Federal de Pernambuco, 1986), especially chapter 3.

¹⁸⁰ President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, March 23, 1847, ANRJ/SM, IJ¹324.

¹⁸¹ See President of Pernambuco to Minister of the Empire, Aug. 4, 1846, ANRJ/SM, IJ²253 and the enclosed letters from Municipal Judge of Limoeiro to President of Pernambuco, July 7, 1846, Delegado of Limoeiro to Chief of Police, July 21, 1846, and the Subdelegado of Limoeiro to the Chief of Police July 7, 1846. On Vicente de Paula and the Guerra dos Cabanos, see chapter 1 above.

neighboring province of Paraíba.¹⁸² In July of 1847, police authorities reported that Limoeiro, and especially Sebastião Lins de Araújo's parish of Taquaratinga, was the site of some of the most horrible incidents in the province. In each of the next two months Sebastião's band was cited for brutal murders.¹⁸³

José Pedro Velloso da Silveira, the wealthy owner of the Lages estate, organized Conservative resistance in the parish of Escada, located thirty-six miles southwest of Recife. In June of 1847, various guabiru senhores gathered there with their followers.¹⁸⁴ Francisco Marinho Cavalcanti, for example, spent eight days there and then returned to his estate, reportedly with the intention of working with Major João Guilherme de Azevedo and the "bandit" Antônio Lopes Ribas to convince the peasants of Jacuípe, in the far south of the province, in the district of Rio Formoso, to join a rebellion.¹⁸⁵ The

¹⁸² See President of Pernambuco to the Minister of Justice, Dec. 30, 1846, ANRJ/SM, IJJ^o324, and the enclosed document, Subdelegado of Taquaratinga to Chief of Police, Dec., 27, 1846; see the list of recent crimes in Chief of Police to the President of Pernambuco, Jan. 12, 1847. Reports the next year provided more details on the Natuba estate and the complicity of local police officials, who allowed gatherings of armed men there. See Subdelegado of Freguesia of Taquaratinga to Delegado of Limoeiro Aug. 5, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 122 and Delegado of Limoeiro to Chief of Police, Sept. 2, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 125.

¹⁸³ See Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, July 3, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17; Delegado of Limoeiro to Chief of Police, Aug. 28, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 121; Subdelegado of Taquaratinga to Delegado of Limoeiro, Aug. 5, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17; Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Sept. 2, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 124; Delegado of Limoeiro to Chief of Police, Sept. 2, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17.

¹⁸⁴ Delegado of Victoria to Chief of Police, June 21, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 73.

¹⁸⁵ Jacuípe is a wooded region around a town and a river by the same name. On the important role the Indians of this region played in the Guerra dos Cabanos, see chapter 1 above.

conspirators offered them counterfeit money to make a more persuasive case. An intercepted letter from João Guilherme referred to his meeting "with Paula's caboclos."¹⁸⁶

João Guilherme and Lieutenant Coronel Eustáquio José Velloso da Silveira, a brother-in law of José Pedro, and both residents on his estate, played prominent roles in seeking an alliance with Vicente Ferreira de Paula for an uprising among the Indians and peasants of Jacuípe and Panellas.¹⁸⁷ Conservatives reportedly paid off Vicente to cement the alliance.¹⁸⁸ In June and July, police officials sent various reports on these efforts to

¹⁸⁶ See Delegado of Victoria to Chief of Police, June 21, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 73, and Subdelegado of Uma to Chief of Police, July 16, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 71, for reports on the Lages estate providing protection for criminals and assassins from other districts and on Francisco Marinho's eight days there. See the reports from the Delegado of Agua Preta to the Chief of Police in the Casa da Cultura--Subdelegado of Una to Chief of Police, June 19, 1847, which includes the intercepted document from João Guilherme to João Cordeiro de Sá Brasil, reports on Francisco Marinho's eight days at the Lages estate; Delegado of Agua Preta to Chief of Police, June 19, 1847; See an unsigned and undated letter, copied by the scribe simply as to the Subdelegado, (but presumably from Francisco da Cunha Machado de Pedroza to the subdelegado of Uma) APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 15 that reported that Marinho had returned from the Lages estate and had about thirty men gathered. In February of 1847 Francisco da Cunha Machado Pedroza had reported that Marinho had gathered ninety men at his Coqueiro estate. The letter raised the possibility of an assassination attempt against its author or the subdelegado or the vicar and stated that if things did not improve soon he (Francisco) would move with his family to Recife. See Francisco da Cunha Machado Pedroza to Subdelegado of Una, Feb. 24, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 14.

¹⁸⁷ On Conservatives seeking Vicente Ferreira de Paula's support, see Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, July 3, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 3; Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, July 14, 1847, APEPE/SM, fol. 26, cites Eustáquio José Velloso da Silveira and João Guilherme de Azevedo as having conferred with Vicente, and Coronel José Pedro Velloso da Silveira as in on it as well. This report also states that the delegados of five termos confirm the information. Also see Subdelegado of the District of Capoeira to Chief of Police, (Reserved) May 28, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 61; Subdelegado of Bonito to Delegado of Bonito, May 25, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 62; Subdelegado of Panellas to Delegado of Bonito, July 16, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 67.

¹⁸⁸ See President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, July 7, 1847, ANRJ/SM, and enclosed letter from Francisco Vasco de Araújo to President of Pernambuco, which claim that the Baronistas paid Vicente fourteen contos de reis.

organize a rural rebellion against the provincial government, as well as numerous requests for more troops, weapons, and ammunition.¹⁸⁹ Perhaps the guabirus were hoping to capitalize on discontent among the peasantry triggered by recent government actions. The delegado of Agua Preta informed the chief of police that he had sent the local military commander to calm people down, people who had been upset by recent government orders.¹⁹⁰

João do Rego Barros' Buranhaem estate served as another gathering place for Conservatives determined to resist the praia administration. João, the Baron of Boa Vista's brother, and José Severino Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, led a gathering of two hundred armed men in November of 1847. When a police force supplemented by twenty National Guard arrived to seize armaments and munitions and disperse the gathering, they were surrounded by the two hundred men. The National Guard promptly fled. After reinforcements brought their number up to sixty, discretion, perhaps, seemed the better part of valor and the strengthened force still did not attack. The police chief explained that with elections near it was not the time for an armed confrontation. The provincial president immediately wrote the minister of justice for more army troops to confront the forces gathered by João do Rego Barros.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ See the citations for the three footnotes above. Police records of this period contain numerous requests for more troops, weapons, and ammunition.

¹⁹⁰ Delegado of Agua Preta to Chief of Police, July 16, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 70. The police commissioner did not specify what these government orders were.

¹⁹¹ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Nov. 5, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 260 and the enclosed documents Inspetor de quarteirão to Subdelegado cabo, Nov. 2, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 261 and Subdelegado cabo to Chief of Police, Nov. 22, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 263; Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Nov. 12, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 270. For the request for military troops and a summary of the events, see President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, ANRJ/SM, IJ³324, Nov.

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Confrontations were not limited to the zona da mata, as Liberal authorities in the sertão made clear. Serrafim de Sousa Ferraz, the police commissioner of Flores, 327 miles southwest of the capital, warned of a plan hatched by Conservatives in Buique and Pesqueira to attack Flores. Rumors had it that with a successful rebellion there, the area could serve as a base for infiltrating into other parts of the province. He gathered 210 men, fearing that his opponents might be able to marshal two to three hundred. The delegado requested more arms and ammunition from Recife and noted the need for a larger permanent force at his disposal. He noted that it took time to gather the National Guard and then there were limits on how long they would serve. The delegado was confident that with fifty troops he would be able to respond immediately to any threat, and supply the necessary time for the Guard to mobilize.¹⁹²

It was against this conflictive backdrop that the September and October elections to vote again for two new Senators, as well as the November elections for the Chamber in Rio, were held. In the midst of intense electoral competition a significant campaign innovation appeared. In an attempt to broaden their appeal and effectiveness, Conservatives initiated the practice of holding electoral meetings. These events, referred to by the English term "meetings," saw prominent politicians atop platforms making speeches and appealing to crowds for their votes. Leaders as prominent as the Baron of Boa Vista and his brother Sebastião do Rego Barros, for example, addressed gatherings, denouncing the Bahian-born praieiro candidates for the Senate as unacceptable to

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12, 1847, as well as the Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco correspondence of Nov. 27, 1847 that follows.

¹⁹² Delegado of Flores to Chief of Police, Oct. 28, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 275 and President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, ANRJ/SM, IJ³324, Nov. 12, 1847.

represent Pernambuco. The Diário do Rio reported that the event was the first of its kind in Brazil.¹⁹³ The Baron of Boa Vista also appeared in bars to gather electoral support, and offered the presidential residence for a dance for master artisans.¹⁹⁴

The praiheiros made far bolder appeals to the middle and lower classes than the Conservatives. In August, praia leader Joaquim Nunes Machado, speaking in a shoemaker's shop, called for nationalization of retail commerce.¹⁹⁵ Praieiro candidates used the new campaign technique of electoral meetings to make a naked appeal to resentment of the large Portuguese presence. Conservative journalists denounced praia abuses, gathering "the most ignorant part of the population for night-time meetings, in which they sought, by means of the most incredible calumnies and absurd stories, to excite popular hatred."¹⁹⁶ In the ever more polarized state of the province, resentment of the Portuguese would remain a staple of praieiro politics.¹⁹⁷

The electoral meetings are also significant in the picture they offer of politicians working crowds to gather electoral support. While the phenomenon is unremarkable in the twentieth century, nineteenth-century campaigning in Brazil has been depicted as a gentleman's affair in which candidates gathered support among the politically influential,

¹⁹³ "Para os Exms. Srs. Vasconcellos e Hollanda Cavalcanti verem.," Diário Novo, Oct. 6, 1847, reprinted from Diário do Rio. Marson, O Imperio do Progresso, 339, reports on another electoral meeting, this one featuring speeches by the Baron and Antônio Pedro de Figueiredo, publisher of O Progresso.

¹⁹⁴ Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 340.

¹⁹⁵ Quintas, O Sentido Social, 25.

¹⁹⁶ See "Os meeting.," Lidador, Dec. 4, 1847, p. 2. In a similar vein, see "As vesperas sicilianas," Lidador, July 11, 1848.

¹⁹⁷ The following chapter explores this theme more fully.

especially through letter writing. In this view, politicking among the mass of voters, in the sense of trying to convince voters on the basis of salient issues, was nearly absent.¹⁹⁸

We have seen that much as political discourse centered on maintaining order, political competition constantly threatened disorder. Not only was violence routine in the electoral process, but Pernambuco's highly polarized atmosphere undermined elite restraint motivated by fear of unleashing upheaval. By mid-1847, a combative Liberal ministry in the Court had demonstrated its support for the praieiros, whose aggressive police were prompting Conservative senhores to band together in armed resistance. Conservative innovation in electoral politics, with political meetings in which leaders directly appealed to crowds with speeches, was matched by Liberals. Praieiro speakers, however, were prepared to escalate tensions further, mobilizing the middle and lower classes with nativist appeals against a Portuguese presence that purportedly monopolized economic opportunities and denigrated the native-born.

¹⁹⁸ See Graham, Patronage and Politics, 154-155. Of course, the marshalling of supporters to vote, intimidate, and sometimes fight on election day which Graham illustrates was far from merely a gentleman's game. It had little to do with campaigning, however.

CHAPTER 4
"FOREIGNERS IN THEIR OWN LAND":
POLITICAL PARTIES, POPULAR MOBILIZATION, AND THE PORTUGUESE

The conceptualization of Brazilian political organization has long emphasized informal structures, such as family and patronage networks, over formal political institutions. Political parties, for example, have often been perceived as façades for personalistic groups formed to capture the spoils of government, and devoid of ideological content and significant differentiation.¹ The evidence from Pernambuco, however, suggests the need to reexamine such a perspective. The praieiros' democratic and nationalist appeal to the middle and lower classes through lusophobia (virulent hatred of the Portuguese) indicates clear differences from the Conservatives in their party program and the composition of their political support.

raise Graham
only
liberals
have
ideology?

Lusophobia in Pernambuco

In nineteenth-century Pernambuco resentment of the Portuguese was always just below the surface. The reasons for this bitterness were varied. As representatives of the former colonial power, a certain guilt by association fell upon them; the anti-colonial discourse of the independence era had blamed the metropolis for the ills afflicting Brazil.²

¹ The reader will recall that many authors have assumed similarity in the class composition, outlook and interests among political parties and have dismissed whatever differences may have existed in their political ideas. See the Introduction.

² On a similar phenomenon in Spanish America, see Romeo Flores Caballero, Counterrevolution: The Role of the Spaniards in the Independence of Mexico, 1804-1838

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Indeed, across Brazil, anger over the continuing influence of Portuguese advisors in Dom Pedro I's Court heightened the opposition to the first emperor. Racial tension also strained relations with the Portuguese. The majority of poorer Brazilians, who in the most part bore the brunt of exploitation by, and economic competition from, foreign shopkeepers and small retailers, were people of color. When day-to-day contact led to confrontations the Portuguese were quick to hurl racial epithets at Afro-Brazilians.³ Yet the greatest source of tension, and by far the most common target of attack, was the Portuguese role in the economy as a whole.

Two complaints--omnipresence in the economy and exclusiveness among the Portuguese--were staples of lusophobia. The terms "Portuguese" and "merchant" were largely synonymous in Pernambuco.⁴ Portuguese merchants did not, of course, monopolize trans-Atlantic trade; in fact, the British dominated it.⁵ Nonetheless, for many

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(Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1974) and Harold Sims, The Expulsion of Mexico's Spaniards, 1821-1836 (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1990).

³ Thomas Flory notes a Portuguese author's comments that "Brazil was a land of 'monkeys, Negroes, and snakes,' settled by people 'netted on the coast of Africa.'" See "Race and Social Control in Independent Brazil," Journal of Latin American Studies 9:2 (Nov., 1977), 205-206. The reader will recall that in Pernambuco, in the 1840s, 65% of the provincial population was of at least partly African descent, while the figure for Recife and its environs was estimated slightly higher, at 69% of the city's inhabitants. See the Introduction.

⁴ João José Reis has pointed out the same for Bahia. See Reis, Slave Rebellion in Brazil, p. 14.

⁵ The Portuguese domination of the trans-Atlantic trade seems a given in the period and was not contested by Conservatives responding to anti-Portuguese arguments. Nonetheless, merchants from various countries had established commercial houses in Recife. Indeed, in the 1840s, the Portuguese never comprised a majority of the import/export merchants listed in trade almanacs; there were typically as many British merchant houses listed as Portuguese. See Naro, "Brazil's 1848," p. 56 and Quintas, O Sentido Social, p. 24. On the British role in the trade, see Alan Manchester, British

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of the native-born, it was the apparent omnipresence of the Portuguese that seemed to make Brazilians outsiders in their own country.⁶ The Portuguese, who had access to Portuguese capital gained in international commerce as well as lengthy experience in the country and, of course, command of the local language, controlled a large percentage of Recife's retail commerce. Moderate liberals such as Joaquim Nunes Machado and radicals such as Antônio Borges da Fonseca both decried the significant number of jobs lost to the Portuguese.⁷ Nor was it simply a matter of open competition. There were constant accusations that the Portuguese kept to themselves, always aiding each other. Portuguese insularity seemed a nearly insurmountable barrier for Brazilians seeking employment.

Moderate liberal and radical newspapers appealed to these deep currents of resentment. Of all the newspapers published in Pernambuco that criticized the Portuguese, none was more vehement nor more insistent than the Voz do Brasil. This publication was dedicated exclusively to attacking foreign influence in Brazil.⁸ Only rarely, however, did this mean attacking foreigners other than the Portuguese.⁹ Rather,

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Preeminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline: A Study in European Expansion (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1933).

⁶ The praia leader Joaquim Nunes Machado, in a speech to Parliament on June 28, 1848, declared the need to "end that terrible anomaly of Brazilians being true foreigners, guests in their own country." "CAMARA DOS SRS. DEPUTADOS. SESSAO EM 28 DE JUNHO 1848.," Diario Novo, July 17, 1848, p. 2. On Nunes Machado, and this and similar speeches, see below, pp. 13-15.

⁷ On the differences among liberals, see below, esp. pp. 122-126.

⁸ "Prospecto," A Voz do Brasil, Oct. 27, 1847, p.1.

⁹ Nonetheless, hostility towards other foreigners for occupying jobs that Brazilians might otherwise hold also existed. There were, for example, complaints about German

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the Voz do Brasil focused on the supposed economic and political influence, insolence, and moral depravity of the former colonizers, and called for action against them.

It was easy for the Voz do Brasil to stoke resentment of the economic success of the Portuguese, who seemingly prospered in the midst of Brazilians suffering poverty. Accusations of Portuguese dominance of large-scale international commerce and small-scale retail trade within Brazil were commonplace.¹⁰ The paper charged that a Portuguese "monopoly" controlled the sugar trade and that the Portuguese dominated warehousing as well.¹¹ The Voz do Brasil depicted control of retail commerce as even more important in limiting job opportunities for Brazilians. Portuguese shippers, warehousemen, and retailers colluded, routinely hiring other Portuguese as clerks. Thus the native-born were denied access to a great many positions.¹² An article reprinted in the Voz do Brasil suggested 6,000 Portuguese-owned retail commerce houses in Pernambuco employed 12,000 Portuguese clerks, depriving Brazilians of 18,000 jobs.¹³

The lusophobic paper also claimed that competition from imported goods and from Portuguese artisans working in Brazil ruined opportunities for native-born artisans.

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and French engineers, technicians and artisans employed on public works projects. See chapter 4, pp. 26-27. In this vein, also see the rhetorical question in O Sete de Setembro, asking how Brazilians are to find work in commerce or artisanry when "our cities are overflowing with goldsmiths, tailors, masons, cabinet makers, coopers, even barbers from all over the world?" Oct. 31, 1845, cited by Freyre, Um Engenheiro Francês no Brasil, p. 284.

¹⁰ "Prospecto," A Voz do Brasil, Oct. 27, 1847, p. 1.

¹¹ "As Traficancias e os Monopolios dos Portuguezes no Comercio do Assucar," A Voz do Brasil, Nov. 24, 1847.

¹² A Voz do Brasil, no. 32.

¹³ "O BRASIL HE DOS PORTUGUEZES," A Voz do Brasil, Jan. 13, 1848, reprinted from O Regenerador Brasileiro.

Particularly galling was the employment of Portuguese in government projects, such as the fifty carpenters employed in the Naval Arsenal in Rio de Janeiro, when there were qualified Brazilians available.¹⁴

Not only Brazilians of limited means suffered the effects of Portuguese control. Even substantial Brazilian planters routinely lacked ready capital. The common practice was to use urban middlemen to sell plantation products, supply goods from the city and abroad, and provide the all-important slaves and working capital. These middlemen, known as comissários or correspondentes, were often Portuguese. The high rates of interest charged allowed Portuguese correspondentes to prosper at the expense of native-born senhores de engenho.¹⁵ Gilberto Freyre, the noted scholar of the Northeastern sugar plantation, described the figure of the middleman as:

A city aristocrat, with a gold chain about his neck, silk hat, a tiled mansion, a luxurious carriage, eating imported delicacies, raisins, figs, prunes, drinking Port wine, his daughters ravishingly attired in dresses copied from Parisian fashion books when they attended the premières of Italian divas at the opera house.¹⁶

Clearly, such a figure, enriching himself through seemingly usurious rates of interest, could provoke resentment.

The Portuguese role, of course, was not invariably exploitative, especially for the elite. After all, marital alliances might be struck, allowing capital-rich, Portuguese

¹⁴ "Eis a Sorte dos Brasileiros," A Voz do Brasil, April 5, 1848.

¹⁵ See Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry, 63-73. This author cites reports claiming that rates might reach as high as six percent a month. This figure, even at the high end of the possible range, seems extraordinarily elevated, however, for a business with a relatively low profit rate. Freyre gives the figure of nine percent a year. See Gilberto Freyre, The Mansions and the Shanties: The Making of Modern Brazil (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1986), 18.

¹⁶ Freyre, The Mansions and the Shanties, 15. On Freyre, see Jeffrey D. Needell, "Identity, Race, Gender, and Modernity in the Origins of Gilberto Freyre's 'Oeuvre,'" American Historical Review 100:1 (Feb., 1995), 51-77.

comissários, or their offspring, to enter the prestigious world of planters, while the latter gained access to much needed capital. Moreover, while interest rates were elevated, the middlemen did provide a crucial service that entailed risk. The uncertainty of sugar cane crops, as well as the difficulty of collecting debts when harvests failed, made loans to planters something of a gamble.¹⁷ Lusophobic papers such as the Voz do Brasil, however, seized on the risk for Brazilians in the relationship, claiming that once Brazilians were entrapped in debt, the Portuguese raised the rate of interest or demanded that the debtors support political candidates who favored Portuguese interests.¹⁸

For the Voz do Brasil, such Portuguese political influence made a mockery of Brazilian independence. The Court in Rio de Janeiro, or so the paper said, was flooded with Portuguese.¹⁹ Since the reign of the Portuguese-born Dom Pedro I, the paper claimed, a Portuguese plan had been in effect to occupy public posts, expand influence, and limit access to public posts to individuals of pro-lusitanian persuasion.²⁰ The active promotion of a more centralized political system allowed the Portuguese dominating the

¹⁷ See Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry, 72-73 on laws regarding collecting bad debts. Foreclosures on mortgages, prohibited in the colonial period, were allowed in the nineteenth century, but on very unfavorable terms for the correspondente. This, despite the fact that mortgages were generally for twice the amount loaned. See Freyre, The Mansions and the Shanties, 18; Stanley Stein, Vassouras, A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850-1890 (New York: Atheneum, 1974); Warren Dean, Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920 (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1976).

¹⁸ A Voz do Brasil, Nov. 2, 1847; "As Traficancias e os Monopolios dos Portuguezes no Comercio do Assucar," A Voz do Brasil, Nov. 24, 1847; "O JURO CONVENCIONAL," A Voz do Brasil, Feb. 12, 1848, reprinted from O Regenerador Brasileiro.

¹⁹ "Prospecto," A Voz do Brasil, Oct. 27, 1847.

²⁰ A Voz do Brasil, Nov. 10, 1847.

Court greater control over the entire country.²¹ The government supposedly overlooked the provinces, choosing ministers from the Court.²² "[I]nfernal centralization" made for despotic rule by provincial presidents comparable to colonial captains general.²³ The paper ascribed unpopular policies, such as heavy recruitment in northern provinces for the War in the Banda Oriental, to Portuguese influence in the Court.²⁴

The Voz do Brasil often appealed to the offended honor of Brazilians, depicting the Portuguese as untrustworthy, depraved, abusive and insolent. The paper accused them of routinely selling poor quality goods at inflated prices. The Iberians reportedly used a variety of tricks to cheat Brazilians, such as misweighing goods, whether in retail sales of beef or large volume purchases of sugar, introducing counterfeit money, and mixing water into the milk they sold.²⁵ The Voz do Brasil indignantly charged that the Portuguese even held sacks of flour between their legs, resulting in a foul smelling product because of flatulence.²⁶ The newspapers frequently reported Portuguese thefts,

²¹ A Voz do Brasil, May 10.

²² A Voz do Brasil, April 19, 1848.

²³ A Voz do Brasil, May 2, 1848.

²⁴ "Prospecto," A Voz do Brasil, Oct. 27, 1847. This war against Argentina, from 1825 to 1828, over territory long disputed by Spain and Portugal, led to the creation of Uruguay. See Ron Seckinger, The Brazilian Monarchy and the South American Republics, 1822-1831: Diplomacy and State Building (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1984).

²⁵ A Voz do Brasil, Nov. 2, 1847; "As Traficancias e os Monopolios dos Portuguezes no Comercio do Assucar," A Voz do Brasil, Nov. 24, 1847; A Voz do Brasil, Feb. 19, 1848. On counterfeit money, see Nov. 2, 1847; on adulterating milk, see Feb. 19, 1848.

²⁶ A Voz do Brasil, Feb. 19, 1848.

even by administrators of church and brotherhood funds.²⁷ Tales of Portuguese men abusing Brazilian women--luring them with promises of marriage, only to abandon them after compromising their virtue; prostituting young girls; raping women, even raping them with the assistance of slaves--were common.²⁸ The paper also accused the Portuguese of intentionally sowing the seeds of depravity by encouraging gambling, dances, and sexual license.²⁹

Depravity
womanizing
pleasures

The Portuguese were routinely depicted as insolent towards the native-born--flaunting their wealth, riding in rich carriages, splattering mud on humble Brazilians.³⁰ Portuguese assumptions that the Brazilian people of color were anarchic, always waiting for the opportunity to rise in rebellion, demonstrated racial contempt for Brazilians.³¹ In consequence, the paper continued, the Portuguese sought to increase immigration of the their white countrymen, as well as to encourage war and violence in Brazil, which would cause the deaths of Brazilian soldiers, largely people of color.³² This charge was a particularly strong formulation of the common accusation that the Portuguese employed a divide-and-conquer strategy with Brazilians.

backlash
v.
immigration

The Voz do Brasil depicted the long history of Portuguese greed, exploitation, and insolence in Brazil. Whether in excerpts of books, such as Memórias Históricas de

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ A Voz do Brasil, Nov. 10, 1847; A Voz do Brasil, March 22, 1848; "Oh La da Policia," A Voz do Brasil, March 28, 1848.

²⁹ A Voz do Brasil, Nov. 10, 1847.

³⁰ "Prospecto," A Voz do Brasil, Oct. 27, 1847; A Voz do Brasil, Nov. 2, 1847.

³¹ A Voz do Brasil, Feb. 19, 1848.

³² "Hum Dezengano," A Voz do Brasil, March 28, 1848.

Pernambuco, or in brief reports on past events, or mixed into news articles, there was no forgetting the sordid story of Portuguese offenses. Colonial restrictions had stifled the Brazilian colony; fabulous quantities of gold had been sent to Portugal with little benefit to Brazil; and the Portuguese government had ridded itself of shiploads of prostitutes and criminals by sending them to Brazil. The paper commemorated colonial resistance to the Portuguese, such as the 1710 uprising of Olinda-based native-born against the Portuguese mascates, or merchants, in Recife.³³

The Voz do Brasil frequently exhorted its readers to action against the Portuguese. On June 9, 1848 the paper proposed severe restrictions on Portuguese immigration, naturalization, and employment opportunities, especially in commerce.³⁴ Often the exhortations were vague but ominous. In April, the paper declared that the Portuguese had left only two alternatives: Brazilians could accept being enslaved by the Portuguese, or they could demand their rights, with a high cost in blood and war.³⁵ On May 2, 1848 the paper praised France's 1848 Revolution as the overthrow of tyranny and lamented that shouts of "liberty or death" were not heard in Brazil. Accusing the Portuguese consul of offering 2,000 Portuguese to help put down any similar uprisings by the native-born, it encouraged Pernambucans not to retreat, assuring them that with 200

³³ Excerpts of Memórias Históricas de Pernambuco were common. See, for example, A Voz do Brasil, Feb. 19, Feb. 26, March 4, and March 11, 1848. On the events in 1710-1711, see C.R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil. 1695-1750: Growing Pains of a Colonial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1962), 106-125 and Nelson Barbalho, 1710: Recife versus Olinda. A Guerra Municipal de Açúcar. Nobres x Mascates (Recife: Centro de Estudos de História Municipal/FIAM, 1986). Evaldo Cabral de Mello is preparing a book on the subject, A Fronda dos Mazombos (forthcoming).

³⁴ A Voz do Brasil, June 9, 1848.

³⁵ A Voz do Brasil, April 19, 1848.

canes and ponteiras de Pasmado (artistically worked knives from Pasmado, Pernambuco) they could reduce the Portuguese to zero.³⁶

The Praia and Lusophobia

The liberal Diário Novo and the praieiro leaders themselves were neither as flamboyant in their accusations nor so reckless as to exhort people to violence, as was the Voz do Brasil. They were, nonetheless, forceful in their denunciations of Portuguese influence and in their proposals for restrictions on immigration and the economic roles permitted to foreigners. Lusophobia was often the medium through which the praieiros raised issues of economic nationalism and democratic participation.

Joaquim Nunes Machado, for example, addressed the Chamber of Deputies in Rio on June 28, 1848 and railed against Portuguese insolence and involvement in Brazilian politics. His speech, however, centered on the baleful effects of the large Portuguese presence in the economy and the need for economic intervention. He forcefully denounced the importations of finished products that destroyed Brazilian production of goods such as clothing, shoes, furniture, and leather and silver goods. He further criticized Brazil's exporting raw materials, which foreigners then processed and sold back to Brazil as finished goods.³⁷

The circumstances of independence, Nunes Machado lamented, in which Brazil needed foreign support, had forced an open-door policy, allowing foreign goods and immigrants to enter without restrictions. The influx of foreigners, with their

³⁶ A Voz do Brasil, May 2, 1848.

³⁷ "CAMARA DOS SRS. DEPUTADOS. SESSÃO EM 28 DE JUNHO DE 1848," Diário Novo, July 17, 1848, pp. 1-2. See praise for this speech in Diário Novo, July 20, 1848, p. 1.

exclusiveness, impeded native commerce and industry, as well as a spirit of national solidarity. That Brazilian artisans, not up-to-date with the latest techniques, and Brazilian merchants, lacking capital, were competing with foreigners who worked together, was indicative of the national peril. Nunes Machado invoked recent revolutionary events in Europe (the revolutions of 1848), affirming that chronic problems must not be put off. "First of all, we should assure our countrymen of reliable means of subsistence," he declared.³⁸ Nunes Machado thus outlined the rationale for strong corrective action.

Implicitly challenging the universality of basic liberal economic thought, the praieiro leader argued that statesmen needed to apply economic principles according to the circumstances of each country. In the young country of Brazil people were "still learning all of the artisanal skills and kinds of work." Only recently emerged from a colonial regime, they were behind in knowledge and could not effectively compete with foreigners.³⁹ On June 3 Nunes Machado and fellow praia representatives, Felipe Lopes Neto, José Francisco de Arruda Camara, Joaquim Francisco de Faria, and Jerônimo Vilella Tavares, as well as a deputy from Rio Grande do Sul, Casimiro José de Moraes Sarmento, proposed the nationalization of retail commerce. On June 16, 1848, Nunes Machado offered an alternative, less radical, proposal for discussion as well: that all commercial houses be obligated to employ at least one Brazilian clerk, and that Brazilian

³⁸ "CAMARA DOS SRS. DEPUTADOS. SESSÃO EM 28 DE JUNHO DE 1848," Diário Novo, July 17, 1848, pp. 1-2, for the text of the June 28 speech, concluding on July 18, p. 1. July 17, p. 2 for the quotes.

³⁹ Ibid.

clerks be exempted from National Guard duty, placing them on more equal footing with Portuguese clerks.⁴⁰

On June 28, on the floor of the Chamber, Nunes Machado defended the nationalization of retail commerce. Foreigners would be allowed a short time to liquidate their holdings; subsequently, only the native-born would work in this sector of the economy.⁴¹ He further proposed selectivity in who Brazil accepted as immigrants. Instead of Portuguese "adventurers" who were immediately offered good jobs in the cities by their countrymen, Brazil should welcome only those who would work uncultivated rural lands. In defense of his proposals he offered examples of European countries restricting the economic activities of foreigners.⁴²

The Praia, Lusophobia, and Popular Mobilization

Far from being identical or nearly interchangeable, as has subsequently been claimed, on lusophobia and the issues the praieiros linked to it, Liberals and Conservatives were sharply distinguished, as they were over mobilization of mass support. Liberals used lusophobia not only as a useful way to champion nationalist development, but also as a method to stimulate political mobilization. One contemporary noted in his diary that stirring up hostilities with the Portuguese "attracted the people to the Liberals' side."⁴³ Campaigning for his party's nominees to the imperial Senate in

⁴⁰ "CAMARA DOS SENHORES DEPUTADOS. SESSÃO EM 16 DE JUNHO," Diário Novo, June 28, 1848.

⁴¹ Diário Novo, July 20, 1848 for text of June 28 proposal.

⁴² "CAMARA DOS SRS. DEPUTADOS. SESSÃO EM 28 DE JUNHO DE 1848," Diário Novo, July 17, 1848, p. 2.

⁴³ See Gilberto Freyre, O Velho Félix e suas "Memórias de um Cavalcanti" (Recife: (continued...)

1847, Joaquim Nunes Machado invoked lusophobia, making a speech from a shoemaker's shop in which he called for the nationalization of retail commerce.⁴⁴ Mobilization of aggrieved artisans, clerks, and individuals who aspired to positions which Portuguese immigrants occupied, as well as those who generally harbored resentment towards the Portuguese such as the free poor, marked a major difference with the Conservatives.

Indeed, the Conservative press in Pernambuco, in sharp contrast to the Diário Novo, actually defended the Portuguese presence. The Lidador noted Portuguese contributions to commerce that stimulated the economy generally and raised customs duties in particular, as well as the benefits Portuguese artisans conferred on industry in Brazil. The Lidador further argued for the beneficial effects of immigration of industrious white Europeans "in preference to that African race that . . . every day . . . demoralizes and barbarizes our land."⁴⁵ The prominent organ of the Conservative Party thus insulted Afro-Brazilians, to whom the praiheiros were successfully appealing.⁴⁶

The praiheiros' mobilization against the Portuguese pointed not only to issues of economic development but also to substantive issues of political power. Wealthy Portuguese merchants had long found entrée into prominent social (and, thus, political)

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FUNDAJ, Editora Massangana, 1989), 12. The author of these memoirs was Félix Cavalcanti de Albuquerque Melo. Subsequent citations, however, will be to Freyre, O Velho Félix, as the work is generally catalogued in this way.

⁴⁴ Quintas, O Sentido Social, 25. The campaign was for nominees to the imperial Senate. See below, pp. 181-183.

⁴⁵ "Ao Diário Novo do 1º, do corrente," Lidador, July 6, 1848, pp. 2-3. "HORROROSO ESTADO DA PROVINCIA. Profecia realizada.," Lidador, Dec. 14, 1847, p. 2, notes that Portuguese artisans had introduced new techniques to Brazil.

⁴⁶ The Lidador legitimized its stance by pointing to the successful United States, declaring its envy of "the enlightened policy . . . that has received all people with open arms." Ibid.

circles in Pernambuco. Many merchants managed to fulfill their aspirations to enter the world of the province's planters. Likewise, under the Conservative presidency⁴⁷ of the Baron of Boa Vista (1837-1844), Pernambuco's premier Conservative political leader of this era, the presence of foreigners from elsewhere in Europe, especially France and Germany, increased. Boa Vista recruited foreign engineers, technicians, and artisans to direct and staff public works projects to improve transportation and modernize Recife.⁴⁸

The political position of the Portuguese was not a problem exclusive to Pernambuco. Portuguese merchants were well established in socially and politically prominent families in the Court. By the latter 1840s, the Portuguese-born emperor, Dom Pedro I, was no longer on the scene, nor was his Brazilian-born son, Dom Pedro II, surrounded by a completely Portuguese circle of advisors, as the father had been. Nonetheless, Portuguese who had settled in Brazil and become naturalized Brazilians still dominated, in many ways, the Court in Rio de Janeiro. There were important links between various Portuguese families and the Conservative politicians who rose to power in the Regresso, the "Reaction" of 1836-1841.⁴⁹ This could only sharpen the liberal

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⁴⁷ Provincial presidents represented the Emperor and his Council of Ministers, the executive branch of government. Presidents were the key to enacting the policies and defending the political interests of the ministry that appointed them. They exercised broad powers of coercion and patronage in carrying out the ministry's wishes, making key administrative decisions, appointing various office holders (including the important Chief of Police post), and deploying armed force in crises.

⁴⁸ See chapter 3 for a discussion of the Baron of Boa Vista's recruitment of foreign experts.

⁴⁹ Consider, for example, the sauquaremas, the three men who provided crucial leadership for the Conservative Party. Two of the three had Portuguese backgrounds. Eusébio de Queirós, a Portuguese born in Angola, son of a crown magistrate who had set down Brazilian roots, himself married into a prominent Portuguese merchant family in Rio de Janeiro; his mother-in-law, after the death of her husband, remarried to José Clemente Pereira, a key Portuguese-born statesmen of the First Reign and supporter of

(continued...)

nativism felt by those in Pernambuco and other provinces who resented the Portuguese influence and the authoritarian centralization of the post-1836 era.

The weight of these factors helps explain prajeiro conflation of liberal decentralism and lusophobia, as well as the willingness to incite lusophobia among the discontented urban middle and lower classes. The mobilization against the post-1836 status quo is especially noteworthy because order was a fundamental political value and a reality only recently achieved. Lusophobia's appeal, in fact, was an appeal to a potent and recent tradition of violence against the Portuguese. Pernambuco's 1817 revolution for independence, as well as the Pernambuco-based 1824 Confederation of the Equator, had occasioned violent action against foreigners, and especially the Portuguese, in Recife.⁵⁰ And while in the immediate aftermath of Dom Pedro's abdication in 1831 there were anti-Portuguese actions in the streets of nearly all of Brazil's larger cities, there were veritable outpourings of such lusophobia in Pernambuco: the Septembrizada rioters in 1831, overwhelming Recife and shouting out "Death to the Portuguese"; the propertied, extreme liberal rebels of the 1831 Novembrada staging an uprising to demand measures against the Portuguese; and the nativist massacre of the largely Portuguese rebels of the 1832 Abrilada.⁵¹

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the ex-emperor. The other, squarema Joaquim José Rodrigues Tôrres, was born to a Portuguese prominent in Itaboraí, in the province of Rio de Janeiro. See Needell, "Brasilien." See chapter 2 above for a discussion of the Portuguese influence in Rio de Janeiro and its intimate links with the Conservative party.

⁵⁰ "HORROROSO ESTADO DE PROVINCIA. Profecia Realizada.," Lidador, Dec. 14, 1847, p. 1, compares the attacks on the Portuguese in 1824 to the lusophobic assaults in December of 1847, in criticizing prajeiro mobilization of the lower classes. Nancy Naro alludes to such events in 1817, 1824, and 1832. See Naro, "Brazil's 1848," p. 55.

⁵¹ On the revolts of 1831 and 1832 in Pernambuco, see chapter 1 of this work. On the (continued...)

During the Regresso the province, under the Baron of Boa Vista's presidency, had enjoyed a respite. Order prevailed.⁵² The return of a Liberal ministry to power at the Court in 1844, however, and the subsequent appointment of a praieiro ally as provincial president, set the stage for renewed challenges to the social stability the Conservatives had achieved. Indeed, in Pernambuco, the willingness of the praia (the local Liberal party) to attack an order they identified with the Portuguese and the Conservative Party, and their willingness to do so by popular mobilization, significantly shaped the identity of the party. In fact, contemporary accounts defined the praieiros as a party of the lower classes.

threat to
order
w/
civil
uprising?

In Pernambuco, Conservative journalists of the period naturally denounced this praia involvement with the lower classes, using a traditional appeal to an ordered, hierarchical society. Following the September, 1844 elections, for example, the Diario de Pernambuco denounced the tactics of the praia leaders in the suburb of Affogados. The paper claimed that three hundred men armed with clubs had marched to Affogados to steal ballot boxes and invalidate the election.⁵³ Praia parliamentary leader Joaquim Nunes Machado, the paper announced, had harangued the "heterogeneous masses" to "throw themselves like wild beasts, with clubs and knives, against an unarmed people."⁵⁴ Such behavior followed the principle of "flattering the passions and inflating popular

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anti-Portuguese actions in other provinces following Dom Pedro's abdication, see Bethell and Carvalho, "1822-1850," in Brazil: Empire and Republic, 1822-1930, p.59. On lusophobia generally in Salvador, see Reis, Slave Rebellion in Brazil, 14, 18, 22-28.

⁵² Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 55.

⁵³ "Diario de Pernambuco," Diario de Pernambuco, Sept. 10, 1844, p. 1.

⁵⁴ "Correspondencia," signed O inimigo da anarchia, Diario de Pernambuco, Sept. 12, 1844, pp. 1-2.

excesses."⁵⁵ The Conservative paper denounced praia efforts to "incite the passions of the masses."⁵⁶

The response of the prajeiros is revealing. In defending praia actions in the September elections the Diario Novo, in turn, attempted to undermine the assumptions of the Conservative attack. On September 13, 1844, the praia organ rebutted the Conservative depiction of Nunes Machado "in the middle of the rabble, corrupting it."⁵⁷ Challenging the Conservatives' view of the social hierarchy, the paper declared that in Brazil "there is no rabble, because among us there are only the people and slaves, and the people is all of us, from the most elevated category to the artisan or peasant."⁵⁸ Thus the praia organ explicitly declared its justification for widespread political mobilization in terms of a democratic, leveling vision of society. The basic division in society was between the free (all of whom ought to enjoy full rights of political participation) and the unfree.

The Conservative Lidador, in contrast, viewed the lower classes as lacking the requisites for responsible political participation. Conservative discourse routinely reinforced this notion. Denouncing praia electoral meetings, for example, the Lidador declared that "the masses do not have the necessary time or means to form personal opinions on the questions of the day, by reading the indispensable books and documents,

⁵⁵ "Diario de Pernambuco," Diario de Pernambuco, Sept. 10, 1844, p. 1.

⁵⁶ Diario de Pernambuco, Sept. 17, 1844.

⁵⁷ "Quis tulerit Grachis de seditione quaerentes.," Diario Novo, Sept. 13, 1844, pp. 2-3.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

and if they had them they would always lack the prior intellectual preparation."⁵⁹ Thus it was logical for the Conservatives to charge that the praieiros abused electoral meetings by failing to inform and wisely guide the benighted masses. Conservatives argued that praieiro subdelegados (deputy police commissioners) intentionally gathered the most ignorant part of the population for meetings in which raging, furious speakers excited mob hatreds with incredible fables and calumnies.⁶⁰

After attacks on the Portuguese in December, 1847, the Lidador denounced the praieiros along similar lines, again arguing that they undermined the prestige of rightful authority when they lowered themselves to court the lower classes. The Conservative paper railed against Praia journalism, which "excite[d] all the low passions of the riffraff against those who . . . apply themselves to industry, and obtain some fortune."⁶¹ Among the tactics the article criticized were the promotion of the 1844 "artisans' manifesto," which called for expelling foreign artisans from the country, and electoral meetings in which praia orators promised to lead artisans to a new society of economic abundance.⁶²

See p. 262

The Praia, Its Ideology, and Violence

The linkage the Conservatives sought to establish between the praia and anarchic, popular violence points to basic distinctions between the parties. At the turn of the century, Joaquim Nabuco, the son of a prominent magistrate who had been a leading figure of the 1840s, and scion of one of Pernambuco's oldest planter families, wrote the

⁵⁹ "Os meetings.," Lidador, Dec. 4, 1847, p. 2.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ "HORROROSO ESTDO DA PROVINCIA. Profecia realisada.," Lidador, Dec. 14, 1847, pp. 1-2.

⁶² Ibid.

classic history of the empire, in which he reflected his father's 1840's view of the lower-class character of the praia party:

One cannot help but recognize in the praia movement the force of a popular whirlwind. Violent, indifferent to laws and principles, incapable of permitting within itself the slightest discord, always employing means far more energetic than resistance requires, drunk in its excesses of authority: all of this is exactly the domain of the praia, and those are the very characteristics of democracy.⁶³

This Conservative depiction, of course, is misleading. The praia was not exclusively, or even almost exclusively, made up of urban radicals and the lower classes. The praieiros gathered support from various sectors of society; rural planters and educated urban groups also identified with the party.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, as pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, urban radicals and masses among the praieiros and the policies they pursued do point to fundamental differences in party membership, program, and ideology between the praia and the Conservatives. Despite the claim in much of traditional and contemporary historiography that there was no fundamental difference between the monarchy's two parties, the praieiros of Pernambuco demonstrated otherwise. For one thing, they were willing to preside over popular violence. Let us see how.

⁶³ Nabuco, Estadista, p. 102. The reference to democracy clearly conveys a pejorative tone. In this usage, the word seems to imply people unprepared for civic responsibilities nonetheless participating and exercising broad rights. Nabuco, who had rejected the republican coup of 1889, wrote this as a monarchist and in the aftermath of the popular, demagogic dictatorship of Floriano Peixoto in the early 1890s. See Jeffrey D. Needell, "A Liberal Embraces Monarchy: Joaquim Nabuco and Conservative Historiography," Americas 48:2 (Oct., 1991), 159-180. NB that Nabuco's father, José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, shifted from the Conservative to the Liberal Party by the late 1860s. By then, of course, the praia tradition of violent radicalism was moribund.

⁶⁴ The pioneering article with respect to the diversity of the praia's composition, and particularly the important presence of planters, is by Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, "A Revolução Praieira," Revista do Arquivo Público 5 (1949). Also see chapter 3 of Marcus Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion"; Marson, O Império do Progresso, 272-274; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," chapter 5.

Once again we begin by examining the issue of the party position on the Portuguese. The significance of the praieteiro lusophobic appeal to the urban radicals and poor is clear in the events of the latter 1840s. An important consequence of the Liberals' willingness to mobilize the lower classes was to increase violence and agitation in an already unstable setting. When, as the governing party in the province, moderate praieteiros appealed to xenophobic currents in popular thought, more extreme factions were prepared to go further to excite people against the Portuguese. Thus the potential for violence was inherent in praia lusophobic policies. If resentment of the Portuguese was always just below the surface, it only took political agitation to stir it up. Elections, when partisan animus was greatest, provided ideal settings for xenophobic outbursts.⁶⁵

One sees this in September of 1847 when hotly contested elections for two new senators were held in Pernambuco.⁶⁶ Praieteiro orators, seeking to harness urban discontent for electoral purposes, made naked appeals to lusophobia.⁶⁷ As noted earlier, in August, praia leader Joaquim Nunes Machado made a speech from the Recife shop of

⁶⁵ After the lusophobic riots of June, 1848, for example, the United States Consul reported that "according to the general opinion, there is every possibility of a new disturbance taking place on or about the seventh September next, at the time of the elections." United States Department of State, U. S. Consul in Pernambuco, 1817-1906, T-344, Roll 3, U. S. Consul Salinas to Secretary of State Buchanan, Aug. 14, 1848, (hereafter cited as U.S. Consul to Secretary of State, date, T-344 and the roll number); Amaro Quintas relates the disturbances in the electoral seasons of September of 1844 and 1845 to lusophobia, Quintas, O Sentido Social, 25.

⁶⁶ Conservatives in the imperial Senate in Rio had nullified praieteiro electoral victories to this influential body, going so far as to clash with the Emperor over the issue. Victory would have consolidated the praieteiro presence in national politics and strengthened the Liberal party in the Conservative-dominated Senate. See chapter 3 of this work.

⁶⁷ See the Conservatives' criticism of these electoral meetings below. See especially Lidador, "Os meetings.," Dec. 4, 1847 and "As vespers sicilianas.," July 11, 1848.

a shoemaker, calling for nationalization of retail commerce.⁶⁸ On September 22, just three days after the vote was held, several Portuguese were beaten. The Portuguese consul, in his letter of complaint to Provincial President Chichorro da Gama, reported the seriousness of the event--one of the victims was in danger of losing his sight in one eye as a result of the attack. The consul also reported other incidents in which Portuguese had been insulted and threatened. He attributed these events to the electoral season, and warned that one might expect more such incidents.⁶⁹

The chief of police, of course, was a partisan political appointee of the provincial president and a praieiro. In commenting on the consul's letter, the police chief left little doubt of his party's view of Portuguese influence in local politics. He played down the seriousness of the attacks and affirmed that the most important incidents were purely personal, one of which had been prompted by the victim's own behavior, when he slapped a prostitute in public. The police chief, however, then went on to criticize Portuguese attitudes and behavior, asserting that many Portuguese were impudent and ungrateful for the hospitality with which they were received.⁷⁰ He then argued that "[A]ny time a group of people gather, to exercise their right assured by the constitution, some Portuguese immediately say, 'There's looting!' If one did not know Pernambucans, one would think they were given to pillage. This is a provocation."⁷¹

⁶⁸ Quintas, O Sentido Social, 25.

⁶⁹ Portuguese Consul to President of Pernambuco, September 28, 1847, Arquivo Público Estadual de Pernambuco/Seção de Manuscritos (hereafter cited as APEPE/SM), DC-5, fol. 130.

⁷⁰ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, APEPE/SM, DC-5, fol. 131.

⁷¹ Ibid. A report from a subdelegado to the President of Pernambuco provides the information on the incident with the prostitute, Oct. 2, 1847, APEPE/SM, DC-5, fol. 134.

The police chief levelled his most important charge when he declared that the consul's real motivation was to assist the Conservative opposition in the elections. He lamented such Portuguese involvement in domestic politics, noting the fact that electoral activity was only appropriate for Brazilian citizens.⁷² The chief of police passed on to the provincial president a report from a deputy police commissioner that named six Portuguese involved in the recent elections, one of whom even attended Conservative meetings.⁷³

Several months later the police chief had to deal with far more serious disturbances. On Saturday, December 4, 1847, just four days before Recife's electoral college was to meet to select representatives to the national Chamber of Deputies in Rio and the local Provincial Assembly, the mostly Portuguese membership of the Philo-Terpichore dancing society on the Rua da Praia gathered for a dance. Throughout the night there were several bouts of stone throwing by a crowd that had gathered at the building. When the members tried to leave they were attacked by the crowd.⁷⁴

Isolated attacks on Portuguese men also occurred on the sixth and seventh of December. On December 8, the final day of festivities that the Nossa Senhora da Conceição do Arco brotherhood celebrated in the Bairro do Recife (the commercial area with a large Portuguese presence), as a fireworks display began, some in the crowd began shouting, inciting people against the Portuguese. A group charged the fireworks, setting

⁷² Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, APEPE/SM, DC-5, fol. 131.

⁷³ Subdelegado to President of Pernambuco, Oct. 2, 1847, APEPE/SM, DC-5, fol. 136. The Portuguese Consul denied charges of his involvement with the opposition. Portuguese Consul to President of Pernambuco, Oct. 7, 1847, APEPE/SM, DC-5 fol. 143.

⁷⁴ "RECIFE, 8 DE DEZEMBRO DE 1847.," *Diário de Pernambuco*, p. 1; "As vespas sicilianas.," *Lidador*, Dec. 11, 1847, pp.3-4; also see the five documents on the incident reprinted in the *Diário Novo* on Dec. 18, 1847.

them all off. Confusion reigned as those taken for Portuguese or other foreigners were beaten. The Conservative paper O Lídador reported that the cavalry soon dispersed the crowd, but foreigners' houses on nearby streets were stoned, windows and verandas broken, and two hundred illumination posts set up for the festivities destroyed. The rioters coursed through the streets, beating the Portuguese they found and stoning foreigners' houses.⁷⁵

Seven months later a far larger outbreak shook the city and surrounding towns. On the morning of June 26, 1848 a student entered one of the many meat warehouses on the Rua da Praia and insulted a Portuguese clerk. The clerk responded with words of his own; the student hit him with his cane; and the clerk struck him with an iron weight, rendering him unconscious. The fallen student's friends incited passersby against the clerk; a crowd gathered; and the accumulated hostility against the Portuguese soon overflowed. Chilling cries of "mata-marinheiro" and "morra marinheiro" (kill the Portuguese, death to the Portuguese) pierced the air. The city streets were soon abandoned to rioters and the authorities charged with putting down the disturbances.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ I Livro de Actas da Irmandade da Nossa Senhora da Conceição da Congregação, fol. 51, in the Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico de Pernambuco; Portuguese Consul to President of Province, Dec. 7, 1847, APEPE/SM, DC-5 fol. 157; "RECIFE, 9 DE DEZEMBRO DE 1847.," Diário de Pernambuco, Dec. 10, 1847, p. 1; "As verperas sicilianas.," Lídador, Dec. 11, 1847. The United States Consul's report on this "riotous mob" informed that not only were Portuguese beaten, but an English merchant and a Frenchman as well, see U.S. Consul Salinas to Secretary of State Buchanan, Jan. 20, 1848, T 344, roll 3; The Chief of Police played down the scale of the incidents. He noted, though, that it seemed not to be a spontaneous outburst, but planned in advance. See Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Dec. 11, 1847, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 313.

⁷⁶ "Horresco referens.," Lídador, June 30, 1848, pp. 2-3; "Ainda a carnificina dos dias 26 e 27 de junho," Lídador, July 4, 1848, pp. 1-2; "Acontecimentos dos dias 26 e 27 do mez findo," Diário Novo, July 1, 1848; "ACONTECIMENTOS DOS DIAS 26 E 27.," p.1, Diário de Pernambuco. Suplemento, June 28, 1848. See Nancy Naro's description (continued...)

Partisan journalistic accounts concurred in the description of heterogeneous mobs, emphasizing the lower classes--the plebe and slaves--as well as students (and even police wielding bayonets, according to the Diario Novo). The mobs broke down doors, looted stores and dragged the Portuguese they found into the streets and beat them. Word of the riots spread quickly; on the evening of the 26th, in neighboring Olinda, rioters attacked Portuguese bakeries and taverns and beat foreigners. Reports of the death toll varied; the Lidador claimed eight Portuguese deaths, with several of the corpses dragged through the streets, while the praieiros' Diario Novo initially claimed only three or four deaths.⁷⁷

On June 27th, the second day of the disturbances, there were new rounds of beatings and looting. At one school a group gathered and, following the example of a crowd that had converged on the government palace the day before to insist on actions against foreigners massacring starving Brazilians, wrote a petition to the Provincial Assembly.⁷⁸ A crowd, described by the Conservative Diario de Pernambuco as a great

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of these events, "Brazil's 1848," pp. 53-55. For the Portuguese Consul's response to these events, see Portuguese Consul to President of Pernambuco, June 26, 1848, APEPE/SM, DC-5, fol. 199 and Portuguese Consul to President of Pernambuco July 3, 1848, APEPE/SM, DC-5, fol. 201.

⁷⁷ "ACONTECIMENTOS DOS DIAS 26 E 27," Diario de Pernambuco, June 28, 1848, Suplemento, p. 1; "Acontecimentos dos dias 26 e 27 do mez findo," Diario Novo, July 1, 1848, p. 1; "Horresco refrens!" Lidador, June 28, 1848; "Horresco refrens.," June 30, 1848. On events in Olinda, see "REPERCUSSAO DOS DIAS 26 E 27 EM OLINDA," Lidador, July 11, 1848, p.2. Five weeks later, the Portuguese Consul called for an investigation into the fatal shooting of a Portuguese merchant while standing in the doorway to his house. The Consul reported that there continued to be beatings of Portuguese in various towns and villages, such as Abreu and Rio Formoso. Portuguese Consul to President of Pernambuco, August 7, 1848, APEPE/SM, DC-5, fol. 213.

⁷⁸ "ACONTECIMENTOS DOS DIAS 26 E 27.," p.1, Diario de Pernambuco, Suplemento, June 28, 1848.

multitude of barefoot people and slaves, marched to the Assembly, entered the galleries and forced their petition on the body.⁷⁹

The nine-point petition raised similar points to those raised by the praia leadership in the Court. The document called for a monopoly of retail commerce by native-born Brazilians and limits on the number of foreign-owned, large-scale commercial houses engaged in international commerce. It also sought protection for textile production. Standard liberal issues were raised. These included greater power for provincial assemblies and local use of tax revenues collected locally, at the expense of the national government. Fairer recruitment that would eliminate the disproportionately large numbers of people recruited in Pernambuco was sought, as was help for the lower classes to earn an honest living, protection for agriculture, and port improvements.⁸⁰

The praieiros' mobilization of the urban lower classes clearly set them apart from the Conservatives. Yet lusophobia had proved dangerous; its appeal was potent, at times too potent for moderate praieiros to control, even if they wished to do so. The praieiro tactics and their willingness to preside over violence against the Portuguese handed Conservatives an opening to attack the praia as a dangerous party of the lower classes. However willing the praia might have been to use lusophobic violence, they could not defend it as such because of the political culture of the milieu. They had to defend it in terms of that milieu--in terms of legitimate authority.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Diario Novo, July 11.

The Praia, Its Ideology, and Legitimate Authority

Such a defense was crucial in the political discourse of the day, where the Conservatives naturally had an obvious claim to the value of such authority. The Conservative press employed the same arguments in blaming the praieiros for the events of June, 1848 which it had used for the lusophobic attacks of December 1847. Conservatives argued that Praia doctrines incited the lowest classes of society against the men of order and orderly liberty.⁸¹ The Lidador denounced nocturnal electoral meetings in which the ignorant masses heard stories that presented Portuguese stores "like a Potosí to be conquered."⁸² They charged that the praieiros sought to inspire the masses with subversive doctrines and mobilize them for electoral purposes.⁸³ In so doing, they created volatile mobs vulnerable to manipulation. Some sought to harness these mobs as a "Mashorca," an instrument of vengeance; others sought to terrorize the vice-president of the province; and republicans sought to exterminate foreigners and usher in a Constituent Assembly.⁸⁴

⁸¹ "Horresco referens.," Lidador, June 30, 1848, pp. 2-3; "As vespers sicilianas.," Lidador, July 11, 1848, pp. 3-4.

⁸² "QUAES OS AUTORES DA CARNEFICINA," Lidador, July 11, 1848, p.2. The reference to Potosí, of course, is to the immense silver deposits the Spanish mined in the Andes.

⁸³ "Horresco referens.," Lidador, June 30, 1848, pp. 2-3.

⁸⁴ Ibid. The term mashorca (mazorca in Spanish) refers to groups of thugs employed by the Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas. Invoking Rosas was a means to discredit those purportedly sharing his tactics, as conflicts with Argentina had led Brazilian journalists to attack him as a demagogic dictator. For an influential treatment of Rosas as symptomatic of a strain of New World barbarism, see the celebrated novel by the Argentine statesman Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Facundo: Civilización y barbarie (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1975). On Rosas generally, see John Lynch, Argentine Dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829-1852 (Oxford: Clarendon and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981).

A Conservative sympathizer portrayed a similar picture in his diary.

New newspapers appeared advising the people to demand their rights. They were Brazilians: they should react against foreigners. Every night there were popular meetings, in which they tried to excite further the people's spirit. That exaltation grew until it touched delirium.⁸⁵

The Liberal response appealed to the same value of legitimate authority as the Conservatives; indeed, like the Conservatives, the Liberals blamed their opponents for the riots. Each side denounced the behavior of prominent individuals among their rivals. The Diário Novo charged that Conservative police authorities had encouraged the rioters, that the Conservative-dominated National Guard battalion in the Recife suburb of Afogados had goaded people on to commit further acts of violence, and that by mid-day on the 26th, only Conservatives were rioting.⁸⁶

In fact, the Diário Novo charged that the Conservative papers Lidador, Carranca, and Esqueleto had "incessantly attempted to undermine the emperor's delegate (the provincial president)."⁸⁷ The praieiro paper also blamed the doctrines of these Conservative journals for sowing insubordination and disobedience. It argued that earlier Conservative resistance to police authorities, when Conservative planters in the south of the province had taken up arms to challenge praieiro authorities, seemed to imply a right of armed rebellion. Conservatives had resisted the police, assaulted political opponents, and demoralized the National Guard; all of this helped justify insubordination to

⁸⁵ Freyre, O Velho Félix, 12-13.

⁸⁶ "Ainda os acontecimentos dos dias 26 e 27 de junho," Diário Novo, July 8, 1848, pp. 1-2. In late April, the Liberal cabinet replaced the praieiro provincial president, Antônio Chichorro da Gama, with Vicente Pires da Mota, who dismissed many, though not all, praia office holders. See chapter 5 for an explanation of this apparent political incoherence.

⁸⁷ "Quatro palavrinhas aos contemporaneos do Lidador.," Diário Novo, July 5, 1848, p. 2.

established authority.⁸⁸ Throughout, the emphasis on order and the inappropriateness of undermining public authority is noteworthy; it makes clear the common value legitimate authority had among both praieiros and Conservatives. Both presumed the fundamental political value of a stable, orderly society and the assumption of legitimate authority under the monarch.

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The element of the monarch and the empire for which he stood in this equation is central. It is especially remarkable that the Diário Novo accused the Conservatives of seeking a republic, separating the region from the rest of Brazil, and promulgating ideas of the French Revolution. Hurling such charges at the Conservatives seems initially perplexing; one would expect the liberals to be fending off such charges themselves. The Diário Novo blamed the "demonic san culot" [sic] Antônio Borges da Fonseca, a noted republican radical, and the "infernal doctrines" of his papers Nazareno and Tribuna and, improbably, depicted him as a Conservative partisan.⁸⁹ Given Borges da Fonseca's radicalism, this claim made it a small step to accuse the Conservatives of harboring plans for the separation of the north from the Empire and the creation of a republic. For good measure, the paper went on to accuse the Conservatives of spreading the ideas of the French Revolution. Borges da Fonseca had, in fact, arranged from his jail cell during the

⁸⁸ "Os guabirus e os acontecimentos do dia 26 de junho," Diário Novo, July 7, 1848, pp. 1-2. Also see "Os guabirus arcando com o Céu, e com a terra," Diário Novo, July 11, 1848, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁹ "Quatro palavrinhas aos contemporaneos do Lidador.," Diário Novo, July 5, 1848, p. 2., for the quotes; also see July 1, 7, and 11, 1848. In accusing Borges da Fonseca of being a guabiru (literally, an alley rat, a commonly used term for Pernambucan Conservatives), the Diário Novo pointed out that the Conservatives had allowed him, when the Praia was in office, to use a printing press of theirs. The Conservatives conceded the point, but maintained they did so only for a short while, because he was also opposed, as they were, to praieiro Provincial President Chichorro da Gama. See "QUAES OS AUTORES DA CARNEFICINA?," Lidador, July 11, 1848, p.3.

riots to have a proclamation distributed that urged the troops and masses to proclaim a provisional government and establish a Constituent Assembly.⁹⁰ This, and his haranguing passersby from the jail, resulted in his and two others' transfer to a prison ship in the harbor⁹¹. The charge of Borges da Fonseca being a partisan of the Conservatives, however, could hardly have been credible. It was obviously used to smear the Conservatives in terms of the commonly held value of the monarchy.

After all, Antônio Borges da Fonseca was known to be the most prominent radical in Pernambuco. His long political career began with his minor participation, at the age of sixteen, in the 1824 Confederation of the Equator, a republican rebellion against the first emperor. He was an indefatigable publisher of newspapers, proponent of a republic, street orator, and opponent of the Portuguese. The success of his various newspapers suggests that he had a not inconsiderable readership for his ideas. What set him apart from other radicals was his insistent republican stance, which led him to oppose whichever of the two main parties of the monarchy was in power. Thus he was brought up on charges of libel by both Conservative and Liberal administrations.⁹²

⁹⁰ "Ainda os acontecimentos dos dias 26 e 27 de junho," Diário Novo, July 8, 1848, pp. 1-2; "ACONTECIMENTOS DOS DIAS 26 E 27.," p.1, Diário de Pernambuco, Suplemento, June 28, 1848.

⁹¹ "ACONTECIMENTOS DOS DIAS 26 E 27.," p.1, Diário de Pernambuco, Suplemento, June 28, 1848. Borges da Fonseca had been jailed by the praieiros on libel charges.

⁹² On Antônio Borges da Fonseca, see his own Manifesto Político. Apontamentos da minha vida política e da vida política do Dr. Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Mello. (Recife, 1867); Hélio Viana, "O Repúblico" Antônio Borges da Fonseca (1808-1872)," Cultura Política (May, 1944); Chapter five of Vamireh Chacon, História das Ideias Socialistas no Brasil (Fortaleza and Rio de Janeiro: Edições UFC and Civilização Brasileira, 1981). Mário Márcio de Almeida Santos, in his brief article, "Borges da Fonseca," Clio 5 (1982), 165-168, announced a work in elaboration, Borges da Fonseca--um homem contra o Império.

Borges da Fonseca, of course, was unusual in his extreme views. Indeed, he was not a praieiro. He does, however, help illustrate an important element of local liberal politics of the period, its factionalism. Even the praia movement was split between radicals and the reformist element of the movement. The party leadership, representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, and the editors of the main press organ, the Diário Novo, were all monarchist reformists. Yet the radicals played a key role because they were active in polemical journalism and in street actions.

The radical wing of the movement appealed especially to the urban middle and lower classes (known as the Cinco Mil, the Five Thousand), and was active in journalism.⁹³ The most extreme papers in the province, such as the Voz do Brasil and any of the papers published by Borges da Fonseca, such as O Nazareno, O Tribuna, and A Revolução de Novembro, were explicitly rejected by the moderate leadership. Indeed, during the debate in Rio occasioned by Joaquim Nunes Machado's proposal to the Chamber for the nationalization of retail commerce, a Conservative deputy prompted a vigorous denial when he held up a copy of the Voz do Brasil and declared that this paper was part of Nunes Machado's provincial political group.⁹⁴ Likewise, during the Praieira Revolution, in which Antônio Borges da Fonseca fought alongside the praieiros, the moderate party leadership initially denied the authenticity of the "Manifesto to the World" which Borges da Fonseca had written and the entire military leadership of the

⁹³ Izabel Andrade Marson identifies the origin of the term "the Five Thousand" as an allusion to classical Athens, referring to the citizens in general, in contrast to the oligarchical regime of "the Four Hundred." See O Império do Progresso, 229-230.

⁹⁴ See "CAMARA DOS SRS. DEPUTADOS. SESSÃO EM 4 DE JULHO DE 1848," Diário Novo, July 24, 1848, as well as "PERNAMBUCO, 24 DE JULHO DE 1848," in the same issue.

northern army had signed.⁹⁵ Reflecting, in part, the influence of the 1848 Revolutions in Europe, this document declared among the aims of the struggle the right to work, universal suffrage, absolute freedom of press, the nationalization of retail commerce, federalism, and a Constituent Assembly to bring about political reforms.⁹⁶ Though the moderate leaders were unwilling to embrace some of the claims and actions of the more radical or even republican leaders like Borges da Fonseca, the activities of the radicals contributed to the political unrest among the urban middle and lower classes. The reformist party leadership was quite willing to seize on this unrest for electoral purposes and to help mobilize supporters during the Praieira Revolution.⁹⁷

Still, the leadership clung to the monarchy in their own pronouncements--and so did many of their followers. Lusophobic disturbances had certain noteworthy characteristics in this regard. While the praieiro and Conservative press organs sought to outdo each other in denouncing instances of rioting as anarchic (as even the Voz do Brasil did), the shouts of the rioters themselves suggest not a ferocious and uncontrollable mob, but people with a deep sense of grievance over the trampling of their rights and dignity. During the anti-Portuguese actions of December 8, 1847, for example, xenophobic cries of "out with the foreigners, the land is ours, death to the Portuguese" were accompanied by "vivas" to the emperor. When the police chief tried to calm the

⁹⁵ During the Praieira Revolution, discussed in chapter 6 below, the praieiro forces were organized into a northern and a southern army. The northern army leadership's signing on to the "Manifesto to the World" played into the hands of Conservative polemicists, who presented the radical document as reflecting a widely-held, mainstream praieiro position.

⁹⁶ On the Manifesto, see chapter 5.

⁹⁷ During the Praieira Revolution moderate praieiro newspapers insistently reiterated charges that their Conservative opponents were allied with the Portuguese in oppressing Pernambucans. See chapter 5.

crowd he was met with shouts of "the land is ours, we are within our rights." The invocation of the emperor, the insistence on Brazil being their own country, and the affirmation of acting within their rights all belie the journalistic denunciations of mere anarchism and suggest purposeful action within a coherent world view, in which the trampling of perceived rights prompted a legitimate, if violent, response. For many, there was no necessary conflict between lusophobic violence and the values of legitimate authority, nationalism, and monarchy.⁹⁸

In conclusion, one can suggest why this should be so. We have seen the depth of the anti-Portuguese sentiments among the urban middle and lower classes. As in many newly independent countries, the continued economic and social presence of the former colonial power's subjects appeared to frustrate expectations for change. Not surprisingly, politicians spoke to such strongly held views. The praiheiro leaders, caught up in this lusophobia, proposed policies to limit the Portuguese role in the economy and emphasized the theme in electoral gatherings. Radicals went further and actively promoted violent lusophobia, especially through virulent journalistic attacks on the Portuguese. In mobilizing the urban lower classes and in challenging classic liberal economic principles, the praiheiros often took advantage of the extremists' work and amply demonstrated clear differences from Conservatives, in both their program of

⁹⁸ Likewise, in Olinda, during the June 26 and 27 events, the group of rioters referred to themselves as "police patrols," again suggesting the legitimacy of their activities. See "REPERCUSSAO DOS DIAS 26 e 27 EM OLINDA.," Lidador, July 11, 1848, p.2. For the classic statements on deciphering the actors' sense of legitimacy in certain types of violent crowds, see E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and Present 50 (1971), 76-136 and Natalie Zemon Davis, "The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France," Past and Present 59 (1973), 51-91.

lusophobic, nationalist development and decentralized, democratic liberalism, and in the composition of their political support. At the same time, however willing the praieiros were to risk violence in defense of this nationalist liberalism, one also has to recognize the centrality in their thinking of the concept of legitimate authority, associated with the monarch. It is to this monarchism that the victors of 1848 would be able to refer as they sought to bind the wounds of the revolution of that year. If we are to understand this, however, we must first comprehend the significance of the Praieira Revolution. That is the substance of the chapter that follows.

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CHAPTER 5 THE PRAIEIRA REVOLUTION, 1848-1850

In the sharply divided province of Pernambuco, political support from the Court was crucial by the late 1830s. The centralizing, authoritarian legislation of the Regresso insured that office holding and the access to public resources it afforded, especially armed force, were often decisive in local struggles. By the same token, a new cabinet could empower its local partisans with dramatic results. Political changes in the Court could have ramifications that swept across the entire province; in 1848, one ministerial change sparked what became known as the "Praieira Revolution." Praieiros rose up in arms, eventually calling for a complete reordering of the political system. The revolt became a test of strength, not only with their provincial opponents, but also for the national political system constructed in the Regency and early years of the Second Reign by the newly emergent Conservative Party.

As we have seen, Conservatives in the upper chamber decisively bolstered their Pernambucan allies in struggles over the election of two new imperial senators. The confrontational May 22 Liberal ministry of Alves Branco, in turn, supported the praieiros. Armed battles in the south of the province and the praieiros' resort to lusophobia marked the increasing polarization in Pernambuco by late 1847. The formation of a dissident group, the Praia Nova, or New Praia, added to the troubles of the ruling praieiro liberal party. These dissenters, notably the first vice-president, Manuel de

Sousa Teixeira, and the Machado Rios brothers, Antônio, the commander of the Police Corps, and Francisco, a deputy police commissioner, were apparently angered over the selection of candidates and ran their own slate in elections for the Provincial Assembly, garnering several seats.¹ This split in the party, particularly the loss of Antônio and Francisco Machado Rios and their influence among the military troops and police, pushed further the radicalization of the party and the appeal to lusophobia.²

In January, the praia administration moved to strengthen its position by replacing police authorities in Goiana, north of Recife, and Bonito, Panellas and Agua Preta south of the capital.³ Such moves exacerbated conflict. In the district of Quipapá, for example, the dismissal of the Conservative deputy police commissioner Luis Bispo Bizerra Cavalcanti prompted Conservative partisans to post threatening flyers on the new official's door. When ordered to turn over the arms and ammunition he held, the fired official responded by only producing those weapons that were in poor condition. The police chief responded to the subdelegado's fears for his life by sending twelve policemen to be put at his command.⁴

¹ There was a series of politicians designated vice-president. The first vice-president was to assume the presidency on an interim basis when needed. If he was unable to carry out the presidential duties, the second was called on, and so forth.

² Joaquim Nabuco wrote that the inclusion of Provincial President Chichorro da Gama on electoral lists led to defections from the party--in the Senate elections, the veteran of the 1817 struggle for regional independence, Francisco Muniz Tavares, and in contest for the Chamber in 1847, Manoel de Souza Teixeira. The latter, who had initiated the period of praia ascendancy by beginning the dismissals of Conservative office holders in June of 1845, was potentially serious, as he had been selected first Vice-President, and therefore first in line to step in as interim President if needed. Nabuco, Estadista, 89; Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 352-356; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 139-140.

³ See the relevant correspondence, APEPE/SM, PC-18 fols. 86-94.

⁴ Delegado of Bonito to Chief of Police, Feb. 10, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-17, fol. 136.

A series of attacks by the bandits known as the Moraes de Alagoas inflamed the south and the interior of the province. Their mobility and the element of surprise gave them a decided advantage as they carried out attacks on the agreste districts of Garanhuns and Brejo da Madre de Deus and Pajeu de Flores in the sertão. The first attack was carried out by a brother-in-law of Moraes who, along with twenty-seven accomplices, left a man dead in the village of São Benedito, in Garanhuns.⁵ The town of Correntes was next, on January 30. Thirty-seven men entered the town, making threats, and, when they were unable to locate the individual they sought to murder, robbed his home and injured a member of his family. They next went to Papacaça, seeking the deputy police commissioner. Facing a well-armed opponent, however, they withdrew, but not before killing five people. They reportedly murdered a total of ten people in the district, stealing money, gold, silver, slaves, and horses.⁶

Traveling west, the bandits, apparently joined by new additions as they went, struck at Pajeu de Flores on the afternoon of February 11. The village surrounded, the surprised police detachment was unable to put up effective resistance. The gang shot up the village and the inhabitants were too intimidated to gather to resist. They broke down doors with axes and killed four individuals, including the county judge and a member of the police detachment. They also murdered the jailer, as they let the prisoners escape. They shot at the door of the police commissioner's house, threatening to kill him and Colonel Barbosa, the leading praia ally in the area, but failed to enter the residence to carry out the threat.⁷

⁵ Delegado of Bonito to Chief of Police, Feb. 10, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 136

⁶ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Feb. 22, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 160; Delegado of Bonito to Chief of Police, Feb. 22, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 175.

⁷ Delegado of Flores to Chief of Police, Feb. 19, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 147;
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As news of the brutal attacks spread, some people were all too aware of their vulnerability to surprise attacks. A rumor that the Moraes were heading to Cimbres, in Brejo da Madre de Deus, terrorized the inhabitants. The bandits were purportedly coming to murder Paulino d'Olinda, whose son they had previously killed. Some inhabitants of the town of Panellas hid their valuables and fled. Here, as elsewhere, police authorities requested additional weapons, ammunition, and reinforcements.⁸

Police authorities in the towns victimized by the Moraes gang were clear about the political importance of these events. The delegado of Flores, for example, reported that many influential people opposed to the government aided the bandits. This official expected the gang to seek the support of Lieutenant Colonel José d'Albuquerque, who was rumored to have been in on the attack. The police commissioner of Bonito reported having information on plans for a rebellion, which would erupt in various locales. The Moraes of Alagoas had reportedly been involved in several clandestine meetings with influential government opponents in which the plan had been hatched. Despite such reports, the police chief, in late February, was of the opinion that the Moraes were not truly motivated by politics. Rather, these were crimes against personal security and property. He warned, however, that "either of the two opposing parties . . . can make use of those bandits to upset public order."⁹

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Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Feb. 22, APEPE/SM, PC-18, 1848, fol. 160; "Relatório apresentado pelo ex-Presidente de Provincia Chichorro da Gama ao 1o Vice-Presidente Manoel de Sousa Teixeira" (hereafter cited as "Relatório apresentado pelo ex-Presidente Chichorro da Gama") ANRJ/SM, IJJ^o253, fol. 99.

⁸ Delegado of Brejo to Chief of Police, Feb. 21, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 182; Subdelegado to Delegado of Bonito, Feb. 24, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 178.

⁹ For the Chief of Police's view, and the quote, see Chief of Police to President of
(continued...)

By March, however, the cooperation of some Conservatives with the Moraes gang was clearer. On the sixth, the police in Bonito reported the previous day's sacking of the town of Panellas by Moraes, as well as Conservative senhores João Guilherme Azevedo and Luis Bizerra Cavalcanti, the former subdelegado of Quipapá.¹⁰ On the eighth, the authorities in Bonito informed Recife of an attack on Capoeira, with initial reports that houses had been broken into and burned.¹¹ The provincial president soon received warnings that southern parishes of Agua Preta, Una, Serinhaem, and Escada were in danger.¹² The chief of police, citing the utter inadequacy of available forces to contend with the challenge being presented, implored the president, for the second time, to request a force of six hundred men from the Liberal administration in the Court, as well as significant new supplies of arms and ammunition and authorization to undertake any necessary expenditures.¹³

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Pernambuco, Feb. 22, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 160; for the others, see Delegado of Flores to Chief of Police, Feb. 19, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 147 and Delegado of Bonito to Chief of Police, Feb. 22, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 175.

¹⁰ Delegado of Bonito to Chief of Police, March 5 and March 6, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 191; Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, March 17, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 219.

¹¹ Delegado of Bonito to Chief of Police, March 8, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 198. The fact that the Chief of Police's report to the Provincial President on March 17 fails to mention this attack suggests that the initial report was probably a mistake. See Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, March 17, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 219.

¹² Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, March 11, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 200.

¹³ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, March 17, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 219; for the previous urgent request for six hundred men and supplies, see Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Feb. 22, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 219.

By the end of the month, police were reporting opposition gatherings on the estates of João do Rego Barros, the brother of the former provincial president, the Baron of Boa Vista, and Colonel Agostinho Bizerra. Both were in Cabo, center of the older sugar plantations, and long a Conservative stronghold. Government supporters there feared assaults.¹⁴ In Jaboatão, near Recife, there were reports that the Moraes and João Guilherme, accompanied by two hundred armed men, were in the vicinity.¹⁵ Just three miles northwest of Recife, in Poço de Panellas, there were reports of opposition gatherings and open conspiracy.¹⁶ On the evening of March 21, a group led by Sebastião Lins de Araújo attacked the police barracks and the home of the deputy police commissioner in the town of Taquaratinga, in the district of Limoeiro, north of Recife, before being run-off.¹⁷ Three days later, a subdelegado was murdered in Bonito, in the south. The chief of police informed the provincial president that this was the work of the opposition, which hoped to prompt anarchy in the province. He expressed his concern that the opposition, recognizing their own weakness, would murder those government allies who served as barriers to greater opposition influence. The chief of police went on to request that one hundred and fifty to two hundred National Guardsmen be quartered in

¹⁴ Delegado of Cabo to Chief of Police, March 27, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 258.

¹⁵ Subdelegado of First District of Jaboatão to Chief of Police, March 23, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 247.

¹⁶ Subdelegado Poço de Panellas to Chief of Police, April 4, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 296.

¹⁷ "Relatório apresentado pelo ex-Presidente Chichorro da Gama," ANRJ/SM, IJJ^o253, fol. 99.

Bonito, that the police forces in the province be expanded, including large additions to the available arms and ammunition.¹⁸

Escada, another parish in the southern forest zone, proved to be the largest center of opposition resistance. In late March police reports had identified José Pedro Velloso de Silveira and João Guilherme Azevedo as conspiring to repeat the recent violent attacks on government supporters. The chief of police was sufficiently concerned that he requested one hundred and fifty rifles and eight thousand rounds of ammunition be sent there.¹⁹

José Pedro's Lages estate became a fortified safe point at which Conservative oppositionists gathered and from which they conducted armed action against government supporters. Powerful Conservatives such as João do Rego Barros brought large numbers of armed followers with them. Fortifications were built, three pieces of artillery set up and guards posted. The chief of police indignantly reported that the "bandits" were convinced that in that feudal castle they were safe and could threaten police authorities and the lives and properties of government supporters.²⁰

Police reports linked many of those gathered there, such as Padre Joaquim de Pinto Campos, José Severino Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, and João Guilherme Azevedo, to recent incidents of theft, arson and murder in Panellas, Quipapá, Pajeu de Flores, and Garanhuns. Padre Campos called for an uprising against the government in the assault on

¹⁸ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, March 27, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 242.

¹⁹ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, March 20, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 228.

²⁰ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, April 10, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 277.

Panellas, and flyers with the same message were distributed elsewhere. José Pedro's son had been in contact with the rebels in the forest of Panellas and Jacuípe to coordinate activities.²¹ The possible reach of the plans is suggested by the discovery of subversive proclamations in the pockets of a worker in the customs house.²² Indeed, the commander of feared a possible assault on Recife upon receiving news of the imminent linking up of a thousand armed men under José Pedro and João do Rego Barros.²³

By early April, parts of the southern forest zone were virtually in open civil war. At four in the morning of April 5, after bribing a soldier on guard, José Pedro led his forces from Lages on a surprise attack which overran government loyalists at his own Cahité estate, which had previously been seized by government forces. José Pedro's attack sent the praieira troops into retreat helter-skelter. The government forces suffered two dead and two injured and most of the men who fled failed to report anew for duty. Government loyalists fared better in battles at the Bamburral estate (belonging to the deputy police commissioner of Escada, Antônio Feijó de Melo) and Aguas Claras, defeating the opposition forces.²⁴

²¹ Ibid.

²² "Relatório apresentado pelo ex-Presidente da Provincia de Pernambuco Chichorro da Gama ao 1º Vice-Presidente Manoel de Sousa Teixeira," ANRJ/SM, IJJ²253, fol 99.

²³ Commander of Arms to President of Pernambuco, April 9, 1848, reprinted in Revista do Arquivo Público Ano II - Número IV, 2º Semestre, p. 56.

²⁴ Subdelegado Second District of Escada to Delegado of Vitoria, April 5, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 273; Subdelegado Second District of Escada to General Commander of Police, April 5, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 324; Lieutenant Colonel Commander of Second Battalion to Delegado of Bonito, April 6, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 323; Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, April 10, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 277; Carvalho, "A Guerra do Moraes," 76. Chapter 3 of Marcus Carvalho's work provides considerable detail on the Conservative armed mobilization.

Police authorities in surrounding areas hurriedly prepared themselves for their own defense, while sending what men they could to Escada to assist in the struggle against the main focus of the opposition movement based at the Lages estate. The general commander of the Police Corps reported from Bonito that various rebels in the forest were attempting to occupy his forces in order to impede them from leaving for the Lages estate in Escada. He did manage, however, to send about one hundred civilians.²⁵ Significant military, police and National Guard forces gathered for an assault on the Lages estate.²⁶ Meanwhile, in Rio Formoso, reports of rebel gatherings in Quitunduba and João do Rego Barros marching toward the parish with two hundred armed men prompted the delegado to quarter one hundred and fifty men ready for action.²⁷ A subdelegado had previously warned that there were barely enough men to carry out routine functions, such as nightly rounds, much less defend against a possible attack to seize supplies in the town.²⁸

Pernambuco's police commander insisted on the need for energetic responses to the crisis, including increasing the numbers of men in the field, the weapons available, and improving the inadequate rations. Rebel invasions of properties, murders, and theft, he

²⁵ General Commander of the Police Corps to Chief of Police, April 9, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 318 and April 7, 1848, fol. 321.

²⁶ See Commanding Colonel of Forces (in charge of battling the rebels in Escada) to Chief of Police, April 12, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 326 for a detailed account of the reinforcements he received in the second week of April.

²⁷ Delegado of Rio Formoso to Chief of Police, April 8, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 305.

²⁸ Subdelegado of Rio Formoso to Chief of Police, March 20, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 238.

argued, were demoralizing the population.²⁹ The morale of the local population was also on the mind of the commander of the forces preparing to assault the Conservative stronghold. He declared that he was "rigorous" in explaining to the inhabitants of the region their obligation to take up arms and defeat José Pedro's forces, or their hardships would be much worse later.³⁰ Considering the local strength of the Conservatives, it is not surprising that the commander felt the need to drive the point home. It is easy to imagine some hesitancy on the part of the poor when asked to do battle against powerful senhores with a permanent presence in the area.

On April 18 the government forces attacked the Lages estate. Antônio Feijó de Melo, the praia commander, approached the well-fortified estate with three hundred and fifty men at six o'clock AM. Another force was to initiate the planned combined assault. After an unexpected delay of three hours, some scattered shooting was heard, and the three hundred and fifty men advanced. Under heavy fire for two hours, they suffered many casualties. No significant second force arrived, however, only a small guerrilla group at one o'clock PM. Meanwhile, Conservative reinforcements made their way to Lages. Feijó de Melo was obliged to retreat.³¹ Leaders of the assault reported a need for artillery to break through the trenches, food and supplies for the soldiers (many of whom were deserting to return to their families), and a surgeon to aid the wounded.³² A

²⁹ General Commander of the Police Corps to Chief of Police, April 7, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 321.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Commander of the Forces (in charge of battling the rebels in Escada) to Chief of Police, April 18, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 335.

³² Ibid.; Subdelegado Second District of Serinhaem to Chief of Police, April 18, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-18, fol. 389 and appended Commander of the Forces in charge of

(continued...)

surgeon, ambulance, medicine and sixteen thousand rounds of ammunition were sent to aid them the next day, but the twenty guards accompanying them were overpowered by João do Rego Barros' men and the supplies fell into their hands.³³

The battle against the Conservative senhores in the Lages estate was undermined at this point by national events in the Court. The May 22, 1847 ministry, which favored the praiheiros' aggressive politics, had been fatally weakened by a split between the cabinet chief, Alves Branco, and Aureliano Soares de Sousa, the emperor's favorite. Alves Branco favored protectionist policies and the revocation of the Aberdeen Bill prior to negotiations with the British over a new treaty to end the slave trade and a new commercial treaty.³⁴ Saturnino de Souza e Oliveira, Aureliano's brother and ally, opposed both these positions and resigned from the cabinet when the emperor failed to support him. Without the support of the áulicos, Alves Branco was significantly weakened. Despite his position as president of the Council of Ministers and his personal appeals to the emperor to permit him to remain, the emperor opted to allow José Carlos Pereira de

(...continued)

battling the rebels in Escada) to Subdelegado Second District of Serinhaem.

³³ Commander of Arms to President of Pernambuco, April 21, 1848, reprinted in Revista do Arquivo Público Ano II - Número IV, 2º Semestre, pp.64-65; João Lucio da Morrti (unclear) Second Commander to Coronel do Estado Maior Joaquim José Lins de Sousa, April 21, 1848, APEPE/SM, OE-12, fol. 34.

³⁴ In 1845 the British parliament passed the Aberdeen Bill, as it was called in Brazil, allowing the British navy to seize Brazilian slave ships, treating them as pirate ships. For a detailed discussion, see Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970).

Almeida Tôrres (the Viscount of Macaé) and Antônio Limpo de Abreu lead a new ministry.³⁵

The March 8, 1848 ministry led by the Viscount of Macaé attempted to replicate the "conciliatory" politics of the May 5, 1846 ministry, which had garnered support from the Conservative leadership, the saquaremas. As part of this effort, the ministry proposed a law to end the practice of provincial presidents running for national office from the provinces in which they served. Demonstrating its commitment to this principle, the cabinet dismissed the saquaremas' bête noir Aureliano as the President of Rio de Janeiro, as well as his ally, the praia partisan Chichorro da Gama in Pernambuco.³⁶

On April 20, Chichorro da Gama embarked for the Court to assume his old seat in the Chamber, leaving the presidency of Pernambuco to the vice-president, praia dissident Manuel de Souza Teixeira. The new interim president appointed a new commander of arms and sent him to resolve the impasse at the Lages estate. The new military commander dismissed the praia leaders of forces in the area, dispersed the forces gathered to confront the men gathered at Lages, and accepted José Pedro's promises to remove the barricades constructed there and return armaments and ammunition in his possession which did not belong to him. The commander of arms also reported José Pedro's complete willingness to obey government orders. José Pedro further insisted that he had never violated any such orders, he had simply refused to allow a police search by

³⁵ Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração de 1840-1848," 530-533; on the fall of the ministry, also see the letter from Eusébio de Queirós quoted extensively by Nelson Lage Mascarenhas, in Um Jornalista do Império (Firmino Rodrigues Silva) (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1961), 154.

³⁶ Pereira de Castro, "Política de Administração de 1840 a 1848," 533; Nabuco, Estadista, 89-90. Nabuco refers to "The scandal of presidents electing themselves . . ."

a personal enemy, deputy police commissioner Antônio Feijó de Melo, with troops that might endanger his life.³⁷

The interim president echoed this perspective in his reports to the Court, arguing that the conflict was born of, and nourished by, private conflicts. He claimed to fear political manipulation of events might encourage "extreme and dangerous ideas," however, and that the hostilities might spread, and he recalled in this argument the five-year struggle of the Guerra dos Cabanos in the 1830s.³⁸ Thus, Manuel de Sousa Teixeira, who as a praieiro had dismissed Conservative office holders in June of 1845, now, in opposition to his former party, argued for the need to dismiss praia loyalists from those same posts. He rationalized this manoeuvre by arguing that many of those office holders had become corrupt, abusing their positions, oppressing people with arbitrary and vengeful acts, which led to the current state of civil war. Conciliation and unity for the good of the monarchy, so he said, now required responding to the public outcry and carrying out a reversal of fortunes at the local level. In six days, he dismissed five hundred praia office holders, including key police, National Guard, and public administration positions.³⁹

³⁷ President of Pernambuco to Minister of the Empire, April 26, 1848, "Relatório of 1º Vice Presidente Manoel de Souza Teixeira," ANRJ/SM, IJJº253, fol. 98; Commander of Arms to Vice President of Pernambuco, April 25, 1848, reprinted in Revista do Arquivo Público Ano II - Número IV, 2º Semestre, pp. 66-68.

³⁸ See chapter 1.

³⁹ For lists of police commissioners, deputy commissioners, officers of the police corps, National Guard officers and public employees dismissed, see President of Pernambuco to Minister of the Empire, April 26, 1848, "Relatório of 1º Vice Presidente Manoel de Souza Teixeira," ANRJ/SM, IJJº253, fols. 87-96. Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 366, places the total number of dismissals at five hundred.

On April 26, the new provincial president, Vicente Pires da Mota, arrived. He faced a formidable task in trying to calm the province. Not only had the praieiros been frustrated by the dispersal of their forces surrounding the Lages estate, but the massive dismissals by Manuel de Sousa Teixeira threatened to almost entirely displace them from official positions, leaving them at the mercy of their enemies. Praia Police Chief Antônio Affonso Ferreira responded by calling on police officials not to step down from their posts, despite their dismissals. The police chief and the respected praia deputy Félix Peixoto de Brito e Melo also led an effort to mobilize praia forces for possible armed action.⁴⁰

By mid-May an interim chief of police had replaced Antônio Affonso Ferreira. The new office holder lamented the state of revolt in the province, declaring that all the powerful citizens were arming themselves. He requested two hundred to two hundred and fifty military troops to be stationed in Cabo, Nazareth, Limoeiro and other points to impede an outbreak of hostilities.⁴¹ At the same time, a Conservative leader wrote to the old Pernambucan Conservative chieftain in the Court, the Marquis of Olinda, that "the praieiros, in their frightful gatherings have decreed the assassination of a few of their influential adversaries, and for that excursion they have armed themselves publicly."⁴²

⁴⁰ Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 367; Nabuco, Estadista, 90; for the text of the Chief of Police's letter, see Marson, 49. For an example of the praia Chief of Police Antonio Affonso Ferreira resisting the President's efforts to dismiss a praieiro delegado, see Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, May 1, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 1, in which the Chief of Police cites an 1842 law, arguing that the dismissal of the delegado of Nazareth was illegal and that he therefore ordered the police official to remain in office.

⁴¹ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, May 16, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 46.

⁴² Maciel Monteiro to Marquis of Olinda, May 22, 1848, Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Marquis of Olinda Collection, Lata 219, Document 52.

He also reported on a Diário Novo threat that "once the first drop of blood was spilt, the carnage will be horrible."⁴³

By May, the imminent eruption of civil war seemed a clear possibility. Police authorities in Limoeiro and Pão d'Alho, in the northern forest zone, Muribeca in the southern forest zone, and Pajeu de Flores in the sertão, called for measures to preserve order.⁴⁴ On May 9, praia partisan João Ignácio Ribeiro Roma was reported to be in the forest near the town of Poço da Panellas (three miles northwest of Recife) with armed men, possibly to attack his adversaries and seek revenge, now that he no longer held office.⁴⁵ The following day a skirmish between Roma's men and military troops occurred in nearby Apipucos.⁴⁶ In Bonito, Conservatives were on the offensive. Manuel Teixeira de Carvalho led an attack on a ward inspector in Cumbe, seizing four arms and some ammunition. A praia subdelegado reported that Teixeira had gathered thirty men to attack the deputy police commissioner's estate, seize arms, and then, with other guabirus (Conservatives), such as José Pedro Velloso de Silveira, attack the town of Gravatá.

Faced with civil war, President Pires da Mota, as the other Liberal-appointed presidents who followed him would also do, tried to find a middle road between the contending parties. Ratifying the widespread dismissals of praia office holders might

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ On Limoeiro, see Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, May 10, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 33 and May 11, 1848, fol. 36; on Pão d'Alho, see Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, May 15, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 54; on Pajeu de Flores, see Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, May 10, 1845, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 34; on Muribeca, Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, May 11, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 36.

⁴⁵ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, May 9, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 31.

⁴⁶ Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 368.

trigger open armed resistance by the praieiros, who, having occupied their positions for several years, were well armed. The president thus reinstated many of the fired officeholders to their posts. He chose not, however, to support those who had publicly and forcefully opposed him. Thus, forty-one of the dismissals of delegados and subdelegados were ratified. While he attempted to find individuals distant from both parties to take over these posts, in practice, most of these positions were simply not filled (the substitutes were officially considered to be in office). The praieiro office holders maintained that they still occupied the positions, yet the posts served them little, as their value depended on support from the government, such as positive response to requests for troops. This state of limbo had its effect on public order in some places. In Bonito, the failure to nominate new police officials prompted complaints about the state of abandonment of the police, making it difficult to carry out even such basic functions as guarding the jail.⁴⁷

Conflicts over nominations of police officials were a constant over the subsequent months. President Pires da Mota's reluctance to name guabiru partisans to posts ultimately led Firmino Antônio de Souza, the interim chief of police who replaced praia-partisan Antônio Affonso Ferreira, to resign.⁴⁸ Struggles over who would occupy particular posts more typically emerged at the local level. Joaquim Machado Portella, for example, was named the new deputy police commissioner of Muribeca by the vice-president on July 12, yet the office holder there refused to recognize him or turn over the

⁴⁷ Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 367-368; Carvalho, A Guerra do Moraes, 82-84 on not replacing the forty-one police officials and pp. 83-84 on the moderation demonstrated by the three provincial presidents from May to September of 1848; on Bonito, see Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Aug. 18, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 343.

⁴⁸ Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 368.

documentation pertaining to the subdelegado post. When a new chief of police took office, he backed the old office holder, prompting a flurry of correspondence with the provincial president.⁴⁹

In Rio Formoso, the interim police commissioner attempted to block Manuel Fermino de Melo from occupying the position as deputy police commissioner to which he had been nominated, prompting a number of appeals to the provincial president. Fermino de Melo prevailed, but was subsequently embroiled in controversy when the same delegado reported that the Fermino de Melo had dismissed ward inspector Arcanjo Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, and replaced him with a long-time ally. On August 19, a cabo of the new inspector fatally shot the former inspector, Arcanjo Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, while the latter was standing in his doorway speaking with the vicar. A shot also entered a horse on which the vicar was mounted. Indignation was such that at seven that evening a crowd gathered at the house of the subdelegado, yelling fora, fora (out with you). When they realized he was not at home, they threw stones, breaking a glass lamp shade. The police commissioner blamed the military commander in the region for supporting the subdelegado. The subdelegado, for his part, complained the police commissioner gathered National Guard troops, of which he was a lieutenant colonel, to pressure Fermino de Melo, wrote to the military commander of the region, requesting that

⁴⁹ Antonio Henriques de Miranda was the new Chief of Police, taking office on July 19. Subdelegado of Muribeca to President of Pernambuco, July 20, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 349; Subdelegado of Muribeca to Chief of Police, July 16, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 350; Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Aug. 28, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 375 and the four appended letters on the same case.

he not cooperate with the new appointee, and instructed the ward inspectors not to follow his instructions.⁵⁰

In Nazareth, a subdelegado attempted to impede a new appointee from taking office as delegado, leading to an altercation in front of the Court house and the suspension of that day's judicial hearings.⁵¹ The delegado of Recife's first district requested the dismissal of subdelegados in seven parishes in Recife, but was opposed by the chief of police.⁵²

The intensity of the ongoing conflicts helps explain the importance which each side attached to control of public offices.⁵³ On June 4, Manuel Tomás de Jesus arrived in Vitória to begin his appointment as the new delegado. He reported that Conservative partisans had been terrorized over the previous year. Six people had taken shelter in his house for three days, fearful of staying in their own homes. Nightly, he reported, gangs

⁵⁰ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Aug. 12, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 313; Delegado to Chief of Police, August 8, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 315; Delegado to Manoel Fermino de Mello, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 316; Delegado Rio Formoso to Chief of Police, August 20, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 355; Subdelegado Rio Formoso to Chief of Police, Aug. 10, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 320. Fols. 321-326 also treat the same case.

⁵¹ Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Aug. 30, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 384; Delegado to Chief of Police, Aug. 23, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 381.

⁵² Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Aug. 17, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 332.

⁵³ Tension and emotions were so high, that in July even Jerônimo Martiniano Figueira de Mello, who would later play a key role in repressing the Praieira Revolution as Chief of Police (as well as publish a basic account of the struggle) was urged to find an excuse to leave the province. "If a soul-less praieiro wants, can't he insult you?" (and, presumably, prompt an altercation) "People willing to serve like that are not lacking...[Y]ou are not cautious, you go out at night." João Pedro de Bandeira de Mello to Figueira de Melo, July 20, 1848, BNRJ/SM, Figueira de Mello archive, I, 29, 21, no. 62. Also see a similar message from the same letter writer, the brother of the future Chief of Police, on July 28, 1848, *Ibid.*, no. 63.

of thugs roamed the streets, pounding on the doors of Conservatives' homes, yelling insulting epithets. Police authorities were of no help; they sometimes accompanied the men terrorizing Conservative families. The new delegado explained that the division of the province into two competing parties was the origin of the degradation. Influential people were ashamed to engage in the despicable behavior that helped secure political success, such as intimidation of opponents and theft of electoral urns, so they appointed infamous individuals to police positions to carry out the dirty work for them. These authorities, however, proved impossible to control, to the point that even the Liberals who had appointed them were now sometimes fearful of them. The police commissioner declared that João Antônio Miranda was typical of the caliber of police authorities, a man who had murdered, committed theft, and dishonored his sisters-in law. Manuel Tomás de Jesus went on to report that he had substituted the deputy commissioners and ward inspectors, and he also requested a new military detachment, as many of the soldiers stationed there were from the area and related to the troublemakers.⁵⁴

While such a report might be exaggerated, it is far from unusual. Private correspondence from early July communicates the desperation of Baronist partisans elsewhere.⁵⁵ Francisco José de Figueiredo described the anxiety felt by Conservatives in his town, where insults and threats were so serious that he and other Baronists felt that if the praiheiros were not removed from office soon, the Conservatives would be forced to leave the area to protect their families. He wrote that flyers had been placed on the doors

⁵⁴ President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, June 15, 1848, ANRJ/SM, II'324, and the appended letter from the delegado of Vitória to the President of Pernambuco, June 5, 1848.

⁵⁵ Baronista, a supporter of the Baron, that is, the Baron of Boa Vista, was a common term to refer to Conservatives. I have rendered it here as Baronist.

of all the Baronist and Portuguese houses, encouraging "the scum" to beat those residents. The district judge may have been intimidated by the praiheiros' strength, as Francisco José wrote that a praieiro would not have committed so many perverse acts and that the judge seemed to be a Baronist only inside the safety of his house.⁵⁶

On July 5, County Judge José Bandeira de Melo arrived in Nazareth, to take up an appointment as a delegado. He was met by a praieiro who had organized armed men to impede him from taking office. The new appointee called on the National Guard to counteract the armed gathering, but the request for armed force was met with "inertia." José Bandeira de Melo then requested to step down from his position, citing concern for his family and public order. Meanwhile, fifty troops arrived to support him, but the judge insisted that even with armed force, he lacked the "moral authority" necessary for the position. Praia strength in the district was so great, and any principle of political tolerance so wanting, that both Liberals and Conservatives had informed him that any appointee not endorsed by the praiheiros would be subject to open defiance. To avoid being an object of laughter, the new delegado would have to dismiss most of his subordinates, which would provoke much resentment. He saw the position as untenable, urged the vice-president to accept his request for transfer, and advised that any new appointee was likely to fail if he was not respected by the praiheiros. The delegado's concern for his family may have been amplified by rumors that praiheiros were operating a laboratory, producing ammunition.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Francisco José de Figueiredo to José Maria Freire Gameiro, July 2, 1848, Figueira de Mello archive, BNRJ/SM, I, 29, 21, no. 70. The town is not identified.

⁵⁷ Municipal Judge of Nazareth to Vice-President of Pernambuco, July 15, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 215-218.

The tense atmosphere in the province was not relieved by the moderate position taken by President Pires da Mota and his successor Antônio da Costa Pinto. Regresso legislation of the late 1830s and early 1840s had set the framework for authoritarian, centralized rule, in which powerful local offices were staffed by men chosen by cabinet appointees, yet now the Court's decisive role in local politics was being used ambiguously. The praieiros had been partially displaced from power, but no general inversion had taken place to confer authority to Conservatives. This made each official post in each community a possible arena for struggle.

Meanwhile, as the praieiros no longer controlled the administrative apparatus in the province, on May 19 they founded the Pernambucan Imperial Society. Members in each district were to be responsible to a local three-man leadership, composed of a president, secretary and treasurer, which maintained contact with the organization's directorate in Recife. This body facilitated communication and helped coordinate praia activities across the province.⁵⁸ While the Imperial Society was beginning its efforts, police spies were reporting secret praia reunions in Recife and secret societies in the suburbs of Poço da Panellas, Affogados and São José, as well as open conspiring elsewhere in the province.⁵⁹

The praieiros were also stepping up efforts to mobilize support through nationalistic appeals to nativist resentment of the large Portuguese presence. In the

⁵⁸ On the Sociedade Imperial Pernambucana, see Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 369-370.

⁵⁹ Delegado First District of Recife to Chief of Police, August 26, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-19, fol. 369. This report summarizes the results of inquiries made after a May 26 meeting with President Pires da Mota. The President sought the discovery of the printing press which had recently printed a republican proclamation. Pires da Mota authorized the use of spies and assured the delegado that he could "count on all the necessary money, even from my own pocket if necessary."

Court, praia deputy Joaquim Nunes Machado delivered speeches to the Chamber on June 3, 16, and 28 in which he railed against the harmful effects of unrestricted Portuguese access to Brazil. He called for measures to increase opportunities for the Brazilian-born in retail commerce, culminating in the proposal to ban foreign participation in this sector. The lusophobic riots of June 26 and 27 in Pernambuco did not deter the praieiros from hammering away at this theme.⁶⁰

Nunes Machado's June speeches came at a time when the praieiros had taken the leading role among Liberal fractions in the Chamber. The Macaé cabinet, though Liberal and supported by the squarema minority and Bahia's deputies, proved unable to gather sufficient support in the Chamber to govern. The praieiros and the álucos had both been displaced from local and ministerial power by the ministry, and opposed it. Likewise, Teófilo and Cristiano Ottoni and followers of theirs, the most ideologically consistent of the Liberal factions, refused to support Macaé. Their allies from São Paulo and Ceará added to the opposition to the cabinet.⁶¹

On May 31, 1848, Francisco de Paula Sousa e Melo, formed a new cabinet, the sixth since the Liberals established the February 2, 1844 ministry.⁶² Paula Sousa considered a renewed attempt at the "conciliatory" politics that Macaé had tried, and Conservative leaders, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão in the Senate and the squarema Eusébio de Queirós in the Chamber, offered cooperation. Praia leader Urbano Sabino

⁶⁰ See chapter 4 of this work for a more thorough analysis of the issue.

⁶¹ Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 533-534; Nabuco, Estadista, 90.

⁶² He was generally referred to as Paula Sousa.

Pessoa de Melo took to the floor of the Chamber, however, asserting that neutrality would not be tolerated in Pernambuco and effectively squelched the idea.⁶³

Events quickly demonstrated that struggle, not non-partisan neutrality, was the order of the day. Conflict between the Chamber, controlled by Liberal fractions, and the Conservative-dominated Senate, flared up. The dispute over the Senate's right to block the Chamber of Deputy's call for convening a joint body of the Senate and Chamber, by virtue of article sixty-one of the 1824 constitution (which had already provoked the fall of the May 26, 1845 ministry and to which the paulista Liberals attached great importance), re-emerged in May of 1848. In June, word arrived that the Senate had annulled the second senatorial election in Pernambuco, once again impeding the praia-partisans Chichorro da Gama and Ernesto Ferreira França from occupying the coveted seats. The committed liberal Cristiano Ottoni proffered his formulation that Conservative senators were making inoperative the two justifications of life-tenures in the Senate: the Chamber's right to fusion of the two houses and the renewal of membership through new elections subsequent to the death of a member, and were thereby forcing reforms to reduce the Senate's power.⁶⁴

After the first annulment, the Marquis of Olinda had made veiled threats of Conservatives taking up arms to defend the Senate's prerogatives; now it was Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão's turn. As was his style, he left aside subtlety and nuance, raising the specter of a forceful defense of the state. "[I]f the government feared a violent usurpation by the Chamber of Deputies, public forces would find unanimous and

⁶³ Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 537-538.

⁶⁴ Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 535-537. On the Senate election, see chapter 4 above.

effective support in public opinion across the country to complete its rigorous duty, to maintain the reality of the Constitution."⁶⁵

The annulment of the praieiro elections to the Senate only spurred the praia to further radicalization. In the Court, Nunes Machado made his calls for legal restrictions on the Portuguese in June. In Pernambuco, praieiros identified Conservatives as accomplices of the Portuguese, such as in the case cited above, in which flyers posted on the doors of Baronists and Portuguese residents called for their beatings. The praieiros soon bought their lusophobic campaign to the streets of the Court.⁶⁶

The intransigent, even threatening, Conservative stance in the Senate, the weakness of the successive Liberal ministries by mid-1848, and, in the praieiros' case, frustration over the consistent failure of Liberal cabinets to choose their members for cabinet posts, all seem to have contributed to the radicalization process. Liberals in the Court, including such prominent leaders as Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu, joined the praieiros in appealing to lusophobia in order to prevail in the September 7 elections for the County Council of the Court. Liberals denounced the Conservative candidate José Clemente Pereira for his Portuguese birth, despite the fact that he, like many other Iberian-born but long-time residents of Brazil, had long ago acquired Brazilian citizenship.⁶⁷

The strident tactic employed by the Liberals was fraught with risk. José Clemente Pereira was a particularly successful example of the phenomenon, especially common in

⁶⁵ Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 537.

⁶⁶ On the proposals by Nunes Machado, see chapter 4 above; on the threatening flyers, see p. 199 above.

⁶⁷ Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 538.

the Court, of Portuguese who had settled in Brazil, become naturalized citizens, and managed to position themselves well within networks of influence. José Clemente, for example, had earlier appointed the Conservative military hero Luís Alves de Lima e Silva (the victor in repressing various rebellions during the Regency, as well as the Liberal rebellion of 1842 in Minas Gerais and São Paulo, the current commander of arms in the Court, stalwart monarchist, and the Count, and future Duke, of Caxias) to a command of military forces in the South. Caxias, in turn, used his influence to secure the presence of several Conservative deputies from Rio Grande do Sul in the Chamber. One of these, Dr. Jobim, also served as the Palace physician, a position which allowed him to offer political advice to the emperor. Dr. Jobim, as director of the Faculty of Medicine in the Court, had long-established relations with José Clemente, due to the latter's position as director of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia, the Court's charity hospital. Dr. Jobim's position also led to considerable contact with Bahian deputies, who, by virtue of having a Faculty of Medicine in their capital, were interested in issues concerning medical education. Thus, the appeal to lusophobia in the municipal elections not only indirectly challenged the many adoptivos in the Court, but specifically a successful individual with solid support in the Palace, the Chamber, and the military.⁶⁸

The Liberal press accused Dr. Jobim of palace conspiracies, of preparing a "Conservative Joana," a reference to Conservative denunciations of Aureliano's influence. The Bahian deputies were supposedly involved in these plans, which led Liberals to call for the dismissal of the President of Bahia, the Baron of Monserrate. The

⁶⁸ Ibid. On José Clemente's political career, and especially his prominent role in First Reign politics, see Tavares de Lyra, Instituições Políticas do Império (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1979), 297-298. On Caxias' extraordinary military career, see S. A. Sisson, Galeria dos Brasileiros Ilustres (Os Contemporâneos) 2 vols. (São Paulo: Martins, 1948).

praiheiros, for their part, went further, calling for dismissals of various military leaders, including Caxias, the commander of arms in the Court, and the Conservative leader of the First Battalion of Sharpshooters, fearful that they would use force to intervene in the municipal elections beginning September 7. Nunes Machado played a particularly prominent role, taking to the floor of the Chamber to denounce Conservative manipulation of influence within the palace. The cabinet did not yield to the pressure for dismissals, prompting criticism from the Liberal party organ, the Correio Mercantil, of the ministry's weakness and failure to promote the interests of the party.⁶⁹

The appeals to lusophobia by various Liberals heightened the always tense electoral atmosphere. On September 8, a group gathered in the parish of Sacramento, reportedly after hearing of the Conservative opposition's efforts to block Liberals from voting in the parish of Santa Rita. The angry group stormed to Santa Rita, shouting all the way, including cries against the Portuguese. In Santa Rita, a confrontation with a butcher who objected to the shouts erupted into violence. The butcher reportedly hurled a cleaver, wounding a man in the arm. The butcher was beaten, as was a man who threw a bottle into the crowd from a nearby house. After this incident, the crowd coursed through nearby streets, screaming "Death to the Portuguese," and other lusophobic denunciations. Shops in the area closed as commerce shut down. All available police, military, and

⁶⁹ Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração," 539; for an example of the Correio Mercantil's criticism of the ministry, see "ELEIÇÕES MUNICIPAES," Sept. 32, 1848, p. 1, in which it defends the ministry from charges of electoral abuse by arguing that while open to all sorts of criticism, it cannot be charged with attempting to appear "energetic, strong, or violent and capable of committing to an opinion." The article goes on to assert that the ministry "avoids with extreme care anything that could displease the opposition . . . [and] has carried that goal to the point that it is already accused of being lukewarm and not very diligent in defense of the interests of those whose triumph elevated it to power."

National Guard manpower, infantry and cavalry, was soon patrolling the streets, yet further incidents occurred on September 8 and 9.⁷⁰

Conservatives quickly used such destabilizing and shocking events as fodder for partisan attacks in the press and on the floor of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The Correio Mercantil initially insinuated that Conservatives were fanning the flames of lusophobia, in order to frighten adoptivos into whole-hearted support of their protectors, the Conservatives.⁷¹ As the magnitude of the events became clearer, however, Liberals attempted to play down the size of the disturbances and the lusophobic elements. The events were depicted as typical of routine "electoral fever," perhaps amplified by the excitement and celebrations of September 7, the anniversary of Dom Pedro's declaration of independence from Portugal.⁷² The Liberal organ declared that Conservatives were greatly exaggerating the magnitude of the events, in part to cover up their electoral defeats, but mainly to weaken the Liberal ministry by depicting the Court in turmoil.⁷³ The paper denounced "[t]he comedy acted out in the Parliament to convince the provinces

⁷⁰ "A MEIA NOITE. AS ELEIÇÕES MUNICIPAES," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 9, 1848, p. 1; "PARTE OFFICIAL," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 11, 1848, publishes several pieces of official correspondence regarding the events, see especially the description in the fourth document, from the Court police to the Minister of Justice, Sept. 9, 1848.

⁷¹ "A MEIA NOITE. AS ELEIÇÕES MUNICIPAES," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 9, 1848, p. 1; "A DESORDEM E OS SAQUAREMAS," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 20, 1848, p. 1.

⁷² "OS MOÇOS EM CALMA, E OS VELHOS AGITANDO," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 11, 1848, p. 1.

⁷³ Ibid.; "A TRANQUILIDAD PÚBLICA," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 12, 1848, p. 1; "A AGITAÇÃO," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 13, 1848, p. 1; "A FARÇA DOS TRABUCOS," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 14, 1848, p. 1; "A DESORDEM E OS SAQUAREMAS," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 20, 1848, p. 1.

that Rio de Janeiro is swimming in blood."⁷⁴ Conservative partisans managed to heighten the sense of turmoil by provoking pandemonium in the Chamber, when a spectator in the gallery began shouting against the Liberal ministry, in the midst of a speech by a Conservative deputy which insulted the Liberal ministers and their allies.⁷⁵

Conservative party stalwarts Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, and Joaquim José Rodrigues Tôrres in the Senate and Eusébio de Queirós in the Chamber propagated images of respectable citizens terrorized by anarchy.⁷⁶ The danger was so great that the Chamber of Deputies had been unable to meet on September 9, for fear of disturbances in the galleries.⁷⁷ They blamed Liberals for inciting lusophobia. Saquarema Eusébio de Queirós, in the course of a two-hour speech, emphasized the liberals' implacable opposition to his kinsmen, José Clemente Pereira. In the Senate, Honório denounced the manipulation of lusophobia, declaring it an electoral tactic that intimidated adoptivos from voting. He asserted that "following the shout of 'Death to the Portuguese, os Chumbos, os Marinheiros,' . . . disastrous, lamentable and woeful consequences always follow. Not long ago we had the example of

⁷⁴ "A FARÇA DOS TRABUCOS," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 14, 1848, p. 1. The same charge that exaggerated reports of the disturbances would be sent to the provinces in the North to undermine the ministry had also been made each of the previous two days, see "A TRANQUILIDAD PÚBLICA," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 12, 1848, p. 1; "A AGITAÇÃO," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 13, 1848, p. 1

⁷⁵ "A TRANQUILIDAD PÚBLICA," Correio Mercantil, Sept. 12, 1848, p. 1.

⁷⁶ For the transcriptions of key speeches in the Chamber on September 11, see the Correio Mercantil, Sept. 17, 1848; for the Senate, see the speeches of Sept. 9, in the Jornal do Commercio, Sept. 10 and 11.

⁷⁷ See the Senate speeches on Sept. 9, 1848, published the following day in the Jornal do Commercio; For the Correio Mercantil's rejection of these assertions, see Sept. 11, 1848.

Pernambuco."⁷⁸ The Conservative statesman also invoked the terrors of revolutionary France--"In France, the key word is down with the aristocrats, here it is down with the Portuguese."⁷⁹ Conservatives additionally blamed the Liberal ministry for failing to properly repress the disturbances once they had broken out. The Conservative press, meanwhile, accused praieiro parliamentarian Joaquim Nunes Machado of personally leading mobs in the streets. O Brasil, the leading Conservative paper, asserted that "the movement was entirely praieiro."⁸⁰

The risks to social stability presented by the praieiro mobilization of the middle and lower classes through lusophobia had already been demonstrated in Pernambuco. Indeed, the conflictive state of the province even prior to the June 26 and 27 riots had already been a topic of discussion nationally, following the publication of Vice-President Manuel de Sousa Teixeira's report upon stepping down as acting president.⁸¹ The praieiros' use of high-risk tactics in the very seat of the government, and the involvement of significant Liberal leaders, was fatal to an already weak Liberal ministry.

The deep divisions among Liberal factions that undercut the ministry reached the point that the praieiros opposed the cabinet on budgetary votes in September, apparently in the mistaken belief that a new ministry might favor them. Weakened by a lack of a

⁷⁸ See the speeches in both the Senate and the Chamber cited above; for the quote, see Sept. 10, 1848, p. 2. Also, see the response in the Correio Mercantil on, Sept. 12, 1848, "A TRANQUILIDADE PÚBLICA."

⁷⁹ Cited in Pedro Calmon, História de Dom Pedro II: Tomo Primeiro. Infância e Juventude. 1825-1853 (Rio de Janeiro, Brasília: José Olympio, Instituto Nacional de Livro), 358.

⁸⁰ See the Correio Mercantil's response to this charge, "O BRASIL RESPONDENDO A SI MESMO," Sept. 20, 1848, p. 1.

⁸¹ Nabuco, Estadista, 90.

loyal majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the Liberal ministry also faced the perennial challenge of a Conservative-dominated Senate. The September riots in the streets of Rio de Janeiro proved too much. The decision to resign was finally prompted by a legislative defeat regarding the extremely difficult issue of a new treaty with Great Britain concerning the abolition of the slave trade. The ministers perceived a lack of support from Dom Pedro as a further blow. On September 29, the emperor appointed a Pernambucan enemy of the prais, the Viscount of Olinda, Pedro de Araújo Lima, to head a new ministry, one that would hand power back to the Conservatives. Years later, writing on his decision to invite the Conservatives to form a new cabinet, the emperor wrote that "the political atmosphere of the northern provinces" and "the lack of energy against the rioters of September" had contributed to the decision.⁸²

Word of the ministerial change reached Pernambuco on October 13, 1848 when Herculano Ferreira Pena, the new appointee as provincial president, disembarked from the steamship Imperatriz, along with his new chief of police and commander of arms.⁸³ Ferreira Pena arrived in a province racked by conflict. In September, a group brandishing swords and firing guns had marched through Affogados, a suburb of the capital, insulting supporters of the government, hurling offensive epithets at the mulambos (Liberals), and yelling "morras" (death) to the government.⁸⁴ Nor was conflict

⁸² For the quotes, see footnote 25, written by Dom Pedro, to Tito Franco de Almeida, O Conselheiro Francisco José Furtado, 39. In the first quotation I have rendered estado dos espíritos as "political atmosphere." Pereira de Castro, "Política e administração de 1840 a 1848," 540; Calmon, História de Dom Pedro II, pp. 358-359; Estadista, 91-92; Helio Vianna, Da Maioridade à Conciliação, 31-34.

⁸³ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 15.

⁸⁴ Subdelegado of Affogados to Delegado of First Termo of Recife, Sept. 9, 1948, APEPE/SM, PC-20, fol. 22 and Sept. 11, fol. 23.

confined to the coast. Partisan struggle was so great in the sertão district of Pajeu de Fores, and the government presence so ineffective, that the chief of police personally traveled to the distant region to restore order.⁸⁵

Joaquim Nabuco later described the state of the province as almost revolutionary. The praiheiros, he wrote, had wanted to rebel, even under a Liberal ministry, when Chichorro da Gama had been relieved of executive authority in the province. The new Conservative ministry apparently feared sending a "strong man," fearful of sparking an open rebellion. For Nabuco, this was a fatal mistake. Herculano Ferreira Pena possessed neither special talent nor noteworthy prestige. According to this analysis, a powerful figure that could command respect, such as nationally prominent Conservatives like Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão or the military leader the Count of Caxias, might have been able to contain the situation. Nabuco perceived the failure to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and call for new elections as further compounding the problem. This step was not taken until February of the following year, leaving some doubt whether Conservative control of the ministry was definitive and thus encouraging resistance.⁸⁶

The new president assured the praiheiros that he would not carry out a general inversion of office holders.⁸⁷ Conservatives were apparently slightly suspicious of the

⁸⁵ President of Pernambuco to Minister of Justice, Oct. 16, 1848, ANRJ/SM, IJ'324, and the appended document, President of Pernambuco to Chief of Police, Oct. 10, 1848. On events here, also see Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Sept. 14, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-20, fol. 32 and especially, Chief of Police to President of Pernambuco, Sept. 23, 1848, APEPE/SM, PC-20, fol. 65 and the appended documents.

⁸⁶ Nabuco, Estadista, 94. Nabuco's analysis here may have been overly optimistic about the possibility of anyone being able to contain an upheaval.

⁸⁷ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 55.

Ferreira Pena's intentions on account of the lack of an immediate wave of dismissals.⁸⁸ Guabirus were not long disappointed, however. Nine days after taking office dismissals of praia partisans began.⁸⁹ On October 26, praia partisans in the sertão district of Flores and Recife's neighborhood of Boa Vista were dismissed from police posts; by November 7 praieiros had likewise been relieved in Exú, Pau d'Alho, Recife, Goiana, Nazareth, Cabo, Rio Formoso, Serinhaem, and Santo Antônio.⁹⁰

The praia grip on official positions established under President Chichorro da Gama had been weakened by the presidents, chosen by Liberal cabinets, who succeeded him, but they had not been entirely displaced.⁹¹ Clearly, President Ferreira Pena was now carrying out a far vaster change in office holding. On November 3, a commission of praieiro leaders met with the president, warning that unless he reversed course on the dismissals, they would oppose him and would be unable to assure public order.⁹²

For the Viscount of Olinda, an elder Conservative statesman, a Pernambucan, and the head of the Conservative ministry, the time had come to hand over power to Conservatives in Pernambuco. State resources, above all, the coercive potential of police and National Guard posts, were to be controlled by the cabinet chief's Conservative

⁸⁸ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 17.

⁸⁹ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 19-20. For a list of the office holders relieved of their posts and their replacements, see pp. 21-24.

⁹⁰ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 21-24, lists those dismissed and their replacements.

⁹¹ For a description of this policy, see the report to the new president, by the outgoing president, Antônio da Costa Pinto, President of Pernambuco to Minister of the Empire, Oct. 17, 1848, ANRJ/SM, IJJ^o253, fol. 155.

⁹² Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 25-26.

allies. Done quickly, it would allow guabirus to occupy official positions before the November 19 elections for county councils and justices of the peace.

Conservatives had bitterly complained when praieiros occupied official posts. The accusations of seeking vengeance and abuse of authority, so common in the discourse of the period, summed up the charge that state power was inappropriately used for personal gain. This argument was even used to attempt to justify open armed actions. José Pedro Velloso de Silveira, for example, after the battles at his Lages estate in April of 1848, declared that he had not opposed the government, but simply the acts of his personal enemy, subdelegado Antônio Feijó de Melo.⁹³ Now the roles were reversed and it was the praieiros who indignantly rejected their enemies' exercise of authority.

Praia deputy Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Melo, in the principal defense of his party's role in the Praiera Revolution, cited infamous crimes, such as the murder at the Genipapo estate, and the protection of criminal bands at the Lages estate, and railed against investing the authors of such crimes with police powers. "And the men chosen (to occupy official posts)? Implacable enemies of the Liberal party, inflamed by the fever for vengeance . . . many of immoral and ferocious character; a few (were) implicated directly, or indirectly through relatives, in praia police actions that seized from their house three hundred stolen slaves; others that shortly before had raised the banner of revolt to resist the king, burning and sacking towns and murdering defenseless citizens."⁹⁴

⁹³ See above, pp. 194-195.

⁹⁴ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 57, 65-67, quote on p. 57. Also see the quote on p. 67, "The names of those nominated were a living threat to those dismissed--rancorous enemies, moved by the instinct for vengeance, carried away by interest in winning the next election by the only means possible, force and terror . . . they let loose true gangs of
(continued...)"

President Herculano Ferreira Pena's delay of nine days before beginning the dismissals allowed him time to prepare the handing over of power to the Conservatives. The secrecy of the preparations and the failure to follow the routine practice of publishing news of the dismissals made for a series of spontaneous confrontations as new authorities attempted to take power across the province. The new office holders arrived, often backed by armed force, military or National Guard troops, as well as their own retainers, with the documents informing of their appointments in hand. Numerous violent confrontations ensued.⁹⁵

In Pau d'Alho, the dismissed praieiro commander of the police force, Pedro Bezerra de Menezes, gathered armed men on the night of November 5 at the Lavagem estate belonging to fellow praieiro Francisco José de Barros e Silva. Shortly afterwards these forces unsuccessfully assaulted the local police force. In Limoeiro, praieiro delegado Henrique Pereira de Lucena entered the town with a group of armed men, claiming the need to assure public order. Similar incidents occurred across the province.⁹⁶

On November 7, National Guard Colonel José Joaquim d'Almeida Guedes, the police commissioner of Olinda, and National Guard Lieutenant Colonel João Paulo Ferreira, a deputy police commissioner, sent letters of resignation to the provincial president, gathered the National Guard members they commanded, and marched toward

(...continued)

paid killers and bandits, and their war shout was "arrest, recruit, kill praieiros . . ."

⁹⁵ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 57, 61-62; Figueira de Melo notes that the dismissals were "not immediately published for reasons of public convenience," Crônica, 21; Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 39.

⁹⁶ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 27-28; Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 59. On the other confrontations, see Figueira de Melo, depicting praia abuses and Pessoa de Melo, 57-61, arguing that Conservative appointees engaged in unwarranted arrests, beatings, and murder upon arrival in their respective towns.

Iguaçu. They were joined by more National Guardsmen in Pau Amarelo, as well as at the Inhamam estate of National Guard Colonel Manuel Pereira Moraes, a prominent praieiro. En route to Iguaçu, they questioned a fisherman they encountered, and upon hearing of his loyalty to the Conservatives, killed him.⁹⁷

The following morning, Chief of Police Firmino Antônio de Souza marched one hundred men to Olinda. He had men march through the city, reading aloud the order to dismiss the two rebel officials, to the accompaniment of a beating drum. After swearing in new officials, he gathered the available forces and marched toward Iguaçu. After hearing reports that the rebels included three to four hundred National Guardsmen, the chief of police sent for reinforcements. On the tenth, with additional police, military and National Guard troops, the government forces overcame a guerrilla ambush at Maricota and approached Iguaçu, ready for battle.⁹⁸

Faced with open warfare, the provincial government immediately moved to strengthen itself. Orders were sent across the province to seize arms that had been distributed by praieiro officeholders. During Chichorro da Gama's presidency, considerable quantities of arms and ammunition had been distributed to praia occupants of police and National Guard posts.⁹⁹ The efficacy of such orders during a state of civil war is doubtful, of course. The provincial government also moved to arm its partisans in their newly occupied posts. The government requested troops, weapons and ammunition

⁹⁷ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 28-29.

⁹⁸ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 29-30.

⁹⁹ Figueira de Melo, the Chief of Police during much of the repression of the rebellion, gave the figures of 5,000 arms and 350,000 cartridges of ammunition. Crônica, 26. Nancy Naro has calculated that a little more than 255,000 cartridges were distributed, more than half of it between January and April, 1848. See Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 150.

from the Court, as well as the nearby provinces of Bahia, Alagoas and Ceará.¹⁰⁰ Troops had already arrived from the Court prior to any armed conflict, and more arrived from Ceará on November 11, suggesting that the government anticipated the possibility of a violent response to the political changes implemented by President Ferreira Pena in the province.¹⁰¹ The president also ended the status of the Diário Novo as the "official" paper, the one that printed government notices, because with official status "the false news it spread on the state of the province was considered true by the less thinking part of the population."¹⁰²

The first major battle occurred on the fourteenth. After abandoning Iguaçu as government forces approached, the rebels, now numbering six hundred, easily overpowered the police detachment of fifty men in Nazareth.¹⁰³ Here they freed the prisoners in jail, reasoning that they were victims of political persecution. They then settled into the Mussopinho estate. With the leaders occupying barricaded structures, trenches dug alongside a fence, men hidden in the hills alongside the road approaching the estate, and superior numbers, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the attacking forces. The government troops attacked in three columns and, carrying out a flanking manoeuvre, set the rebels to flight after three hours of intensive gunfire. The

¹⁰⁰ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 32.

¹⁰¹ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 55; Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 39.

¹⁰² Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 30.

¹⁰³ In late October, the District Judge of Nazareth had correctly identified Nazareth as a likely point for an uprising to begin, noting the praieiro strength in the area, the willingness to oppose violently attempts at dismissal, and the fervor and intimidation tactics of praia partisans. A Municipal Judge reported that the Baronistas and Portuguese were threatened with a new Saint Bartholomew Day Massacre. District Judge to President of Pernambuco, Oct. 26, 1848, APEPE/SM, JD-6, fol. 244 and appended document Municipal Judge to District Judge, fol. 246

government presented the action in the best possible light, claiming only twenty-three losses, compared to nearly twice that many for the rebels. The British consul, however, reported to London that government losses totaled 170 men and the entire cavalry. The praia deputy Felipe Lopes Neto, for his part, later claimed that the government victory had been achieved only by betraying the flying of a white truce flag by the praieiros.¹⁰⁴

In Serinhaem, in the coastal region south of Recife, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Henrique Wanderley, arrived to take over as delegado on November 10. Aware that the police detachment was loyal to the dismissed delegado and praia partisan, Caetano Francisco de Barros Wanderley, the new appointee came accompanied by a large group of armed men. Many of these men been supplied by José Pedro Velloso de Silveira, the owner of the Lages estate and a major figure in the armed resistance to the praia administration in the latter days of Chichorro da Gama's administration. Various praia partisans were promptly arrested, while others were forced to abandon the area. On the Cachoeira estate, Caetano Francisco de Barros Wanderley gathered 200 armed men. On November 17, the new delegado marshaled 50 military troops and 100 National Guard supplied by José Pedro and attacked the praia loyalists on the Cachoeira estate. After fifteen minutes the government forces had dislodged their opponents from many of their protected positions, and within an hour had put them all to flight. Eight were left dead

¹⁰⁴ Commander of the Northern Forces to President of Pernambuco, Nov. 14, 1848 and the same Commander's Ordem do Dia, Nov. 15, 1848, printed in Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 38-42, as well as Figueira de Melo's comments on the battle, pp. 36-38, 43. British Consul Cowper to Lord Viscount Palmerston, Nov. 20, 1848 FO 13/ 260, fol. 293. On Lopes Neto's claim, see Crônica, 48-49.

on the battle field, while two more drowned, shot as they tried to cross a river in escape.¹⁰⁵

In the sertão, the locally prominent Conservative Manuel Pereira da Silva was installed as delegado of Flores on November 17. The following day, the praieiro leader Francisco Barbosa Nogueira Paes entered the village with twenty eight armed men. In concert with several local allies and their fifty men, they controlled the village, barricading positions in the jail and Nogueira Paes' house, as well as several others. The delegado barricaded himself in his house, unable to advance on the praieiros' superior numbers during a three hour battle. On the nineteenth, fighting began again, and continued into the next afternoon, when eighty reinforcements arrived with Lieutenant Colonel Simpício Pereira da Silva at four o'clock. Two and a half hours later, the government forces prevailed. A majority of the praia forces escaped, but Francisco Barbosa Nogueira Paes and twenty others were arrested and taken to Serra Talhada. Curiously, after discussions with Nogueira Paes' relatives in Piancó, in neighboring province of Alagoas, and written assurances that the praieiro would not interfere with the Conservative officials, and would in fact stay out of the province, he was released on December 4.¹⁰⁶ Perhaps this flexibility on the part of Pereira da Silva was a recognition that in the distant sertão, where news and assistance from the capital was slow in coming, reducing tension with local rivals might avoid attempts at retribution by family members and allies.

¹⁰⁵ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 58; "Ordem do Dia," Nov. 17, 1848, Major Comandante General Ignácio de Siqueira Leão e Cruz, reprinted in Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 86-88, as well as Figueira de Melo's account, pp. 85-86.

¹⁰⁶ Delegado of Flores to President of Pernambuco, Nov. 26, 1848, reprinted in Crônica, 100-102, as well as Figueira de Mello's discussion of the events, Crônica, pp. 99 and 102.

By mid-November, much of the province was in arms. Though the possibility of resistance when a Conservative ministry handed offices back to the guabinus had long been clear, the armed responses showed no signs of coordinated action.¹⁰⁷ Across the province, opposition to the appointees arriving to occupy official posts erupted spontaneously. The praia party leadership hoped to avert armed struggle. Deputies in Recife had earlier written to the popular leader Joaquim Nunes Machado, urging him to return from the Court and help avert an outbreak. By time of his arrival in Recife on November 17, however, violent struggles were well underway.¹⁰⁸

Praieiro resistance to dismissals in late April and early May had been partially successful, as some dismissed office holders were returned to office and some nominations were abandoned, leaving interim office holders officially in the posts. In the changed circumstances of November, however, it was clear that resistance would not prompt the provincial president to yield. On the contrary, President Pena was firmly moving to solidify the Conservatives' ascension. The bloody death toll of the battle at the Mussopinho estate demonstrated that the new administration was committed to crushing praieiro recalcitrance. Moreover, facing resistance across the province, on November 13 the president postponed until December 17 the elections for county councilmen and justices of the peace scheduled for November 19. These elections was crucial, as the victors would control the electoral boards that would qualify electors in the next

¹⁰⁷ This, despite Figueira de Mello's partisan efforts in Crônica to depict the Praieira Revolution as a plan preconceived in the Court. This argument is contested by Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Melo in Apreciação.

¹⁰⁸ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 38-39; Nabuco, Estadista, 96-97.

elections for the Provincial Assembly, the Chamber of Deputies in the Court, as well as for the Imperial Senate.¹⁰⁹

Nunes Machado disembarked into a province in open conflict, where the blood of his fellow prajeiros had already been spilt, one where a Conservative administration, backed by the cabinet in the Court headed by the Conservative Pernambucan statesmen, the Viscount of Olinda, seemed determined to stamp out resistance to its turning over of the state apparatus to Conservative praja opponents. Nunes Machado's initial conciliatory attitude, hoping to find grounds for pulling back from armed conflict, such as securing an amnesty from President Pena for acts committed over the previous weeks, led to rumors that the prajeiro leader had betrayed the movement, switching sides to support the guabinus. On the eighteenth, flyers were distributed in which Nunes Machado vehemently denied such rumors and insisted on his adherence to his principles and continued opposition to the saquaremas. He denounced President Pena's use of force and declared his willingness to offer his own life, if necessary, to save Pernambuco.¹¹⁰

On November 25, Nunes Machado and the other seven prajeiro deputies to the Chamber of Deputies issued a manifesto in which they railed against the atrocious acts of the new office holders and denounced the inflexible attitude of the administration, which instead of listening to their complaints, sent troops to crush them. They insisted that they

¹⁰⁹ On the electoral postponement, see "Transferencia das eleições," Diario Novo, Nov. 15, 1848, p. 1; Marson, Imperio, 51-52, 64.

¹¹⁰ The flyer was subsequently published in the prajeiro press, see "AO PUBLICO," Diario Novo, November 20, 1848, p. 1. Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 50-51; Nabuco, Estadista, 97. On Nunes Machado hoping for an amnesty or other government measure that would assist him in restraining the prajeiros, see Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, "Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Melo," p. 22. Figueira de Melo conceded that Nunes Machado intended to restrain his allies, but criticized what he described as weakness of character for abandoning his principles and accepting armed struggle once he saw that he was unable to prevail. See Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 50-51.

did not want war and were only motivated by self-defense. The manifesto was emphatic on not rejecting constitutionality. It did not call for broad reforms or radical changes. Rather, it insisted on the illegality of numerous acts by President Pena and his allies. The deputies asserted that they had no choice but to "[a]ccompany our fellow citizens in their glorious defense [and] protest in the name of the constitution and the emperor against so many atrocities committed by his delegate (the provincial president)." The term used-- "accompany" their fellow citizens--reflects the fact that the revolt was initiated by praieiros across the province; when party leaders arrived from the Court they were faced with a fait accompli.¹¹¹

One contemporary, the Conservative leader Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, interpreted these events in terms of personal loyalty, noting that Nunes Machado, had "courage in all matters, save resisting his friends."¹¹² Without underestimating the importance that personal attachments and loyalties must have had, it also seems clear that failure to accompany their allies would have meant abandoning their leading role in the party at its most critical moment.¹¹³ The polarization of the province over the previous year, with escalating rhetoric, broader, and riskier, mobilization of allies, and, in several regions, periods of open armed conflict, must have made it difficult to stop the momentum towards greater armed action. Thus, despite their sober judgement suggesting the difficulty of prevailing, all eight of the praia deputies to the Chamber

¹¹¹ "AOS PERNAMBUCANOS," reprinted in Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 197-202, quote on p. 202. Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, "Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Melo," p. 22.

¹¹² Quoted in Nabuco, Estadista, p. 97.

¹¹³ Figueira de Melo put this in terms of vanity, that Nunes Machado did not want to lose the adulation of his followers, Crônica, 50-51.

agreed on the manifesto.¹¹⁴ Party leaders in Recife then set out to organize the praieiro forces throughout the province.¹¹⁵

The Conservative administration, meanwhile, was preparing for a lengthy struggle. Volunteer Battalions were formed, the largest headed by Sebastião do Rego Barros, a prominent guabiru and brother of the Baron of Boa Vista. While arrangements were made for men and material from the Court, on November 23 the entirety of the military troops previously stationed in Bahia arrived. The commander of arms of Bahia, Brigadier General José Joaquim Coelho, a decorated military leader who had served in the independence wars and in suppressing revolts in Pernambuco in 1824, Bahia in 1838, and various times in Rio Grande do Sul, accompanied the troops. Orders from the Court soon named him supreme commander of the forces suppressing the Praieira, as well as commander of arms. Instructions from Rio de Janeiro removed praia deputies Félix Peixoto de Brito e Melo and José Francisco de Arruda Câmara from posts as district judges and also replaced praia partisans on the list of vice-presidents for the province.¹¹⁶

A series of battles in the coastal forest region north of Recife demonstrated government superiority in open battle. The praieiros, however, as the pursued, made full use of surprise and mobility. They employed guerrilla tactics at times, concentrated their forces for surprise attacks on lightly-defended towns, or dug themselves into well protected positions for larger battles when it suited them.

¹¹⁴ On the difficulties facing the deputies trying to contain their praia allies, and on Nunes Machado's fatalism concerning the likely outcome of armed struggle, see Nabuco, Estadista, 97, 105.

¹¹⁵ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 53; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 161.

¹¹⁶ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 55-57.

A major battle at Maricota on November 30 was typical of the government forces' success in inflicting greater casualties than their opponents, only to see the praieiros escape worse damage by successfully retreating to regroup elsewhere. The praieiros massed troops in dug in positions the hilly, forested area along the principal road heading north from Recife, aiming for a surprise attack on government troops returning from Goiana. The plan was discovered, however, and 400 troops were sent from nearby Iguaçu to engage the praieiros. The government forces retreated at nightfall, claiming victory, having dislodged their enemy from their positions and inflicting greater casualties.¹¹⁷

On December 10, the supreme commander of the government forces, José Joaquim Coelho, personally directed a battle against praia forces gathered in the Catucá forest north of Recife. The praieiros used this area as a safe haven, gathering forces there, retreating there when defeated, taking advantage, as runaway slaves had long done, of the dense forest and its possibilities for hidden refuge and surprise attacks on the estates of nearby guabirus. Rumors of preparations for an attack on Recife, which spread such panic that some families fled to ships in the harbor for safety, may have prompted the general's decision to enter the forest. The praieiros saw their positions overrun, but had little difficulty escaping, particularly as the forces of João do Rego Barros did not arrive in time to cut off an escape route.¹¹⁸

The praieiros took advantage of Coelho's massing of troops in the Catucá forest to seize Goiana. On December 13, 800 men overpowered the few National Guardsmen left there after the gathering of government forces for the attack in the Catucá forest. While

¹¹⁷ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 64.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 61-62, 70-73.

only six National Guard were killed in the initial attack, the death toll tripled in the hectic retreat. The praieiros sacked the houses of their Conservative opponents and then abandoned the town the next day as Coelho's troops approached. They took advantage of the hilly, forest terrain twenty-one miles to the west, at the village of Cruangi, to dig into a strong defensive position. One thousand two hundred men settled in to await the government attack, which came on December 20. After eight and a half hours of combat, the defenders were forced to abandon their positions and escape under the cover of darkness; yet they had achieved a victory in an open, large-scale battle.¹¹⁹

The praieiros' use of the Catucá forest presented problems for the government. praia faithful in nearby parishes, both north of Recife, such as São Lourenço da Mata, and to the south, such as Muribeca and Jaboatão, funneled men, money, arms, ammunition and supplies to the rebels. The government strengthened its presence in Casa Forte, Monteiro, and Apipucos, villages just to the north of Recife. The precautions proved wise, as rebels attacked the Dois Irmãos estate in Apipucos, on November 30, losing three dead. praieiros were also active proselytizing for the cause in these villages, as well as parishes near the capital such as Affogados and Varzea. Figueira de Melo, discussing these efforts in the latter two villages in his 1850 account of the Praieira, noted the success of National Guard Captain Manuel Romão Corrêa, who "had achieved a certain ascendancy among the men of color."¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 74-75, on the taking of Goiana and 78-81 for the Cruangi battle, which includes, "ORDEM DO DIA," December 21, 1848, from José Joaquim Coelho.

¹²⁰ On the Apipucos attack, see "ORDEM DO DIA," Nov. 30, 1848, from Major Comandante João Guilherme de Bruce, reprinted Ibid., 62-63, and Figueira de Melo's comments on p. 62. On supplying the Catucá forces and recruiting support, see pp. 96-97, quote on p. 97.

In the forest zone south of the capital a similar situation prevailed. Office holders in Escada and Ipojuca used their National Guard and police posts to gather men, then resisted new appointees and refused to hand over their weapons and ammunition. Familiar enemies of the praia, prominent, wealthy figures such as João do Rego Barros, brother of the Baron of Boa Vista, and Pedro Cavalcanti Wanderley, were appointed to National Guard and police posts, and when combat drew them away for the area, the praiiro nemesis José Pedro Velloso da Silveira moved in as temporary commander of the forces there. At the Gaipió estate, praieiros attacked on November 30, only to withdraw when large government forces approached. José Pedro took the initiative on hearing of a rebel gathering at the Benfica estate, leading police and National Guard forces early in the morning of December 13 on a preemptive strike that seized arms, ammunition, and several prisoners. At three o'clock the next morning 150 praieiros attacked the São Francisco Convent where the prisoners were held, only to be held off by thirty six policemen for three hours, and finally abandoning the effort.¹²¹

In the far south of the province, in Una on the coast and Agua Preta inland, praia office holders successfully resisted new appointees. They occupied the town of Una, stealing and wrecking the houses of Conservative opponents. The forces they gathered reflected the makeup of the local population, including many caboclos from Barreiros, as well as men who had escaped defeat at the Cachoeira estate in Serinhaem. Confronted with the prospect of facing over 300 National Guardsmen and 43 military troops, they abandoned the area on November 27. The praieiros split into two forces, one that crossed the border into Alagoas and another that went west to Agua Preta. The latter joined up with the praia leaders Pedro Ivo and Caetano Alves, and were attacked by government

¹²¹ Ibid., 93-95.

forces on December 8 at the Camorim estate, losing twelve men, while inflicting five deaths on the government forces. The praieiros nonetheless enjoyed easy freedom of movement in the forests of the region, and sent out patrols that disrupted government communications with their southern headquarters in Rio Formoso. An unsuccessful attack on the night of December 22 and into the next morning at the Almecega estate again indicates the makeup of the troops the praia leaders employed in the south--200 Indians from Jacuípe and Agua Preta.¹²²

December proved to be decisive in determining the character of the conflict. In full-scale confrontation, momentum was towards greater radicalization. On December 25, Manuel Vieira Tosta, accompanied by 340 soldiers of an artillery battalion and another 40 cavalry soldiers, arrived to replace Herculano Ferreira Pena as President of Pernambuco. A prominent praia opponent when he served in the Assembly in Rio de Janeiro, President Tosta soon named Jerônimo Martiniano Figueira de Melo chief of police. Figueira de Melo, from Ceará but married into the prominent Paes de Andrade family in Pernambuco, had impeccable credentials as a hard-line praia opponent, having proved himself an acerbic critic of the praieiros as an editor of the Conservative newspapers Lidador and União.¹²³

The significance of these appointments was clear. President Pena's strategy of moderation, maintaining the normal state of legality, respecting the praieiro deputies' immunity from arrest, and allowing the opposition press to continue to publish, was being

¹²² Ibid., 88-93.

¹²³ Figueira de Melo is the author of Crônica da Rebelião Praieira, 1848 e 1849. Written in 1850, it is the fundamental account of the Praieira, one which interweaves the Chief of Police's narrative and commentary with extensive reprintings of documents, as well as providing many more documents in extensive appendixes.

abandoned. President Tosta would use the full force of his position, including suspending constitutional guarantees, to crush the rebel movement. In his own words, on the day of his appointment, "I will not vacillate before the use of the most energetic measures to extinguish the anarchistic movements, which have already caused so much harm."¹²⁴

President Tosta was true to his word. He quickly moved against the press. On Jan. 4, the Voz do Brasil was shut down and its editor, Ignácio Bento de Loyola, as well as its publisher, were jailed without legal formalities.¹²⁵ The principal praiêira organ, the Diário Novo, was repeatedly harassed, both the publishers' building and home repeatedly searched, and employees and distributors arrested. Ordered not to cover provincial affairs, the paper ran blank columns in the place of the stories it could not run. By February, it too had been shut down.¹²⁶

Police actions broadened in scope. Praia sympathizers had their houses searched for weapons. Arrests and recruitment for the military increased. Crucially, facing the prospect of an end to the immunity for praiêiro deputies, the political leadership, that had up to that point operated freely in Recife, had to flee the city or go into hiding.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ For the quote, see the proclamation, dated Dec. 25, 1848, by Manoel Vieira Tosta, reprinted in Figueira de Melo, Crônica 108-109; Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 75-76; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 165, 167; Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, "Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Melo," 22-23.

¹²⁵ "A PRISÃO DE IGNACIO BENTO DE LOYOLA," Diário de Pernambuco, Jan. 5, 1849, pp. 1-2.

¹²⁶ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 77-78. For the new Chief of Police's justification of actions against the liberal press, see Figueira da Melo, Crônica, 136-139.

¹²⁷ On the hard-line policies immediately implemented by the new president, see Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 135-140; Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 75-76; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 171-172.

The appointment of Manuel Vieira Tosta and the hard-line actions to crush the praieiro movement that he implemented forced the praia deputies not only to flee Recife for fear of imprisonment, but also to redefine their party's position. This they did in late December and early January in a proclamation issued by the praieiro deputies calling on people to take up arms and in three articles in the Diário Novo entitled "The Banner of the Liberal Movement."¹²⁸

The praieiro leaders mounted a three-fold attack on the status quo, implicating the Conservatives in each criticism. First, they denounced the lack of effective constitutional guarantees, demonstrated by the Conservatives' trampling of rights, especially through arbitrary imprisonments and paying professional assassins from public funds.¹²⁹ Second, they railed against the Portuguese's continued undermining of national sovereignty. Here they returned to a theme the praia press had been emphasizing since the beginning of the hostilities, depicting, with labels such as "luso-guabiru gang," the Conservatives as the allies of the Portuguese in a continuing assault on Brazilian sovereignty.¹³⁰ Third, the praieiros raised the traditional liberal banner of provincial rights, one that had been central to the Liberal revolts of 1842 in São Paulo and Minas Gerais. In doing so, they

¹²⁸ For the Proclamação dos Deputados, see Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 203-204 and Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 125-127. "The Banner of the Liberal Movement" ran in the Diário Novo on Dec. 30, 1848, Jan. 1 and 2, 1849. The articles are also available in Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 204-213. The author of the articles was Felipe Lopes Netto. See Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 77.

¹²⁹ See Proclamação dos Deputados, reprinted in Pessoa de Melo, pp. 203-204;

¹³⁰ The Diário Novo and the Guarda Nacional leveled these charges frequently in November and December of 1848. Typical is the accusation in "A ACTUALIDADE.," Diário Novo, Nov. 14, 1848, p. 2, that President Pena was using the army "to sustain the influence of family (ie., the Cavalcantis) and of foreigners." The Proclamação dos Deputados declared that President Manoel Vieira Tosta was "completely dedicated to the Portuguese cause." See the reprint in Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, p. 203.

rejected the achievement of the Conservative Reaction that had laid the basis for authoritarian, centralized rule. The praiheiros challenged the Conservatives' claim to be defenders of the monarchy, asserting that "The throne of Brazil can not remain unless it is surrounded by liberal institutions; absolutist concentration is the garrote of this monarchy."¹³¹ Denouncing the failure of the government in Rio to name a single Pernambucan to high position in the current provincial administration, the praiheiros asked "[D]oes the present state of affairs differ at all from the old colonial regime? Do we, Pernambucans, have the slightest role in governing this province?"¹³² The call for autonomy was also, in part, an appeal to provincial resentment of remitting taxes to the Court, arguing that locally collected revenues should be spent locally.¹³³

The praieiro statements constituted a call to arms. The leaders invoked the sovereignty of the nation and the right to rebel and declared that "since we can not avoid a conflagration in the province . . . we have to follow the impulse of the movement and give it appropriate direction."¹³⁴ The praieiro leaders also abandoned their earlier position of simple resistance to illegal acts by the Conservative administration in Recife

¹³¹ See the third of the "BANDEIRA DO MOVIMENTO LIBERAL" articles, reprinted in Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 211.

¹³² See the second of the three articles titled "A BANDEIRA DO MOVIMENTO LIBERAL," reprinted in Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, especially, pp. 208-209, see p. 209 for the quote.

¹³³ See the first of the three articles of "A BANDEIRA DO MOVIMENTO LIBERAL," 205, 207.

¹³⁴ On sovereignty and the right to rebel, see the first of the "BANDEIRA DO MOVIMENTO LIBERAL" articles, in Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 207; for the quote, see the second of these articles, p. 208.

and called for sweeping political reforms.¹³⁵ They called on the emperor to convoke a Constituent Assembly within six months to carry out the needed constitutional reforms. This was the only path to creating the truly liberal institutions needed to save the throne. Not even bothering to veil the threat, the praiheiros declared that failure to do so would lead to a dissolution of the Empire, though they insisted on the desire to maintain the monarchical form of government and the territorial integrity of the nation.¹³⁶

The expansion of goals to embrace more radical positions is not, of course, surprising in the midst of armed struggle.¹³⁷ Under physical threat radical tendencies can more easily come to the fore, overcoming moderate impulses, within individuals as well as among members of a group. More extreme positions had long coexisted alongside reformist ones, after all. The praieiro paper A Barca de São Pedro, for example, in July had declared that revolution was inevitable and that "We want a revolution . . . not a revolt, nor a tumult, nor a military sedition. . . . We want a complete reorganization of the country."¹³⁸ The radicalization can also be seen in part as an effort to mobilize people for the struggle. Yet there were risks in such an approach as well. The moderate praieiro

¹³⁵ For a statement on the earlier position, see Pessôa de Melo, Apreciação, 76.

¹³⁶ See the second and third articles of the "BANDEIRA DO MOVIMENTO LIBERAL" series. These articles, which purported to speak for the Liberal party across Brazil, also specified that the Constituent Assembly would be composed only of Brazilian-born citizens, with each province represented by the number of deputies and senators each currently sent to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate.

¹³⁷ Likewise, remember the initial embrace of armed resistance by Nunes Machado, shortly after he arrived in Recife with the explicit intention of averting armed action. Once blood had been spilt, it proved impossible for him to restrain his fellow party members.

¹³⁸ Chacon, História das Ideias Socialistas, 114, citing A Barca de São Pedro, July 11, 1848.

leadership faced the difficulty of mobilizing support for their movement, without losing control to the radicals.¹³⁹

The republican activist Antônio Borges da Fonseca had joined the fight in mid-November and, bolstered by his lengthy experience as a polemicist and agitator, quickly attained a leadership position in the praia's northern army. On January 1, 1849 the entire leadership of this northern army signed and issued a proclamation entitled "Manifesto To The World."¹⁴⁰ Written by Borges da Fonseca, it was clearly inspired by European liberalism, in particular, the Revolution of 1848 in France.¹⁴¹ After denouncing the September 29 ministry, the "conquest" of Pernambuco in support of the centralized political system, and the predominance of the Portuguese, the document called for a Constituent Assembly to achieve ten principles.

Universal suffrage

Liberty of the press

Work as a guarantee of life

Retail commerce restricted to Brazilians

Complete independence of the constituted powers

Elimination of the moderating power and the right to bestow titles

Federalism

¹³⁹ Joaquim Nabuco later commented on their dilemma, noting that "Each palm the jacobins conquered at the expense of conservative liberalism . . . produced a defection (to the Conservatives)." Nabuco, Estadista, 105.

¹⁴⁰ For the text, see União, Jan. 13, 1849, p. 2 or Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 116-118.

¹⁴¹ The document declares that the absolutist ministry of September 29, 1848 "decided to conquer the country, as a reaction to the progressive movements of Europe, that have annihilated tyrants, and achieved the promise of the All Powerful to depose the Kings from their thrones, and raise the people."

- Reform of the judiciary, to assure individual rights
- Elimination of the conventional interest law
- Elimination of the current system of military recruitment

The praia leadership promptly denounced the document as a forgery, spread by guabirus hoping to stigmatize the praieiros.¹⁴² References to progressive European movements deposing kings from their thrones, the need to eliminate the moderating power, and the right to work were far too radical for the moderate praieiro leadership to accept. The moderates themselves were indeed adopting positions more extreme than they had previously done, but they were not willing to allow a republican radical like Borges da Fonseca, whose formulations constituted a complete rejection of the imperial regime, to define the movement. The Conservative press, of course, pounced on the opportunity, and depicted Borges da Fonseca's participation in the struggle and the Manifesto To The World as evidence of the real, though previously disguised, republican agenda of the praieiros.¹⁴³

In the face of President Tosta's hard-line policies, five of the praieiro deputies left Recife by ship on December 31, disembarking the next day just across the border between Pernambuco and Alagoas, the neighboring province to the south. Here they met with an ally, the delegado José Luiz Beltrão Mavignier. One of the deputies, Félix Peixoto de Brito e Melo, had served as provincial president of Alagoas until May of

¹⁴² Diário Novo, Dec. 13, 1849.

¹⁴³ See "A reconciliação," União, Dec. 14, 1848, p. 2; "Os mulambos jogaráo a ultima carta," União, Jan. 9, 1849, p. 1; "A proclamação das forças liberaes constituintes," União, Jan. 18, pp. 1-2; "Antônio Borges da Fonseca actual chefe da praia," União, Jan. 25, 1849, pp. 1-2. On the deputies' goal of distancing themselves from Borges da Fonseca in order to maintain the legitimacy of the revolt, see Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 81-82.

1848, and with Mavignier's assistance they sought to recruit support for the movement. The president of Alagoas, however, dismissed Mavignier, ordered the prajeiro deputies arrested, sent troops to the area, had a ship patrol the coast to prevent the movement of arms, and sent the chief of police and several other high office holders to persuade people not to support the movement in Pernambuco. The president's decisive actions effectively dissuaded potential allies from extending support. The prajeiros thus proved no more successful here than in earlier efforts to secure support from Ceará and Paraíba, provinces to the north of Pernambuco.¹⁴⁴

Despite the inability to obtain assistance from outside the province, the prajeiros were not faring poorly in battle. The victory at Cruangi on December 20 had demonstrated a new-found willingness to engage the government in large-scale battles. Victory seemed to embolden them; attacks on Conservative estates to seize ammunition increased. In late December and early January praia forces acquitted themselves well in a series of battles in the south of the province, at Agua Preta and Ipojuca; farther inland, sixty-nine miles southwest of Recife, at Bezerros; in a canoe-born attack on the island of Itamaracá, north of Recife, and at the Utinga estate in Iguaçu.¹⁴⁵

In response to the hard-line policies of the new president that effectively interrupted communication between Recife and fighters elsewhere in the province, prajeiro leaders adopted a new strategy. Pedro Ivo Veloso de Silveira, a former army captain and a nephew of the Conservative planter and praia opponent José Pedro Velloso de Silveira, had established a significant armed force in the far south. Several of the praia deputies

¹⁴⁴ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 127-132, both the author's narrative and the documents reproduced; Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 84-85; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 169-170.

¹⁴⁵ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 112-115, 140-144, 149-153; Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 86-87.

who had been compelled to abandon efforts to gather support in Alagoas joined up with him at the Tentugal estate in the parish of Una. From this estate, four to five hundred fighters launched successful attacks on the town of Barreiros and the Camorim estate on January 10 and 12, reportedly killing over one hundred men in the first attack. Faced with the inability to direct operations from Recife, prajeiro leaders opted to concentrate their forces in the south of the province.¹⁴⁶

Between forces already in the region and additional ones that came down from the north, the prajeiros gathered between 1,600 and 2,000 men, the bulk of them in Agua Preta.¹⁴⁷ The effectiveness of these forces was weakened by chronic shortages of ammunition, as well as lack of discipline. While the Indian and caboclo fighters led by Pedro Ivo and Caetano Alves proved to be disciplined, the majority of the troops, mobilized by planters, were accustomed to obedience to their particular patrons and action in small-scale battles.¹⁴⁸

While these difficulties were not easily overcome, the prajeiro leaders did establish a formal leadership structure, composed of a Liberal directorate and three divisions, divided into brigades and battalions, to provide clear direction to the movement. Henceforth, conflict over tactical issues, such as whether to attack the numerous government forces in Rio Formoso in pursuit of a major victory, or attack the smaller forces in Bonito, was reduced, as decisions fell to those designated to make them.

¹⁴⁶ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 132-135, 144-146, 148-149.

¹⁴⁷ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 159, 168, estimates at least 1,600 men initially, and 2,000 by the time of preparations for the attack on Recife. General Coelho likewise estimates 2,000 men. See "COMMANDO DAS ARMAS. ORDEM DO DIA.," signed José Joaquim Coelho, União, Feb. 10, 1849, p. 1.

¹⁴⁸ Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 92-93.

Likewise with political issues, such as Borges da Fonseca's desire to establish a provisional government that would declare an independent state, in contrast to focussing strictly on military victory. Leaders of the various forces selected Félix Peixoto de Brito de Melo as the commanding general, as well as Antônio Affonso Ferreira, Manuel Pereira Moraes, and Antônio Borges da Fonseca as the other members of the Directory.¹⁴⁹

With praia forces concentrated in Agua Preta, General Joaquim José Coelho, commander of the government forces, perceived an opportunity to crush the praieiro forces. He gathered three thousand men and marched to Rio Formoso, in preparation for an attack on the enemy at Agua Preta planned for January 30. The Liberal Directory, however, having received word from praia deputy Felipe Lopes Neto that Recife was left only lightly defended after Coelho's departure, decided to attempt to seize the capital by surprise. Marching on January 26 for Recife, they escaped the trap being set by General Coelho. They avoided battle en route, rushing as fast as possible, arriving on the outskirts of the capital on the evening of February 1.¹⁵⁰

The geography of the capital facilitated its defense; sea and rivers divided the city into three districts, Boa Vista to the east, Santo Antônio in the middle, and the Bairro do Recife on the ocean, with bridges linking the three. Trenches and walls helped defenders control the bridges. The praieiros had only a few military officers among those leading

¹⁴⁹ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 161-166; on conflicts among the praia leadership, see Marson, Imperio do Progresso, 91, 93-94, and 481 for an organizational chart of the Liberal Army.

¹⁵⁰ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 159-160, 166-169; "COMMANDO DAS ARMAS. ORDEM DO DIA," signed José Joaquim Coelho, União, Feb. 10, 1849, p. 1; "O dia 2 de fevereiro," União, Feb. 8, 1849, p. 1; British Consul Cowper to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, Feb. 6, 1849, FO 13/269, N^o 11, fol. 83-88; Naro estimates the government forces at 3,000 men, see Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 173-174.

their troops. They did not possess artillery or cavalry. The success of the assault depended upon throwing superior numbers at the defenders in a surprise attack.¹⁵¹

At 5:00 AM on February 2, the praieiro forces began their assault. They split into three forces. Pedro Ivo Veloso da Silveira led a group of 800 men, along with Borges da Fonseca, Henrique Pereira Lucena, and Leandro César Paes Barreto, which attacked from the south, seized the suburb of Affogados, and then invaded Santo Antônio. For some time they controlled the bridge to Boa Vista from nearby houses, but by 10:30 AM were dislodged. They attacked the government palace, but could not seize it. Likewise, efforts to capture the Arsenal, and the arms and ammunition stocked there, failed. Throughout the day, the praieiros took advantage of the shelter offered by houses of supporters and the barricades they constructed. The praieiros inflicted heavy losses on the National Guard defending the Cinco Pontas fort, attacking from neighboring houses and dug in positions. General Coelho's arrival at 3:00 proved decisive; though tired from the long, forced march, the reinforcements he brought significantly increased the government forces, as well as bolstering morale. Praieiro losses were heavy, as escape proved difficult, with the government forces controlling the two bridges connecting Santo Antônio to Boa Vista and the Bairro do Recife. In the disorderly attempt to flee, many were shot or bayoneted; some drowned while trying to swim to safety; others were taken prisoner, while some managed to hide in the houses of supporters.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 87; British Consul Cowper to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, Feb. 6, 1849, FO 13/269, N° 11, fol. 83-88.

¹⁵² British Consul British Consul Cowper to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, Feb. 6, 1849, FO 13/269, N° 11, fol. 83-88, gives an overview; for a detailed general account, see "ATAQUE DA CAPITAL PELOS REBELDES. -- COMPLETO TRIUMPHO DA LEGALIDADE.," Diário de Pernambuco, Feb. 5, 1849, pp. 1-2; for detailed reports on events in particular areas, see "COMMANDO DAS

(continued...)

Manuel Pereira de Moraes' men approached the city from the north. Upon finding the Brun and Buraco forts heavily manned and ships ready to add their fire to the defense of the city, however, this force returned to Olinda. The largest force, directed by João Ignácio Ribeiro Roma to the west of the city, divided into two groups, one that Roma led to Olinda to join up with Moraes' troops, and another group of 500 men led by Joaquim Nunes Machado that attacked Boa Vista at Soledad.¹⁵³

The praiheiros attacking Boa Vista at 5:00 AM were initially blocked at the Olho do Boi bridge, but eventually passed, overrunning the military barracks at Soledad. Both sides made ample use of houses, firing from the safety offered by buildings. General Coelho gave instructions to use artillery to dislodge the rebels if necessary, but reinforcements from Nazareth, north of Recife, arrived at 11:00 and proved sufficient. The praiheiros suffered heavy losses, including their popular leader Joaquim Nunes Machado, who fell dead, struck by a bullet to his head while battling government troops retaking the Soledad barracks.¹⁵⁴

By nine o'clock PM the fighting in Recife was over. The praiheiros were in a hasty retreat, heading northwest out of the city, towards Nazareth. They had lost 200 dead;

(...continued)

ARMAS. ORDEM DO DIA," signed José Joaquim Coelho, União, Feb. 10, 1849, p. 1; "O dia 2 de fevereiro," União, Feb. 8, 1849; "CORPO DE VOLUNTARIOS," a report from the Lieutenant Colonel, Commander of the Corp of Volunteers to Superior Commander, Feb. 6, 1849, printed in União, Feb. 10, 1849, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵³ British Consul Cowper to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, Feb. 6, 1849, FO 13/269, N^o 11, fol. 83-88.

¹⁵⁴ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 179-181, 189; "COMMANDO DAS ARMAS. ORDEM DO DIA . . . 10 de fevereiro de 1849," signed José Joaquim Coelho, União, Feb. 15, 1849, p. 1; Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 85-86; British Consul Cowper to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, Feb. 6, 1849, FO 13/269, N^o 11, fol. 83-88.

another four hundred were captured, including various leaders.¹⁵⁵ One praia partisan maintained that the failure to take Boa Vista had been crucial; victory here, combined with the initial successes in Santo Antônio, might have led to a praieiro victory.¹⁵⁶ The larger issue, though, was the size of the forces each side could marshal. The bold move of an attack on Recife had depended on the element of surprise. With General Coelho preparing for battle in the south of the province, the capital had far fewer defenders than normally was the case. Praia victory depended on seizing this momentary advantage, and then taking advantage of the geography that favored the defense of the city. However, reinforcements arrived prior to the attack, including the arrival of upwards of 500 sailors and naval sharpshooters on February 1, unexpected even by the government. Crucially, General Coelho perceived the praieiros' plan in time to rush his troops back to the capital and enter the fray in the afternoon. The numerical superiority the praieiro leaders counted on dissipated; in fact, the defenders of the city ultimately outnumbered the attackers.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ "DISPERSÃO DOS REBELDES. -- BRADO ANIMADOR," Diário de Pernambuco, Feb. 13, 1849, p. 2; Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 182; Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 87.

¹⁵⁶ Pessoa de Mello, Apreciação, 85.

¹⁵⁷ For the plan to defend the city, see "DEFESA DA CAPITAL. Quartel do commando da praça na cidade do Recife, 31 de janeiro de 1849. Ordem reservada.," Diário de Pernambuco, Feb. 5, 1849, pp. 1-2. Estimates of the numbers involved vary, most sources put the number of defenders around 1,600 to 1,800, with a somewhat smaller number, though still well over 1,000 men, attacking the city. Only the British Consul differed markedly, reporting the figure of 2,500 attackers, see British Consul Cowper to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, Feb. 6, 1849, FO 13/269, N^o 11, fol. 83-88; see the document in the Diário de Pernambuco, Feb. 5, cited above, as well as "O dia 2 de fevereiro," União, pp. 1-2, Feb. 8, 1849; Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 170-174; Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 89-90; Marson lists defenders at 1,600 and praieiros at 1,200, but does not give the source of those figures, O Imperio do Progresso, 97.

The failed attempt to seize the provincial capital was the turning point of the struggle. The praieiros suffered large losses, both in deaths and prisoners seized. House to house searches of Recife in the days following the attack compounded the losses, as government forces arrested large numbers of praieiros, combatants and supporters, as well as shooting some of those they found. The authorities sent lower class prisoners to Rio de Janeiro for forced military service, banished others to the island of Fernando de Noronha, and housed others awaiting trial on ships in the harbor.¹⁵⁸ Though armed praieiros remained in the field, they never again posed a significant threat to the government.

General Coelho's decision to rest his troops, instead of immediately pursuing the Liberal forces, allowed the praieiros to regroup north of the capital. Some 600 to 800 men seized Goiana on February 11, acquiring 25,000 much-needed rounds of ammunition. Pursued by a government column, these forces suffered some losses at the Pau Amarelo estate, including the mortal wounding of the praieiro leader João Roma, and then headed north to the neighboring province of Paraíba. On February 18 an ally in Paraíba, County Judge Maximiliano Lopes Machado welcomed them, but his support could not prevent the pursuing government column from inflicting serious losses at Brejo da Areia.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 98-99 on assassinations and massacres by the government forces, particularly the Battalion of Volunteers. See p. 103 on wholesale arrests of suspected sympathizers and p. 109 on banishment of Fernando de Noronha. On the fate of the prisoners, and a list of significant praieiros captured, see Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 191-193.

¹⁵⁹ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 201-215; British Consul Cowper to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, Feb. 20, 1849, FO 13/269, N^o 15, fol. 99-100 and March 2, 1849, N^o 17, fol. 103-105; Edison Carneiro, A Insurreição Praieira (1848-49) (Rio de Janeiro: Conquista, 1960), 128-137.

After the setback in Paraíba, the praieiro forces then returned to the Catucá forest north of Recife. A plan was settled on to regroup with the remaining praia forces in the south of the province. Pedro Ivo and Caetano Alves, following the debacle of the attack on the capital, had led their largely Indian and caboclo troops back to the south of the province, easily capturing Agua Preta.¹⁶⁰

By this time, however, the inevitability of defeat was clear. Losses had been heavy and were mounting, chronic ammunition shortages were only getting worse, their newspapers had been shut down, and many leaders were dead or imprisoned. The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies in Rio was the final blow. With immunity for praia deputies ended, and without the deputies to argue for the legitimacy of the struggle, leaders began looking for ways out. Government offers of amnesty were now appealing. The troops faced no punishment, while more important figures, depending on the degree of their involvement, might obtain amnesty, or a safe pass to go into exile. The principal leaders, however, received no offers of protection.¹⁶¹

Félix Peixoto de Brito, the Commander in Chief of the Liberal Army, sailed a jangada to Alagoas, and, hearing of the Chamber's dissolution, boarded a ship for Portugal. Moraes and João Paulo Ferreira made their way to the United States and later to Portugal. Borges da Fonseca, when denied an amnesty, continued fighting, and was captured on March 31. By early April, most leaders of the forces remaining in the field were either planning flight to exile, where to hide if they chose to take their chances in

¹⁶⁰ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 214-215, 218-219; Carneiro, A Insurreição Praieira, 136-138; Marson, O Imperio do Progresso, 99-101.

¹⁶¹ Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 219-224; Marson, O Imperio do Progresso, 104-105; British Consul Cowper to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, March 24, 1849, FO 13/269, N^o 19, fol. 109-111; Edison Carneiro, A Insurreição Praieira, 140-141.

Brazil, or were negotiating the terms of their surrender. The most significant exception was Pedro Ivo Velloso de Silveira, who remained in the field, retreating to the forests in the south of the province. On April 10, President Tosta declared to the newly convened Provincial Assembly that the civil war had been won.¹⁶²

In August, nine men, Dr. Felipe Lopes Neto, Dr. Jerônimo Vilella de Castro Tavares, General José Ignacio de Abreu Lima, Antônio Correia Pessoa de Melo, Henrique Pereira de Lucena, Leandro Cesar Paes Barreto, Feliciano Joaquim dos Santos, Antônio Feitosa de Melo, and Antônio Borges da Fonseca, were brought to trial charged with the political crime of rebellion. Praieiro partisans were indignant at the proceeding. José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo presided over the hearings, while Jerônimo Martiniano Figueira de Melo served as a prosecuting attorney. Both men were prominent praia opponents. Both served as editors of partisan Conservative newspapers. Figueira de Melo, of course, was the chief of police brought in by President Tosta to implement hard-line policies in repressing the revolt. Likewise, the president of the jury was a Conservative partisan. Unsurprisingly, the nine defendants were found guilty as heads of a rebellion and condemned to life imprisonment at hard labor.¹⁶³

Despite President Tosta's declaration to the Provincial Assembly and the judgment against the nine praieiro leaders, the province was not entirely pacified. Moreover, the

¹⁶² Figueira de Melo, Crônica, 219, 227-231, 234-235, 241; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 180-182; Edison Carneiro, A Insurreição Praieira, 141.

¹⁶³ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 150-151, 168. See Nabuco, Estadista, 108-111 on Nabuco de Araújo as judge. Praieiros objected to various elements of the trial. See chapters 12 and 13 of Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação. None of the defendants actually served out their entire life sentences; all were amnestied a few years later. For the documents on the trial, see Autos do Inquerito da Revolução Praieira (Brasília: Senado Federal and Editora da Universidad de Brasília, 1979), edited by Jerônimo Martiniano Figueira de Melo.

president was alienating people with his hard-line tactics. In March he had instructed all estate owners within 120 kilometers of Água Preta to abandon their estates, as a means of eliminating support for Pedro Ivo's rebels. When Miguel Affonso Ferreira joined Pedro Ivo, the president ordered his crops burned, and slaves and sugar processing machinery seized and brought to Recife. The president warned that all political opponents in the area would be similarly treated, as even unarmed opponents provided valuable information to the rebels. Tosta had also offended foreign consuls, invading their residences in search of prajeiros, even bringing criminal charges against the British consul following a conflict over an arrested British officer. The opening of the Provincial Assembly also occasioned repudiation, as hostile groups of spectators in the galleries shouted down praia speakers and the police arrested prajeiro deputies.¹⁶⁴

The Conservative ministry in the Court sent Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão to replace President Tosta. One of the principal leaders of the Conservative party, the ministry could not have found a stronger figure than Honório. Yet he was not sent to crush the prajeiros: that had been Tosta's assignment. Honório was sent to promote a reconciliation in the province, as well as assure a legitimate victory in the elections scheduled for August. Arriving on July 2, he immediately took a series of steps to bind the wounds opened by the revolt. Prisoners held on ships were transferred to prisons on land; thirty-seven men banished to the island of Fernando de Noronha were freed;

¹⁶⁴ Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 182-184; Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 143-147; British Consul Cowper to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, May 29, 1849, FO 13/269, N^o 31, fol. 169-170.

various prisoners in Recife released. Military recruiting was temporarily ended.

Opposition journals were allowed to publish again.¹⁶⁵

The president's conciliatory approach faced two principal difficulties. One was the renewed fighting by the remaining praieira troops in the field. The other, which only worsened as fighting expanded, was the opposition of leading Pernambucan Conservatives to the moderate approach Honório was implementing. As early as the August elections, Conservatives demonstrated their resistance to the president's approach, when they disregarded his clear instructions to avoid the excesses of intimidation tactics and egregious abuse of public authority that so often characterized elections. Honório incensed Conservatives when he undermined their tactics in the war effort. President Tosta, for example, had made a valuable alliance with Vicente de Paula, the charismatic guerrilla leader sought by the authorities since the Guerra dos Cabanos of the 1830s. Vicente and his experienced fighters had contributed much to the war against the praieiros, yet the president arrested him when he showed up for a meeting to receive a payment promised by President Tosta. Likewise, the president grossly insulted Conservative leaders early in 1850 when government troops surrounded the residence of Francisco Rego Barros and attempted to seize Pedro Ivo during a secret meeting with leading Conservatives, in which the praieiro leader had agreed to leave the province and await amnesty.¹⁶⁶

Embroiled in conflicts with the president, Conservative planters did not throw their full support into the effort to finish the pacification of the province. In mid-October

¹⁶⁵ Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 175-180; Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 141.

¹⁶⁶ Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 192-194; Pessoa de Melo, Apreciação, 181-185; Carneiro, A Insurreição Praieira, 167-168.

of 1849, rumors surfaced of a praia attack from the Catucá forest on the lightly defended capital. In mid-December, praia forces were sighted within twenty-one kilometers of the capital, raising fears of an attack. Honório realized that without the full cooperation of local Conservatives, he could not assure the success of his mission. In a meeting with Conservative leaders Francisco Rego Barros, Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, and Sebastião Rego Barros, he assured them that he would cease his conciliatory policies and vigorously suppress the praiheiros. He promptly had a number of praia leaders arrested and banished to the island of Fernando de Noronha. In return, he secured the full cooperation of the Conservative planters in finishing the war effort. A final offensive was launched in March of 1850, following the completion of the sugar harvest, and the remaining praia forces put down their arms. The last of the great regional rebellions of the Empire was over.¹⁶⁷

By early 1848 politics in Pernambuco had become so polarized that Conservatives challenged the praia administration in open warfare. Even with support from the militant Alves Branco Liberal administration in the Court, the praiheiros faced considerable difficulties in maintaining order in the province. Nor could the moderate policies of the succeeding liberal administration of Vicente Pires da Mota restore calm by mollifying Conservative fears, displacing leading praiheiros without a complete inversion in favor of the Conservatives left political opponents battling for local power across the province. Threatened by ministerial changes and liberal equivocation, Nunes Machado boldly

¹⁶⁷ Naro, "Brazil's 1848," 193-194; Pedro Ivo secured a safe pass to leave Pernambuco, but was seized in Rio de Janeiro. Imprisoned and tried in a military court, his sentence to hang was commuted to life in prison. Liberal leaders in the Court conspired to smuggle him out of prison and onto a ship bound for Europe. He died en route. See Carneiro, A Insurreição Praieira, 165-166.

brought the politics of lusophobia to the streets of the Court. He thus attempted to strengthen provincial radicalism by radicalizing national politics. In so doing, he inadvertently produced a reaction--he helped usher in a ministry headed by a Pernambucan Conservative who did not hesitate to place the administration of Pernambuco in the hands of his Conservative allies.

The threat posed by this dramatic reversal was so clear that Liberals rebelled when faced with this prospect of Conservatives controlling government resources through office holding across the province. In the course of armed struggle, ideological differences came to the fore. Moderate praiheiros called for sweeping reforms to decentralize the nation's political system and limit Portuguese political and economic penetration of Brazil. Radicals went farther, challenging the very monarchy. Provincial Conservatives, however, emerged victorious. The centralized institutions they had helped construct in the Regresso now provided them with valuable military resources too great for provincial Liberal challengers to overcome. The value of the reactionary institutions of the monarchy were patent.

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CONCLUSION

Following Dom Pedro I's abdication in 1831, many politically-active Brazilians rejected central rule from Rio de Janeiro, rule associated with colonial subjugation. Liberal reforms were implemented that restructured political authority. Federalism, the liberal notion that prominent men, intimately familiar with local conditions and interested in stability, could better exercise authority than agents of the central government, informed changes in judicial institutions and the distribution of power from the national executive branch to provincial legislative bodies.

The Regency (1831-1840), however, was marked by politically diverse revolts and wide-spread criminality. In Pernambuco, news of the abdication set off radical anti-Portuguese riots; liberal soldiers and law students gathered to petition for the dismissal of Portuguese absolutists and their Brazilian-born allies from government posts. In September of 1831, military recruits revolted, overrunning Recife in three days of looting and mayhem. Poor, forcibly-recruited, and ill-paid soldiers erupted with shouts against the Portuguese and strict military discipline. With long-standing fears of social upheaval being realized, elites of all political factions united to restore order. In November, radical liberal military officers and propertied citizens revolted to press demands for the dismissal of Portuguese-born and Brazilian restorationists from official posts and deportation of most of the Portuguese. Unlike the September revolt in which poorer Pernambucans figured and which resulted in hundreds of deaths, there were no fatalities

in November, as militia members and civilian volunteers refused to fire on the more socially prominent rebels who had occupied the Cinco Pontas fort. The government simply waited them out. In April of 1832, Portuguese-born and Brazilian restorationists, comprised of military officers, shopkeepers, clerks, artisans, and planters, revolted, hoping to facilitate the return of a Portuguese monarch. When the urban revolt was quickly crushed with much loss of life, the leaders commenced a rural rebellion. Yet they were unable to control what they had begun, and when they abandoned the battle later in 1832, the rural poor they had mobilized continued the struggle on their own terms. The government, weakened by lack of supplies, conflict among its supporters and the inability to control the excesses and desertions of its soldiers, required three years to prevail in the struggle.

During the regency, the absence of a reigning monarch, the traditional symbol of legitimacy, authority and unity, made the resort to force a far easier step to contemplate. Moreover, the advantages of such a decision was clearer. Decentralization of political authority had raised the stakes of local and provincial political competition, further fueling conflict. Combined with the state's limited effectiveness in employing the means of coercion, this all made for a fluid period in which political institutions were open to challenge and the ability to marshal armed force was crucial.

Provincial circumstances also favored such violence. Most of Pernambuco resembled a frontier zone, with slow communications, limited government presence, only minimally effective police and National Guard and few soldiers. Such conditions not only presented obstacles to suppressing political strife, but also to controlling crime. Wide-spread criminality heightened dissatisfaction with liberal reforms. Expectations for a more efficient judicial system were not realized. The broad powers of elected justices

Regency - force
as opinion

of the peace undermined the police. Many of the elected judges (positions for which formal legal training was not required) demonstrated incompetence. The institution of citizen juries also presented problems to convicting the guilty, as jurors, fearing retribution, were easily intimidated by the accused.

Conservatives successfully blamed the Regency's political upheavals and widespread criminality on liberal reforms. Foreign-inspired liberal innovations were repeatedly attacked as inappropriate to a "new" society riven by profound divisions of class, race, and slavery. Brazil was depicted as in an early state of "civilization," in which the masses were unprepared for modern European and North American institutions. This Conservative analysis triumphed with the Regresso (1836-1841), which reconstructed authoritarian, centralized institutions presided over by a powerful and prestigious emperor. The political system first outlined in the 1824 Constitution, but subsequently challenged during the early, liberal years of the Regency, was thus recovered and strengthened. In the 1840s, the implications of that system were worked out.

In Pernambuco, the local triumph of Conservatives was embodied by Provincial President Francisco do Rego Barros, who maintained the peace and carried out significant public-works projects to improve the provincial economic infra-structure and beautify the capital with European-inspired reforms and construction. Yet the liberal political opponents of the powerful Rego Barros and Cavalcanti families and their allies rejected the reforms as wasteful. These critics argued that scarce resources ought to be put to better use, helping to assure public order, for example. They frequently attacked the provincial administration, charging it with immoral conduct and abuse of authority which actually undermined public order.

Order was a central theme for most of the participants in the political discourse of the period. Indeed, there was constant tension between public discourse, which emphasized the new consensus on the overriding need for order, and political practice, which routinely threatened disorder. In Pernambuco, the dynamics of local and provincial party competition, and their tight links to politics in the Court, led to dramatic polarization in the province. During the liberal administrations in Rio of the middle 1840s, the Conservative regime of Rego Barros ended in Pernambuco and a succession of Liberals were appointed. Some, praieiros, used police authority in a blatantly partisan manner to attack the very estates of their Conservative rivals, rationalizing their actions in terms of the need to impose public authority on the "feudal" redoubts of private power in the countryside. Conservatives responded with armed resistance to praieiro authorities, insisting that strictly personal and partisan motives impelled praieiro abuses of public positions. Pernambucan Conservatives found crucial allies in Senate Conservatives in Rio de Janeiro, who were willing to defy the emperor in an unprecedented manner, rejecting his selection of praieiros to the Senate on the basis of electoral fraud. Praieiro hopes of using the political structure built by Conservatives after 1836 failed against such provincial and national Conservative resistance. The frustrations and conflicts over this use of legitimate public power measured a shift in strategy by both parties.

In such a polarized atmosphere, politicians appealed to the lower classes for support. Conservatives introduced electoral meetings as a means to rally backers. Praieiros, in turn, raised the stakes, using the new electoral technique to make lusophobic appeals to the middle and lower classes. Praieiros mined the deep resentment of continued Portuguese social and economic presence in Brazil, linking the Portuguese to

the Conservatives and proposing a nationalist development strategy that would limit Portuguese economic penetration of the country. In contrast to much of the historiography, which plays down the importance of any programmatic or ideological differences among the political parties or the composition of their supporters, praiheiro willingness to undertake popular mobilization through nationalist appeals to lusophobia, and risk popular violence, demonstrates clear differences from the Conservatives.

After the Regresso counter reforms, the direct constitutional connections between the national administration and local appointments necessarily implied a direct connection between the "high politics" of the Court and local and provincial politics. Changes in the center of the political system had far-reaching ramifications across Brazil. It was one such change in the Court, the coming to power of the Conservative cabinet of September 29, 1848, that led to the Praieira Revolution of 1848.

The Praieira Revolution brought to even clearer definition the ideological differences in the province. Moderate praiheiros went so far as to call for a Constituent Assembly to carry out fundamental reforms of national political institutions, a clear reversion to the liberalism of 1831-1834. The traditional national Liberal banner of decentralization was accompanied by nationalist cries to limit the political influence of the Portuguese. Praieiros challenged the universal applicability of liberal economic principles, insisting on the need to scale back Portuguese economic penetration of the province. Radicals went even further, challenging the monarchy itself.

Pernambucan Conservatives prevailed, backed by a strong central government. It was a victory of historic irony. In 1817, many of these same men, or their fathers, had fought for regional independence; in the early 1830s, some of them still flirted with the idea of secession. The upheavals of the Regency, however, had gone far to convince

revolt
1831-34

such men of the need to yield some local independence and hegemony to a strongly centralized, authoritarian national government, in the interest of reinforcing and assuring local social stability. In 1848, Pernambucan Conservatives reaped the benefits of centralized rule, as their access to troops and legitimacy from Rio shored up their administration against the prajeiros, provincial rebels who could not muster sufficient resources to defeat the armed forces of the Empire.

The Praieira Revolution was the monarchy's last great regional revolt. It demonstrated that the political system constructed by Conservatives in the Regresso had been consolidated to such a point that revolt against it was clearly futile. With the system secure, the ideological battles over the role and nature of the state began to loosen their grip on men's minds.

Two of the protagonists of Pernambuco's drama of the 1840s would demonstrate the beginnings of that process in the "Conciliation Ministry" of the mid 1850s. Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, an imposing Conservative leader in the party's founding generation, who had served as Pernambuco's provincial president during the pacification of the province in 1849 and 1850, headed the ministry. José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, the Conservative polemicist active in Pernambuco who, as a judge, had presided over the trial of the prajeiro leaders following the revolt, served in the key post of Minister of Justice. The term "conciliation" referred to the reconciliation between Liberals and Conservatives under the monarch. Honório, following the emperor's wishes, presided over a ministry that included both Liberals and Conservatives and explicitly sought to set aside partisan party differences to benefit the Empire as a whole. An era had passed.

conciliation

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
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
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Born in 1959, Jeffrey Mosher grew up near Philadelphia. He graduated from Lower Merion Sr. High School in 1977 and earned a B.A. in Philosophy from Emory University in 1980. After working as a language instructor in Spain and Saudi Arabia, he earned an M.A. in Latin American Studies at Georgetown University in 1987. After working briefly in Brazil as a language instructor, he began working on the Ph.D. at the University of Florida in 1989, under the direction of Dr. Jeffrey Needell. Mr. Mosher is married to Dina Mosher. They have been blessed with two children, Talia Rose and Miriam.


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David Bushnell
Professor Emeritus of History


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